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4Thesis Abstract
For the most part, philosophical discussion of the senses has been concerned with
what distinguishes them from one another, following Grice’s treatment of this issue
in his ‘Remarks on the senses’ (1962). But this is one of two questions which Grice
raises in this influential paper. The other, the question of what distinguishes senses
from faculties that are not senses, is the question I address in this thesis. Though
there are good reasons to think that the awareness we have of our bodies is
perceptual, we do not usually think of bodily awareness as a sense. So in particular, I
try to give an account of what it is that is distinctive about the five familiar
modalities that they do not share with bodily awareness.
I argue that what is distinctive about vision, touch, hearing, taste and smell, is that
perception in all these modalities has enabling and disabling conditions of a certain
kind. These enabling and disabling conditions are manifest in the conscious
character of experience in these modalities, and exploited in active perceptual
attention— in looking, listening, and so on. Bodily awareness has no such enabling
conditions. The five familiar senses having this distinctive feature, and bodily
awareness lacking it is not a merely incidental difference between them.
Nevertheless, I do not claim that having these enabling conditions is necessary and
sufficient for counting some faculty as a sense, or, correlatively, for something being
an instance of sense-perception. Rather, we can see why it would serve certain
(contingent) human interests for us to think of the faculties that involve these
enabling conditions as instances of a single kind of thing, of which bodily awareness
is not an instance.
5Chapter 1: Introduction
For the most part, philosophical discussion of the senses has been concerned with
what distinguishes them from one another, following Grice’s treatment of this issue
in his ‘Remarks on the senses’ (1962). But this is one of two questions which Grice
raises in this influential paper. The other, the question of what distinguishes the
senses from faculties that are not senses, is the question with which I will be
concerned in this thesis. Here, I introduce the question, and summarise the answer I
will give to it.
1. Internal and external boundaries
Grice begins his ‘Remarks on the senses’ with the question of how we might meet
the claim ‘that certain creatures possess a faculty which should be counted a sense,
different from any of those with which we are familiar’ (Grice 1962: 248). At the
outset, he points out that there are two ways we might meet this claim. Firstly, we
might deny that the faculty was a new sense, because although it was indeed a sense,
it was ‘only one of the familiar ones, operating, perhaps, in some unfamiliar way’
(ibid.). We might say that the alien faculty was after all one of seeing, or tasting, for
example. Secondly, we might deny that the faculty was a new sense, because it was
not a sense at all. For example, we might say that the faculty was one of memory or
even of divination.
Grice devotes most of his remarks to discussion of the first of these reasons for
denying that an alien faculty is a new sense. And of course, though he introduces the
topic via this question about alien faculties, we can take it that his interest was not so
6much in alien faculties as in our own un-exotic senses. If we are to argue that some
faculty is one of these, such as vision or taste, it might seem that we need a general
account of what distinguishes our senses from one another.1 It is with this question
of how the senses are distinguished from one another that Grice is largely concerned
in his remarks, as is much of the still relatively small philosophical literature on the
senses that has followed-on from Grice’s seminal paper on the topic.
Grice’s own —somewhat tentative— answer to this question is that appeal to the
conscious character of experience is ineliminable from any account of how the
senses are distinguished from one another.2 In order to characterize the conscious
character of perceptual experience in any modality, on Grice’s view, we need to
appeal not only to its apparent objects but also to a ‘generic resemblance’ signalled,
in the case of vision, by the word ‘look’. ‘Looking’ on this view, denotes a
distinctively visual way of appearing, independent of what the objects and properties
we see, or seem to see, are. This way of appearing, Grice says, can be ‘noticed and
labelled but perhaps not further described’ (Grice 1962: 267). Similarly, there is on
Grice’s view a generic and characteristic kind of ‘appearing’ involved in auditory
experience, and in tactile experience, and so on for each of the senses. It is reference
1 It’s not obvious that this is what’s required in order to meet the claim that the alien faculty is a new
sense in this first way. Rather than try to find a single way in which all the senses differ from one
another (say, in terms of features perceived by means of them, or the conscious character of
experiences they yield) one might take a more piecemeal approach. So, for example, we might try to
give the conditions under which a modality counts as vision, and a distinct set of conditions under
which a sense is that of hearing, and so on.
2 See also A.D. Smith 1990: 239 and E.J. Lowe 1992: 80. Austen Clark (1993) can be seen as
attempting to ‘naturalize’ the introspectible character criterion- thus Bermudez (1999) writes that
psychophysics is the attempt to ‘capture scientifically’ different categories of conscious state. See the
same paper for some criticisms of this approach.
7to this kind of ‘appearing’ that is ineliminable, Grice argues, from an account of how
the senses differ from one another.
Another commonly argued-for individuation criterion is provided by features we
become aware of by means of the different senses. We see colours, hear sounds,
taste flavours, and so on.3 These properties that are perceived each in one modality
only, we can call ‘special sensibles’. Proponents of the ‘features’ criterion argue that
we can distinguish the senses in terms of their special sensibles. On this view, two
perceivings count as perceivings in the same modality if both are perceivings of the
same special sensible. Thirdly, some have appealed to types of physical stimuli as
distinguishing one sense from another.4 And fourthly, some have argued that the
senses are distinguished in terms of the sense-organs involved in their functioning.5
These four are the most commonly proposed individuation criteria, and are all to be
found in Grice’s discussion of the question of how the senses are distinguished from
one another. In the chapters that follow this one, I aim to remain as neutral as
possible as to how this question should be answered, whilst addressing a different
question about the senses. Though I will discuss sense-perception under the five
headings of vision, touch, hearing, taste and smell, I do not assume, at the outset, the
3 Proponents of this view (or variants of it) include: Aristotle (De Anima) Colin McGinn (1991: 35),
Dretske (1995: 94-5), Ross (2001) and Roxbee Cox (1970). For criticism see for example Nelkin
(1990) and Nudds (2003).
4 This is one of Keeley’s individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. He suggests that in
providing ‘an ontology of forms of energy’ (2002: 13) physics creates for us a space of possible sense
modalities. Gray (2005) objects to this use of the stimulus criterion.
5 On this approach, ‘sense-organs’ can be understood to be those parts of the body we usually take to
be sense-organs, or, as on Keeley’s account, might include physiological and psychological processes
and mechanisms more generally. See Roxbee Cox 1970 for the claim that in order to determine
which parts of the body are sense-organs, we have to already have answered the question of how the
senses are distinguished. And for further critique of the sense-organ criterion, see Nudds 2003.
8truth of any account of how the five familiar modalities are distinguished from one
another. We will see, in section 4 of this chapter, that one might, in any case, be
sceptical about whether the distinction between the senses is in any case, a non-
conventional one. I want also to remain neutral as to whether this scepticism is
justified. I include this brief discussion of the answers that have been given to the
question of how the senses are distinguished from one another partly so as to
indicate the range of positions with regards to which I want to be, as far as possible,
neutral. Furthermore, since most philosophical discussion of the senses has been
concerned with this question it is therefore worth having in mind, at the outset of a
philosophical thesis the topic of which is the senses, some of the answers that have
been given to it.
Christopher Peacocke remarks, in a different context, that ‘a territory may have
boundaries of two kinds, external boundaries which delineate it, and internal
boundaries which subdivide it’ (Peacocke 1983: 55). Our territory and Grice’s is that
of the senses. And the question of how the senses are distinguished from one another
is a question about the internal boundaries of this territory; it asks how the territory
is subdivided— what determines its internal boundaries. I have mentioned in this
section some of the ways in which it has been argued that these boundaries are
determined. But there is also an external boundary question to be asked with regards
to this territory. This question asks how senses are distinguished not from one
another, but from other faculties that are not senses— what is distinctive about
senses, in comparison to these other faculties. It is this external boundary question
9that one might expect to have to answer if one is to deny that an alien faculty is a
new sense in the second way pointed out by Grice, and alluded to in the first
paragraph of this section. And it is with this external boundary question, or at least,
with some version of it, that I shall be concerned in this thesis. In particular, I will be
concerned with how the senses differ from bodily awareness, which we do not
usually count as a sense.
2. Bodily awareness and the senses
It might be thought obvious that the boundary between faculties that are senses, and
faculties that are not, coincides with that between faculties of perception, and non-
perceptual faculties. Grice seems to have been of this opinion; at least, the
circumstances that he identifies as those in which we would deny that some faculty
was a sense are all those in which we would deny that it was a faculty of perception.
We will have more to say about what these circumstances are shortly. Vision, touch,
hearing, taste and smell are perceptual faculties. But on some views, the awareness
we have of our bodies in proprioception, kinaesthesia, and when we have bodily
sensations, is also perceptual. It is an interesting feature of the way in which we
usually distinguish between senses and other faculties that we do not count bodily
awareness amongst the former. In this section I want to argue that it is not obvious
that if we accept a perceptual model of bodily awareness we are thereby forced to
accept that bodily awareness is a sense. And this raises the possibility that the
question of what is distinctive about the senses is not just that they are perceptual
faculties, as Grice seemed to think.
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One circumstance in which Grice argues that we would deny that some faculty was a
faculty of perception is that in which we have reason to think that the faculty in
question is a faculty for having sensations. It might be held that the faculty did not
deserve to be counted a sense, Grice suggests, because its functioning,
…consisted in having some sort of experience generated by material things
or events…by way of some effect on [the] nervous system, though it did not
qualify as perceiving the things and events in question. (Grice 1962: 248)
When would we think of a faculty in this way? By way of illustration, Grice
discusses the example of pain. Our experiences of pain are often experiences
generated by the impact of objects and events on us. Nevertheless, such experiences
do not count as experiences of those impacting objects and events. The pain caused
by my touching the hot stove is not an experience as of the stove. I don’t attribute
painfulness to the stove, or as Grice puts it, I don’t ‘externalize’ my pain. Does it
follow from this that bodily awareness, such as pain, is not a form of perceptual
awareness?
To start with, consider AD Smith’s (2002) account of the phenomenal difference
between, as he puts it, ‘mere’ sensation, and perceptual consciousness. On his view,
when one has a perceptual experience, it seems to one as if the objects of that
experience are distinct from one’s experience of them. Such experiences are, we
might say, phenomenally objective. An example of the kind of thing Smith has in
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mind when using the term, ‘mere sensation’ is the ‘inner light show’ we experience
when we have after-images, or press on our eyeballs through closed lids. On Smith’s
view, sensations such as these differ phenomenally from perceptual experiences in
that our sensations do not seem to present to us anything the existence (or
occurrence) of which is distinct from our perceiving it. When we experience
something like the inner light show, it doesn’t seem to us as if we are aware of
something which would continue to exist unperceived.6 To be clear, this suggestion
about the difference between mere sensation and perception is supposed to be
entirely phenomenological. The claim is not that the objects of experience that
seems this way are always independent of one’s experience, or that one can reliably
tell that they are. It is rather a matter of how such experience characteristically
seems— it seems to be as of things that persist when they’re not being perceived.
The experiences of the proverbial brain in a vat, Smith suggests, could also have this
kind of ‘perceptual’ phenomenal character. So on this view, perceptual awareness is,
and mere sensation is not phenomenally objective.
Some philosophers have argued that bodily awareness, including bodily sensation,
should be considered a form of perceptual awareness. I do not intend to provide an
argument for this perceptual model of bodily awareness here. We will discuss it in
more detail in the following chapters. But the thought that in bodily awareness, one
perceives one’s body is an intuitive one. When one, for example, sees or touches an
object, one’s experience is ‘directed onto’ things in the physical world that persist
6 This isn’t uncontroversial. It might be thought that to the extent that the experience we have when
we have after-images is spatial, it does seem to be directed onto something that persists unsensed,
namely, the apparent location of the coloured lights one seems to see.
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whether or not they are perceived, and on Smith’s view, that also seem to persist
unperceived. And intuitively, this is true also of bodily awareness, including bodily
sensations such as those of pain. Bodily awareness too, is phenomenally objective.
Whilst, as Grice pointed out, we don’t attribute pains to the objects that pain us, we
nevertheless do attribute them to some mind-independent object, namely, our bodies.
As Martin puts it:
When you feel an ache in your left ankle, it is your ankle that feels a certain
way, that aches. Now ankles are no less components of the physical world
than are rocks, lions, tables, and chairs. So at least to first appearance, bodily
sensation is no less concerned with aspects of the physical world —in this
case one's body— than are the experiences associated with the traditional
five senses (Martin 1998a: 268).
On the view that bodily sensations are perceptual, one takes such sensations to be as
they first appear. That is, on such a view, when one has a pain in one’s foot, or pins
and needles in one’s hand, one is thereby aware of parts of some object, namely
one’s body. That’s not to say that the features of one’s body one experiences (its
hurting, itching, warmth) are in all cases features that persist, or even seem to
persist, unperceived. On some perceptual views, some of the qualities of which one
is aware in undergoing bodily sensations are mind-dependent.7 But all who take
bodily sensation to be perceptual agree that all bodily sensation is concerned with or
7 We shall discuss some differences amongst bodily sensations, and touch upon some of the
differences there are amongst perceptual views of bodily sensation in Chapters 4 and 7.
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directed onto one’s body. This stands in contrast to a subjectivist view of bodily
sensation, on which the experience of pain in my foot or of pins and needles in my
hand is one that has, and perhaps also seems to have no object distinct from itself.
On such a view, bodily sensations of pain, warmth, and so on, are ‘mere’ sensations,
in Smith’s sense of this term.
And one may hold the view that not just bodily sensation, but also bodily awareness
more generally, including also proprioception and kinaesthesia, is perceptual. When
I feel the relative location of my outstretched hands, or the movement of my fingers
I thereby have an experience as of an object in the physical world, namely my body,
that can persist unsensed. This is to be contrasted with the view that awareness of
one’s posture and movement has no ‘experiential’ element at all (see Anscombe
1981; Hamilton 2005). The awareness we have of our bodies, on this latter view, is a
kind of knowledge without observation. We just know, without having any
characteristic kind of experience that tells us so, whether, for example, our legs are
crossed, or we are upside down. This kind of view goes along with the
Wittgensteinian thought that our experiences of our body are never of it as object but
rather, and exclusively, of it as subject.8
Now the point here isn’t really to argue that a perceptual model of bodily awareness
is correct, though I will assume, for the most part, that it is. Instead the point is that
the perceptual model (even if it turns out to be wrong) is quite intuitive— after all, it
8 The view that our bodies seem to us, in all kinds of bodily awareness, to be objects in a mind-
independent world, might be consistent with the claim that they also seem, in some respect, to be the
subjects of experience. But I will have no more to say about that here.
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takes bodily experience to be as it first appears to us. But nevertheless, as a matter of
fact, we don’t usually count bodily awareness as a sense. This suggests that even if
we accept that bodily awareness is perceptual, this is not sufficient for us to count it
as a sense. It might conceivably be both a perceptual faculty, and also not a sense.
And given this, the question arises of just what it is that is distinctive about the five
familiar senses that they do not also share with bodily awareness. It’s my aim in this
thesis to say what this distinctive feature is. And, as I point out in the next section, it
is far from obvious what this feature might be.
3. Phenomenology and sense-organs
In this section I want to show that whilst we have certain expectations about what
should turn out to be distinctive about the senses, it is far from obvious how or even
if these expectations are to be fulfilled, particularly given that, as discussed in the
previous section, we do not usually include bodily awareness amongst the senses.
This, I hope, encourages one to think that there is a philosophical question here to
which it is reasonable to seek an answer. At the end of this section (3.3) I summarise
the answer I will give, in chapters 2–7, to this question. The first expectation we
might have, which I will discuss in 3.1, is that what is distinctive about the senses
will have something to do with the conscious character of sense-perception. The
second, is that it will involve there being sense-organs involved in perceiving in the
five familiar modalities (3.2). The account I will give in this thesis will fulfil these
expectations.
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3.1 Phenomenal character
We might expect that what turns out to be distinctive about the senses will have
something to do with the phenomenal character of sense-perceptual experience,
because of certain intuitions one might have about what makes something an
instance of sense-perception. Firstly, it is intuitive that sense-perception is
informative about the world. It’s not of course that sense-perception is the only way
we can find out about the world. I can perceive the tree outside my window with my
senses, and I can also think about it, remember it, imagine it, or hear about it from
others. All these other non-perceptual ways of being in some respect ‘in contact’
with the tree can, like perceiving it, be ways of finding out about it. And so the
human faculties of thought, memory, imagination, learning from testimony and
sense-perception can all be thought of as faculties we can use to find out about
things in the world (which is not to say that there aren’t or couldn’t be any other
such faculties too).
A second intuition that we have about sense-perception is that unlike these other
faculties, it informs its possessor, as Grice suggests, ‘only about conditions of the
world spatially and temporally present to the creature’ (1962: 148). If a faculty
informed its possessor about conditions of the world other than these, we would
deny, Grice suggests, that the faculty was a sense. Now, in some cases we see things
not as they currently are, but as they were some, or even a very long time ago.
Things as they are presently given does not always correspond to things as they
actually presently are. For example, we take ourselves to see the stars, yet since they
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are so far away, and it therefore takes some considerable time for light from them to
reach us, we see them now as they were years previously. But we do not take from
this that star-seeing is not an instance of sense-perception. So the point isn’t that a
sense can only be capable of informing us about how the world actually is at the
time one perceives it. But it certainly seems right that sense-perception is
nevertheless constrained by the state of, and the doings of its objects in a way that,
for example, thought and imagination are not. If I look at a star for 30 seconds, and
see it as it was for thirty seconds, say, 4.3 years ago to the day, then if, for example,
it grew and then changed colour during that long-gone thirty seconds, then my
seeing it now will be immediately responsive to those changes over the thirty
seconds in which I see it.9 My thinking about it or imagining it, for example,
exhibits no such sensitivity. During the same thirty seconds I can think about it
disappearing or exploding, or imagine it to have shrunk, or even to have turned into
something else all together. This condition also, as Grice writes, distinguishes sense-
perceptual faculties from only ‘dubiously informative’ faculties such as that which
we might call a moral sense, or a sense of humour. If these faculties tell us about
anything in the world, they are not sensitive to the way those things are in the way
that perception is.
A third intuition that we might have is that if something is to be an instance of sense-
perception it must inform its subject about how things are in his environment, as it
currently is, because of the way his experience seems to him. Intuitively, the
9 4.3 years is how long it takes for light to reach us from the star that is next-nearest (after the sun) to
earth, Proxima Centauri.
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knowledge of the world acquired by means of anything that is to count as sense-
perception must be at least partly causally explained by the conscious character of
the experiences we have, in virtue of having these faculties. I know that there is an
orange on my desk, because I can see it, which is at least partly to say that I have a
visual sense-perceptual experience ‘as of’ the orange. We would not count as sense-
perceptual a faculty by means of which one just finds oneself saddled with
knowledge about the world without a corresponding experience on the conscious
character of which that knowledge is in some way ‘based’. So, for example, when I
see the orange on my desk, and so know that it is there, I have a characteristic visual
experience the sensory aspects of which are the basis for my knowledge that the
orange is there. Whereas I would count perhaps as ‘divining’ the presence of the
orange on the table, if I just know it was there without having an experience the
conscious character of which is in any respect the basis of this knowledge.10
There is much more that might be said about each of these intuitions than is required
for our purposes here. My point, in this section, is that having these intuitions, we
might expect that there will be something phenomenologically distinctive about
sense-perception. Sense-perception informing us about the world spatially and
temporally present to us, and our being thus informed being causally explained by
the phenomenal character of sense-perceptual experience, we might expect there to
be some aspect of the conscious character of sense-perceptual experience, that is
10 If one accepts that perceptual faculties must yield conscious sensory experience then one thereby
rules out the possibility of modalities the functioning of which is wholly below the level of conscious
awareness. Thus, the vomeronasal faculty posited by Keeley (2002) would not count as a sense- we
may be able to detect hormone’s, and we might even allow that we gain some knowledge by our
doing so, but we do not have conscious sensory vomeronasal experiences.
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absent from all other cases. But it is far from obvious what this distinctive
phenomenology might be. As discussed in the previous section, we do not usually
think of bodily awareness as a form of sense-perception. So if there is something
phenomenologically distinctive about sense-perception, it must be something that is
not a feature of the conscious character of bodily awareness. And at the outset of
our investigation, there are no obvious contenders for what this distinctive
phenomenological feature might be.
3.2 Sense-organs
If we’re looking for something that is distinctive of the five familiar senses, and in
particular, something that they do not share with bodily awareness, it is likely that
the presence in the one case, and the absence from the other of sense-organs will
come to mind. It is intuitive that whatever the answer is to the question of what is
distinctive about the senses, it will have something to do with their involving sense-
organs. As Grice suggests, we might think we would deny that some faculty was a
sense if the possessor of the faculty
…seemed to have direct (non-inferential) knowledge of certain contemporary
states or events in the material world, though this knowledge was not
connected with the operation of any sense-organ (ibid.)
The problem with this suggestion, intuitive as it may be, is that it looks to be very
difficult to give conditions under which a part of the body counts as a sense-organ.
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It’s this difficulty that rules out the sense-organ criterion as an answer to the
question of how the senses are distinguished from one another. A specific problem is
that it’s very difficult to say what the organ of touch is, since there is no single part
of the body that seems to play in touch a role analogous to that which the eyes play
in vision. This is why Armstrong (1993) suggests that we should avoid reference to
sense-organs in analyzing the notion of perception.11
More generally, it is difficult to specify criteria by means of which to identify sense-
organs in a way that corresponds to the way we usually identify them (See also
Chapter 3, section 1). For example, we might think that, as Kenny puts it, a sense-
organ is ‘a part of the body which can be moved at will in ways which affect the
efficiency of the sense in question’ (1963: 57). Without further constraints, by this
criterion, one’s whole body might count as a sense-organ, since I can affect the
efficiency of a sense (in fact, of all my senses) on a given occasion by moving my
whole body around. I can move to a dark place so as no longer to see, for example,
or I can move away from the source of a sound so as no longer to hear the sounds it
makes. And it will not help, as we might expect it to, to try to identify sense-organs
naturalistically, in terms of physiological or psychological mechanisms involved in
perception in each modality For one, As Nudds (2003) points out, there are many
more such mechanisms than we usually count sense-organs. And more importantly,
for our purposes here, bodily awareness too involves the functioning of such
mechanisms, no less than the five familiar senses do.
11 We will see in Chapter 4 that a minimal notion of a sense-organ is applicable to touch.
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So, we have then a distinction that we usually make, between senses and other
faculties, including bodily awareness. This prompts us to raise the question of what
underlies this distinction— of what, if anything, is distinctive about the senses, and
correlatively, about sense-perception. And, furthermore, we have some intuitions or
expectations about how this question ought to be answered that, as we have seen, are
not easily met. This, I hope, encourages one to think that this is a question with some
intrinsic interest, to which it is reasonable to look for an answer. The account I give,
in the following chapters, of what is distinctive about the senses, allows the
expectations discussed in this section to be met. In the next subsection I summarise
this account.
3.3 The answer
I will argue that what the senses have in common which they do not share with
bodily awareness are enabling and defeating conditions of a certain kind. These
enabling and defeating conditions are manifest in the conscious character of sense-
perception: this is what is phenomenologically distinctive about the senses. And
these conditions, which are thus manifest to us, are also exploited in active
perceptual attention— in looking, listening and the like. In Chapters 2 and 3 I argue
that vision has, and bodily awareness lacks enabling and defeating conditions of the
relevant kind. Chapter 2 is concerned with the way in which enabling conditions are
manifest in vision, and Chapter 3 with their exploitation in looking. In Chapters 4, 5
and 6 I argue that though touch, hearing, taste and smell differ from vision in various
ways, enabling conditions are manifest in the conscious character of perceiving in
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these modalities too, and exploited in actively feeling, listening, tasting and
smelling.
There being enabling conditions of this kind, I will suggest, is what is right about the
expectation that what is distinctive about the senses has something to do with their
involving the use of a sense-organ. For one, it’s in the exploitation of the enabling
conditions in perceptual activity that the sense-organs are put to use. Bodily
awareness (including bodily sensation, proprioception and kinaesthesia) has no such
enabling conditions. And given certain distinctive and important functions that
bodily awareness has for us human perceivers, I will argue, it is a very good thing
that bodily awareness differs from the five familiar senses in this way. (See Chapter
7, section 2).
Now, one might also think that the feature identified as distinctive of the senses
ought to be in some way ‘significant’ to our grouping together the faculties we do as
senses. If we are to accept that involving enabling conditions of the relevant kind is
truly that which is distinctive of the senses, and not merely something that the senses
happen to have, and bodily awareness happens to lack, we need to say what this
significance is. I will not have much to say about the significance of the feature until
the final chapter of the thesis. In the final section of this introduction I want to
discuss what sort of significance this ought to be, and make some anticipatory
comments about the way in which, I will argue later, the feature identified is thus
significant.
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4. Significance
If we are to say what it is in virtue of that senses are to be distinguished from other
faculties, it will not be enough to have identified a feature that the five familiar
senses have, and bodily awareness lacks. What is required in order to answer the
question is a feature that is in some way significant to our grouping together seeing,
touching, hearing, tasting and smelling, as instances of a single kind of thing and
excluding bodily awareness from this grouping.
A feature might conceivably be significant to our counting the faculties we do as
senses if its possession were necessary and sufficient for a faculty to be a sense. I
will not argue that possessing enabling conditions of the relevant kind is necessary
and sufficient for being a sense. This is not for lack of ambition, but because it
seems to me that we might easily have called other faculties, including bodily
awareness, senses. Thus, we might suspect that when we group together those
faculties we call senses, we are not grouping together instances of a natural kind.
This being so, our task in answering the question of what is distinctive about the
senses is not one of uncovering or discovering a natural kind. As such, we will not
expect to find conditions necessary and sufficient for some faculty to count as a
sense, or for something to count as an instance of sense-perception. But from the
senses not being a natural kind, it does not follow that our grouping them together is
arbitrary or capricious. To see this, it is helpful to look at Matthew Nudds’ answer to
the internal boundary question— the question of how the senses are distinguished
from one another.
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Nudds argues that we should think of the distinction we make between the senses as
a distinction between ‘ways of perceiving’. A way of perceiving, he writes, is ‘just
the conditions that have to be satisfied for us to perceive something’ (2003: 45).
There are many such conditions: physical conditions, such as the presence of light,
psychological conditions ‘having to do with the proper functioning of various
sensory processes’ and what Nudds refers to as ‘relational’ conditions, such as being
pointed in the right direction, or near enough to the object of perception (2003: 47).
And there are ‘as many different ways of perceiving as there are ways of
individuating the conditions necessary for perceiving something’ (2003: 45, n.30)
Our distinguishing between five such ways of perceiving, Nudds suggests, is not a
distinction between natural, psychological kinds, as it is assumed by the proponents
of the views about how to distinguish the senses discussed briefly above, in section
1, that it is. Those philosophers who argue that the senses should be distinguished in
terms of, for example, the features we become aware of by means of them, or the
conscious character of the experiences they yield, try to answer the question of how
the senses are distinguished by ‘locating some appropriate distinction in nature
corresponding to that we make between the senses’ (2003: 47), a ‘distinction in
nature’ being, Nudds writes, ‘at least a distinction which exists independently of our
practice of making it’ (2003: 47, n32). Nudds suggests that the distinction between
senses is not, in this respect, a ‘natural’ one. After all, we might have individuated
ways of perceiving in many different ways, other than the way we do.
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Though, on Nudds’ view, the distinction between the senses is not a ‘natural’ one, it
is not one that we are wholly capricious in making. For it is constrained by the
significance that the distinction has for us. On Nudds’ view, an answer to the
question of how the senses are distinguished must not just be extensionally
adequate— it must also ‘be able to explain the explanatory significance of the
distinction’ (2003: 43). It must be able to explain what knowing that something is
seen as opposed to heard, or touched, as opposed to smelled, adds to knowing
merely that it is perceived. What, Nudds argues, knowing that some object o was
perceived in a particular modality adds to knowing merely that it was perceived, is
being in a position to know what someone else is likely to come know about o, due
to their having perceived it in that way. For example, if some third person who I am
observing touches the book on the desk, she is likely to come to know about its
shape and texture. Whilst, if she sees the book, she is likely to come to know about
its shape, but also its colour, and so on. Which features of the book she comes to
know about will, as Nudds writes, ‘have consequences for her judgements and
actions’ (2003: 45). And this is why it is useful for me to know in which modality
she perceived what she perceived— because it is ‘potentially explanatory of her
behaviour’ (ibid.) in a way that merely knowing that she perceived the book is not.
If this is the significance that the distinction between the senses has for us, then it
places various ‘pragmatic constraints’ on how we individuate ways of perceiving,
constraints that may even, Nudds suggests, ‘be sufficient to determine a unique
distinction’ (2003: 48). We will only distinguish between ways of perceiving that
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are informative to us, with respect to our interest in predicting and explaining other
people. Thus the conditions distinguished ‘must be differentially correlated with a
significant difference in what is likely to be perceived’ (ibid.). And in addition,
…there is no point in making a distinction for the purposes of telling what
people are likely to perceive if we cannot actually tell or detect which way
they are perceiving something (2003: 49)
So we will distinguish between ways of perceiving in a way that picks out sets of
conditions that are such that we can easily tell whether or not they are met. I cannot
tell, for example, whether various underlying psychological conditions for
perceiving something, on a particular occasion, are met. But I can tell, by and large,
whether or not someone has tasted something or seen it, for example— because I
can see whether they are, for example, facing the thing with their eyes open, or
holding the thing in their mouth.
If Nudds is right, the distinction between the senses is in some way ‘interest
relative’. Other philosophers who have addressed the question of how the senses are
distinguished from one another, can be seen as having attempted to make the
distinction relative to other interests than those Nudds identifies, and in particular,
relative to ‘scientific’ interests. Thus, Brian Keeley’s avowed aim is to make the
distinction between the senses ‘scientifically useful’:
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To the extent that philosophy of psychology is a branch of philosophy of
science, the notion of the senses as differentiated from one another is a core
notion in perceptual sciences; a scientific assumption requiring philosophical
justification (2002: 8).12
And in justifying this ‘scientific assumption’, Keeley’s avowed aim is to provide an
account that will distinguish between senses other than the familiar five. Some
psychologists having gone so far as to postulate thirty-three human senses (see Durie
2005)— the human faculties amongst which Keeley intends to distinguish include
faculties additional to the familiar five. And Keeley also intends his account to be
able to distinguish between non-human senses, such as the proposed thermal sense
of the pit-viper, and the electric sense of some sharks, as well as imaginary senses,
such as those of aliens. If Nudds is right, and the distinction between the five
familiar senses is in some respect relative to an interest we have in predicting and
explaining others’ behaviour, then we might suspect, as Nudds does, that
philosophers such as Keeley who give a ‘scientific’ account of the senses have
simply ‘changed the subject’. As Nudds puts it, ‘whatever it is they are giving an
account of, it’s not the senses as we commonly understand them’ (2003: 35 n. 12).
The important point, for our purposes in this section, is that on Nudds’ view, it is the
very interest to which the distinction is relative that makes the distinction, though
‘conventional’, in that it is not a distinction between natural, psychological kinds,
not wholly capricious, or arbitrary. I have said that I will not argue, and that we do
12 See also Nelkin 1990.
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not expect, that the feature identified as common to the senses will provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of the concept of
sense-perception. Nevertheless, if the feature is truly to be thought of as that which
is distinctive of the senses, it must not be one that the senses just happen to have,
and bodily awareness just happens to lack. If it can be shown that our grouping
together the faculties that have this feature is something that it is intelligible that we
should do, given our contingent human interests, then it will have been shown that
possessing the feature identified is not incidental to our grouping together the senses
in the way that we do. This is the sort of ‘significance’ that I will argue, in Chapter
7, that the notion of sense-perception has for us. It is conventional, in some way, that
we think of the things we do —things that have the feature identified— as being
instances of sense-perception. It is conventional, in that it could have been
otherwise— and it would have been otherwise if, for example, our interests had been
different. But given certain interests that we humans do in fact have, we can see why
it would serve those interests for us to group the senses together in the way that we
do.
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Chapter 2: Visual enabling conditions and the visual field
In order to identify that which is distinctive to the senses, we need to consider how it
is, assuming bodily awareness is a perceptual faculty, that it differs from the five
familiar modalities. This is what I do in the following five chapters. In the current
chapter and the next, I argue that vision and bodily awareness differ, in that vision
has, and bodily awareness lacks, enabling conditions of a certain kind. These
enabling conditions are manifest in the conscious character of seeing, and exploited
in active visual attention, that is, in looking. There are no enabling conditions
manifest in bodily awareness, and exploited in attention to one’s body. In this
chapter, I give an account of the aspect of visual phenomenology that makes
manifest to us an enabling condition for seeing. In the next, I describe how we
exploit our grasp of the condition in looking.
Mike Martin has argued that vision has, and bodily awareness lacks, a field. I argue
in this chapter that the aspect of visual phenomenology that makes manifest to us a
certain visual enabling condition is that in virtue of which there is a visual field, in
Mike Martin’s distinctive sense of the term. So, much of the discussion of this
chapter will be involved in making clear just what it is about vision that gives it its
field-type character. That in virtue of which there is a visual field, I will suggest, is a
structural feature of visual experience that is involved in our seeing empty space. In
describing this feature, and the way in which it is a structural one, I make explicit the
role that seeing empty space has, implicitly, in Mike Martin’s account of the visual
field.
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In the first section I introduce Martin’s rather distinctive notion of the visual field.
This will prevent confusion with other philosophical uses of the term, and also —I
hope— forestall some possible objections to what follows. I will argue that we
should make sense of the claim that vision has a field, thus understood, in terms of
our being aware of its limitations, or boundaries. The boundaries of the visual field, I
suggest, are our own sensory limitations, and we are aware of them as such (sections
2 and 3). We are aware of them in that vision has a certain structural feature that is
also involved in our seeing empty space. Some philosophers have denied that we
perceive absences (section 4), yet it is intuitive that we see empty space, and that we
don’t just see that space is empty (sections 5 and 6). I suggest that one reason for
denying that we see empty space might be the neglect of structural features of
perceptual experience, since we need to appeal to just such a feature to get right the
way in which we see empty space, but are not aware of empty space in bodily
awareness. In section 7 I argue that vision having this structural feature makes
manifest to us an enabling condition for seeing.
1. What is ‘the visual field’?
For Martin, to say that vision has a field is to allude to certain features of the
phenomenology of visual experience. These are features which ‘can be identified
independently of a commitment to any specific theory of perception’ (1992: 198).13
Thus, in his use of the term ‘the visual field’, Martin does not commit himself to a
sense-datum theory of vision. The visual field, as the term is used by some
13 Although see n30 below.
30
philosophers, such as O’Shaughnessy, denotes a field of mind-dependent sensation.
This sense of ‘the visual field’ is not Martin’s.
On other accounts, too, the notion of the visual field is introduced as a matter of
features of the phenomenology of visual experience. For example, some
philosophers, without committing to a sense-data theory of perception, have used the
term ‘visual field’ to denote features of experience in virtue of which we might
identify some aspect of its conscious character as corresponding to a two-
dimensional array. For example, when we perceive two trees of equal height, one
closer to us than the other, there is a sense in which, as Peacocke puts it, ‘the nearer
tree occupies more of your visual field than the more distant tree’ (Peacocke 1983:
12). This type of experience, he argues, is fixed by the condition that on a plane
perpendicular to the perceiver’s line of sight, a larger area of the plane would have to
be made opaque to obscure the nearer tree than the farther (1983: 18).14 For
Boghossian and Velleman, the notion of ‘location in the visual field’ is required in
order to account for the way in which certain phenomenal items, such as after-
images, appear to occupy locations without appearing to be in those locations,
amongst the other objects we can see: ‘the after-image is like a coffee-stain on a
picture, a feature that occupies a location on the picture without representing
anything as occupying that location’ (1989: 93).15
14 The notion of the visual field, in this sense, is introduced by Peacocke (1983: Ch1) as part of his
argument for there being not only representational, but also sensational properties of perceptual
experience.
15 Boghossian and Velleman, like Peacocke, take the features of visual experience the notion of which
the visual field is introduced to explicate to be non-representational. Their discussion of the visual
field occurs in the context of an argument for the projective theory of colour perception. For Gibson,
the visual field is similar in being ‘picture-like phenomenal experience at a presumptive phenomenal
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The phenomenological features of visual experience that the notion of a field is
invoked by these philosophers to explain are not the features with which Martin is
concerned. What then are these features? The visual field, Martin writes, delimits,
(sets the boundaries of) a cone of physical space which is somehow ‘part of visual
experience’. This cone has its apex where our eyes are. To the left, right, up and
down are diverging boundaries which are joined by a boundary that forms the base
of the cone. We can see things that are very large and bright, such as stars, at
extraordinary distances. Though we are poor at judging how far away from us, and
from other things such things are, we nevertheless see them. So, at least on the face
of it, the base of the cone is, or can be extremely far away— I will return to this
point later. The phenomenological features with which Martin is concerned in his
account of the visual field have to do with this cone’s presence, in some way, in
visual experience. I think we can make best sense of this notion of the visual field in
terms of the claim that we are in some way aware of the cone-shaped boundaries or
limitations of the visual field. Vision has a field, in this way, in that we are aware of
its boundaries in visual experience. I shall discuss our awareness of the boundaries
or limitations of the visual field more in the next section. Before doing so, three
points are worth emphasizing.
distance from the eyes’ (1989: 151). But for him, the visual field is not part of ordinary visual
experience, or (as some would have it) its basis, but ‘an alternative to ordinary perception’ (151) that
depends on one taking what he calls a ‘pictoral’ attitude (149); the attitude a painter takes to his
subject.
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First, vision having a field is not just a matter of visual experience seeming to be
‘from somewhere’. Visual experience is ‘egocentric’ in that we seem to see the
things we see from where we are. In virtue of the apex of the cone of space delimited
by the visual field being where our eyes are, we seem to see the things we see
roughly in relation to where our eyes are. And if there were no such point of origin
for visual experience, there would not be a visual field. But to say that vision has a
field is not just to say that there is a point of origin present in visual experience. It’s
to say that the boundaries or limitations of the cone, the apex of which is the point of
origin for visual experience, are present in visual experience.
Secondly, in this sense of the visual field, it is not to be identified with a region of
physical space. Rather, it delimits —fixes the boundaries— of some such region.
When I move my gaze, I change what falls within the limits fixed by the visual field,
but I do not change the field itself. I take my visual field with me, as it were, as I go
about.
Thirdly, the space the visual field delimits is not the space containing everything I
see at a time. Another, different notion of the visual field is that of the field of view.
This notion of the visual field is probably the closest to the everyday, non-
philosophical use of the term (to the extent that there is any such use), and is the first
of the three varieties of visual field considered by Austen Clark (1996).16 The field
of view is the sum of physical phenomena seen at a time:
16 The first, which he attributes to Boghossian and Velleman, being an array of impressions. The
third, not discussed here, is ‘the world as represented visually’- an intentional object (Clark 1996: 7).
33
The field of view is a large three dimensional physical phenomenon. It might
be several miles deep. Its size and shape is determined at time t by the
physical position of the head and eyes. With one’s head in a closet, the field
of view dwindles considerably. Turn off the lights and it dwindles to nothing.
But as long as one is seeing something, there exists a sum of things seen: a
field of view (1996: 2).
The space the visual field delimits contains unseen regions. This is particularly
important to bear in mind if the account of the visual field offered here is to be
acceptable. As Martin makes clear in his account, the visual field includes regions of
space at which nothing is currently seen due to occlusion (1992: 199) or darkness
(1993: 214). If it is thought that that with which we are concerned is the field of
view, then the claim that the visual field contains locations that are currently unseen
will seem preposterous. On Martin’s view, with my head in a closet, my visual field
does not dwindle, though my field of view does.17 The visual field includes the
spaces and objects beyond the walls of the room and even the building I’m in.18
Having distinguished Martin’s notion of the visual field from some other uses of the
term, in the rest of this chapter (and also in other chapters), I’ll use the term in
17In the case of ganzfeld phenomena, such as snow-blindness or the experience of pilots at high
altitude, the visual field does dwindle to nothing- all visual experience is extinguished. Whether the
same is true of darkness is contentious (see Sorenson 2008).
18 It’s not clear that this part of the account is obligatory, particularly given the account of the visual
field given here. One could accept that we are aware of our sensory limitations in that it always seems
as if there is more to be seen than is currently seen, and still insist that the visual field does dwindle
with one’s head in a closet- after all, it would certainly seem, in such a case, that there was more to be
seen than was currently seen.
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Martin’s sense. I will argue that vision has a field, thus understood, in that we are
visually aware of the cone-shaped boundaries of the field. In the next section I
consider what these boundaries are, and the way in which we are aware of them. We
will see later in this chapter that the way in which we are aware of the boundaries
involves vision having a structural feature that makes manifest to us an enabling
condition for seeing.
2. Boundaries and limitations
What sort of notion of a boundary or limitation could be in play here, such that we
can make sense of our being aware of these limits in visual perception? One way in
which we are aware of limits or boundaries is the way in which we see the outer
edges of physical objects. We might think that we are aware of the limits of the
visual field in something like this way— that we can see its outermost edges, the
boundaries of a cone-shaped region of space.
I don’t think this is the way in which we are aware of the limits fixed by the visual
field. Firstly, the outermost edges of this space are more often than not beyond
occluding objects; the walls of rooms, other buildings, and so on. So it’s just not
true, usually anyway, that the limits fixed by the field are things we’re aware of in
this way. Secondly, if we consider what’s involved in being aware of the outer edges
of physical objects, it is clear that we could not be aware of the limits of the visual
field in this way. When I see the outer edges of objects, I see them as bounded
within a space that extends beyond them, which I also see (or at least, that’s the
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claim I’m making here). I am aware of the boundaries of the cup on my desk, for
example, in that I pick the cup out as a figure against a background of other seen
things. My awareness of the limits fixed by the visual field cannot be like this,
because the limits fixed by the visual field, whatever else they are, are the limits
beyond which nothing can be seen, without changing what falls within these limits
by moving one’s gaze. The limits fixed by the visual field are not then the limits of
an object of awareness that I see, bounded within a space that extends beyond it.
And I am not aware of the limits fixed by the visual field in the way in which I am
visually aware of the limits of such objects.19
What then are these limits, and in what does our awareness of them consist? My
claim is that the limits are our own visual sensory limitations, and that we are aware
of them as such. We are aware of our visual sensory limitations in that it always
seems to one that there is more to be sensed than one is currently sensing. It seems
as if the space delimited by the visual field, is a sub-region of a larger space which
has that region as a sub-region. By way of clarification, this should not be thought of
as meaning that it always seems to you that you could see further than you currently
can if only the objects weren’t in the way. The claim is that on a cloudless day,
looking out to sea on a deserted beach, it would still seem to one that there was more
to be seen than one currently could see. It would still seem to you that way in outer
space. One is aware of the limits fixed by the visual field in the sense that the space
it delimits seems to be limited. It seems, always, as if there is more to be seen,
19 Cf. Sorensen forthcoming. He remarks that the limits of the visual field, like the vanishing point,
are not objects of vision.
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beyond these limits. And it is not just that we know there is more to be seen than
what we do in fact see. There being more is something that is manifest to us in the
phenomenology of experience. This, perhaps, is what Kant meant by the claim that
space is an ‘infinite given magnitude’ (A25/B40). In this rather elusive claim, as
Gardner suggests:
Kant does not mean that we perceive space as an infinite whole, which we
obviously do not, but that space is given to us, first, as unbounded (we
cannot represent the end or edge of space; behind any space, more space
lies). (1999:79)
It is worth noting that the boundaries of the visual field of which we are aware are
not all alike. Human perceivers do not have 360 degree vision. On all sides of the
cone apart from the base, there is a fairly obvious boundary beyond which nothing,
no matter how bright or large, can be seen. The base of the cone is different. In the
‘straight ahead’ direction we can see large objects such as stars, given the right
illumination conditions, that are very far away indeed. Nevertheless, even in this
direction, it seems to us that we can only see so far— that we are limited, sensorily.
For example, we are aware of things, such as aeroplanes and birds, flying out of
view, beyond where they can be seen. We might think of the visual field as a kind of
‘net’, the ‘holes’ in which grow larger with distance.20 (We will return to this in
Chapter 5.)
20 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for the European Journal of Philosophy for this suggestion.
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Now, in order to understand the way in which our awareness of the limits fixed by
the visual field is awareness of our sensory limitations, it is useful to compare this
kind of awareness to a third kind of awareness of limits that we have not yet
considered. This is the awareness we have of the limits of the body, in bodily
awareness. On Martin’s account, whilst there is a visual field, there is no bodily
field. We can understand this difference, I think, in terms of the two different kinds
of awareness of limits involved in each case. There is a field in vision, in that we are
aware of our sensory limitations. There is no field in bodily awareness, in that we
are not so aware. What we are aware of in bodily awareness, are the limits of an
object, namely, our bodies.
As we said in Chapter 1, Martin holds a perceptual model of bodily sensation. And
as we saw there, on this model, what you are aware of when you feel a pain in your
hand, is not a purely subjective state, but your hand, hurting. You are aware of a
quality of some object in the world, namely, that part of your body which hurts.
Furthermore, for Martin, bodily sensation (when it feels to be located), is
intrinsically bodily. The object in which you feel the sensation, feels to be part of
your body. ‘Wherever a sensation feels to be located’, writes Martin, ‘one’s body
feels to extend to at least that point in space’ (1993: 210). Thus, if one experiences
bodily sensations at locations that are not internal to one’s body, such as a pain in a
phantom limb, so one experiences an illusion with respect to the extent of one’s
body.
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In order for bodily sensation to have this quality of appearing internal to one’s body,
it must incorporate a contrast with external to the body. And, as Martin points out,
this contrast cannot be:
…a positive quality over and above the qualities and location of sensation,
[for] then it would be conceivable that sensations should lack this feature,
and also conceivable that sensations could have the opposite feature of
“falling outside of one’s boundaries” (1998a: 271).
And this is not conceivable, or at least, not conceivable for creatures whose bodily
experience is like ours. We cannot conceive of feeling a sensation to be located, but
external to the body, as O’Shaughnessy has argued (1980: Vol. 1, 162). How then
does bodily sensation have its bodily character? To say that one feels one’s
sensations to be internal to one’s body, can also be seen, as Martin says, as ‘one
feeling one’s sensations to be located within one’s boundaries’ (1993: 212). So the
key to the bodiliness of bodily sensation is awareness of one’s bodily boundaries or
limitations.
This awareness though, like our awareness of the limits of the visual field, is not like
the awareness one has of the outer edges of seen objects. One is not aware of the
outer edges of one’s body by picking it out, in bodily awareness, as a figure against a
background of other objects and empty space of which one is also, bodily aware.
One is aware of one’s boundaries, on Martin’s account, in that one is aware of one’s
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body as in a space ‘that extends beyond whatever one does feel’ (1998: 271). So that
in virtue of which any location at which one feels a sensation feels to fall within
one’s boundaries, is one’s awareness of the limits or boundaries of one’s body in the
following sense:
…wherever one does feel a sensation, to be located, one [also has] a sense
that the world must extend beyond that point, the world beyond extending
beyond one’s limits being composed of regions of space which one couldn’t
at this time be feeling a sensation to be located in (1993: 212).21
Hence, it is necessary that one does not feel that one’s body is all there is: ‘that one’s
body might simply extend to encompass the whole world, or the world apparently
shrink to the limits of one’s body’ (1993: 212).
Now, I have argued, above, that it is also true of vision that it always seems to one
that there is more space than that which is currently delimited by the visual field. In
this sense, we are aware, in vision, of our sensory limitations. Yet the awareness we
have of the limits of our body, in bodily awareness, though it also implies that there
is necessarily more space than that in which we feel our body to be located, should
not be understood as awareness of any sensory limitations. In this kind of awareness
of limitations, though it is different to one’s visual awareness of the outer edges of
objects in the above-noted ways, what one is aware of are the limits of some object,
21 The awareness we have of our bodily boundaries is to be understood as a matter of a structural
feature of bodily awareness. I will return to this point in Chapter 4.
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namely, one’s body. One couldn’t feel a sensation at a location beyond one’s
boundaries not because one is limited, sensorily, but because that’s how far the
boundaries of the sole object of that awareness of reach. One might bemoan the
limited reach of the limits set by the visual field, wishing that one could see further.
Such a complaint would not make sense in the case of bodily awareness— what one
would be wishing for would be to be larger than one is, not to feel further, beyond
one’s boundaries. Vision has a field in that we are visually aware of our sensory
limitations. Bodily awareness lacks a field in that the limits we are aware of in
bodily awareness are those of the object that is our body (albeit ‘from the inside’ and
so not in the same way as we are aware of the outer edges of objects). But in what
does our awareness of our visual sensory limitations consist? I will argue, in the
following sections, that it consists in a feature of experience that is involved in
seeing empty space, and that this feature is a structural feature of visual experience.
In the final section of the chapter I will argue that this structural feature is that in
virtue of which an enabling condition for seeing is made manifest in the conscious
character of visual experience.
3. Is perception ‘positivity all the way’?
Many philosophers have argued that we don’t perceive any absences. Amongst them
is Brian O’Shaughnessy. Perception, he claims, is invariably of presences, it is
‘positivity all the way’ (2002: 334). In this section I introduce the claim that there is
no perception of absence, and the contexts in which it is made. Whilst the topic of
the perception of absence is one with its own intrinsic interest, I include this
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discussion here because, I want to argue, one reason why it might be denied that
certain absences, such as empty space, are perceptible, is if one neglects structural
features of perceptual experience. And it is a structural feature of visual experience,
and one that is involved in our seeing empty space, that I want to argue makes
manifest to us a visual enabling condition.
O’Shaughnessy argues against our perceiving absences in the context of
distinguishing perception from thought. In his view, perception differs from thought
in not having propositional objects and, concomitantly, not being truth-evaluable.
Thoughts, he writes, ‘being conceived under the aspect of truth, can as readily take
negative as positive propositional objects’ (2002: 331). Perception, not taking
propositional objects at all, cannot take negative propositional objects— we cannot
perceive something not to be the case. The objects of perception, not being
propositional, are, O’Shaughnessy says ‘objective phenomenal realities like material
objects, or colours, or relations, none of which are capable of truth-values’ (2002:
328).
O’Shaughnessy allows that some experiences of absence, such as that of silence, are
not equivalent to an absence of experience— the deaf, he acknowledges, do not
experience silence. But the experience the hearing have and the deaf lack is not
‘hearing silence’ but ‘hearing that it is silent’. In denying that perception takes
propositional objects, O’Shaughnessy does not deny that ‘hearing that…’ or ‘seeing
that…’ are possible. But perceiving that something is the case involves the
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possession of a cognitive attitude, such as belief. Thus experiences of absence such
as hearing that it is silent, on O’Shaughnessy’s view, require a cognitive attitude
with the content that the relevant absence obtains, in this case, that it is silent.22
I don’t want in this chapter to consider the merits of O’Shaughnessy’s argument for
the claim that there is no perception of absence. My concern is rather with the
plausibility of the claim itself. O’Shaughnessy is not alone in claiming that there is
no perception of absence, though others have made the same claim for different
reasons. Demos writes that negative objects, such as absences, ‘are not to be found
in experience’ (1917: 195). Bertrand Russell, like O’Shaughnessy, emphasizes the
role of the possession of certain cognitive attitudes in the perception of absence,
suggesting that ‘perception only gives rise to negative judgement when the
correlative positive judgement has already been made or considered’ (1948: 138).
Another reason, other than O’Shaughnessy’s, for these denials of perception of
absence is the thought that absences and omissions cannot be causes, and thus, since
perception is causal, cannot be perceived.23 More generally, there is some discomfort
with the idea of the existence of negative facts, or even more generally, of negative
things. It is felt that not only perception, but also the world that is perceived, is
‘positivity all the way’.
22 On O’Shaughnessy’s view the experience of silence is a cognitive experience of ‘coming to know
that it is silent’ (2002: 329). For a different view, see Sorensen 2008, Chapter 14 and Phillips
forthcoming.
23 Not everyone considers absence causation to be problematic. See, for example Mellor 1995; Lewis
1986; Schaffer 2000. For discussion of absence causation in perception see Goldman 1977 and
especially Sorenson 2008.
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I do not intend to give any account at all here of the metaphysics of negative things.
And nothing said here about seeing empty space is supposed to provide a general
account of the perception of absence. It is with the particular perception of absence
that is seeing empty space that I am concerned here, because, I will argue, it involves
a structural feature that is that in virtue of which vision has a field, and bodily
awareness does not, and which makes manifest to us a visual enabling condition. In
the next section I suggest that, contra O’Shaughnessy, it seems rather obviously
characteristic of vision that we see not only objects and the like, but also the empty
space around and between them.
4. Seeing empty space
What’s meant by the claim that we see not only objects and the like, but also empty
space? It cannot be just that the objects seem to be a certain distance in space from
one another, and from myself. Things can seem to be a certain distance apart if the
space between them is partly or even wholly occupied. I can see two bookends, for
example, and they seem to be about a foot apart, even if the foot of space between
them is entirely occupied by books.24 So their seeming to be thus parted does not in
itself imply that we see empty space. And seeing empty space does not entail that the
space seen is entirely empty. The space between my bookends is not a vacuum or a
void. I will return to this point later, in section 6.
24 I can’t see an object to be a certain distance from myself if the space between me and it is occupied
by occluding objects, but that’s another matter.
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What’s important is not merely our seeing the distances between objects, such as
bookends, but that visual experience is not neutral as to whether the space between
the bookends is occupied. In this, it differs from bodily awareness, as Mike Martin
has pointed out (for example, 1998a: 271). In bodily awareness, there is no direct
analogue to our seeing empty space. If you hold your hands out in front of you about
a foot apart and close your eyes, you are aware of the relative locations of your
hands, as I am the relative locations of the bookends. And it does not seem to you
that your hands are only related ‘through’ the space occupied by your body. They
seem to be next to each other, a certain distance apart, in the space in front of your
body, and which your body does not occupy. But your bodily experience as you hold
your hands out, unlike my visual awareness of the bookends is neutral as to whether
the space between them is occupied or unoccupied. If I were to place a stack of
books between your hands, without your hands touching the books, your bodily
awareness of your hands would not change. The presence or absence of the books
makes a difference to my visual experience, as it does not to your bodily experience.
Another way of putting much the same point is that there is a difference from within
visual experience between absence of visual experience at some place and
experience of ‘nothing there’— of empty space. This is brought out by reflecting on
what are, at least on the face of it, examples of localized absence of visual
experience. In such cases, our relation to certain regions of space is comparable to
our relation to the space between our outstretched hands in bodily experience. This
serves to highlight the sort of case in which we’re interested here, in which bodily
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awareness and vision are not thus alike. When a very bright light is flashed into your
face, the retinal cells onto which the light is focussed are temporarily bleached. For a
moment, the cells are, as Austen Clark puts it, ‘out of commission’ (1996: 4). At the
location in space from which reflected light is focused onto these cells, nothing,
briefly, can be seen. As the cells recover, the experience is that which we
characterize as an ‘afterimage’. During that brief period when the cells are out of
commission, we have a temporary blind spot— a location at which there is an
absence of visual experience.25, 26
We can imagine there being for me a blind spot of this kind of such a shape and size
as to fit precisely the space between the bookends. I still, in this case, see the
bookends, and I am still aware of the distance between them. But now my visual
experience is comparable to your bodily experience of your hands. The presence or
absence of the books between the bookends will make no difference to my visual
experience— I do not see the space between them. Now, I have a lack of experience
with regards to the region of space between them. This imagined case, in which I
have a complete lack of visual experience of the space between the bookends, is
different from the case in which I have a visual experience of ‘nothing there’
between them. In one case, there is no experience. In the other, there’s an experience
of absence— of empty space.
25 This is not of course a blindspot in the sense of the one that we all have and rarely notice.
26 Other ways of understanding the temporary blindspot are available. For example, one might think
of it as a hallucination of darkness- this was pointed out to me by an anonymous referee for the
European Journal of Philosophy. However, it seems to me implausible that one would describe one’s
experience in the case described here as being ‘as of’ darkness. In any case, this response would not
be available to someone who thought there was no perception of absence, unless, as O’Shaughnessy
does, they were to deny that seeing darkness is a perception of absence.
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5. Seeing that the space is empty?
Still, you might say, seeing empty space may not be equivalent to the absence of
visual experience, but nevertheless O’Shaughnessy is right: I see only that the space
is empty. And this requires a belief with the content that the space between the
bookends is unoccupied. Is this right? I don’t think it is.
I don’t want to deny that there are cases of perception of absence for which there are
good reasons to claim that the possession of some such cognitive attitude is required.
It seems implausible that one could, for example, have an experience of a cat’s not
being blue without a corresponding belief or other cognitive attitude with the content
that the cat is not blue. What one would have in such a case would be, plausibly, a
positive perceptual experience of the cat’s being, say, brown, and thus, perhaps in
the context of an expectation that the cat would be a blue one, a belief that it’s not.27
Others too have emphasized the role of cognitive attitudes in perceiving absences.
Consider the two circles below:
27 Though on approaches to the admissible contents of perceptual experience at what Tim Bayne has
called the ‘conservative’ end of the spectrum, the property of being a cat is not perceived either. The
idea here is just that the cat not being blue is something that only an uber-liberal would allow into the
content of experience, whilst space being empty, in contrast, should be admitted by all but the most
conservative.
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We see the circle on the left to have a dot in it. And in some sense, we see the
absence of a dot from the circle on the right. In Molnar’s view, we infer the absence
of the dot from ‘the perception of the circle and the failure to perceive the dot’. Our
seeing there to be a dot in the circle on the left, on the other hand, involves no
inference: ‘there is no perceptual datum from which such an inference could be
drawn except the fact of the dot’s being in the circle itself’ (2000: 79). And, Molnar
suggests, whilst it may in some sense seem to us that that there is an absence of dots
in the circle on the right, this ‘appearance depends on our expectations’ (80). If our
expectations had been different, we may have seen it as empty of crosses, triangles,
or elephants. Thus, we might well conclude that we only see that the circle on the
right is empty of dots.28 It seems to me that Molnar’s interpretation of this case of
perception of absence is the right one.
As Kusko (2006) has argued, we should distinguish an ‘attitudinal’ account of the
perception of absences, such as O’Shaughnessy’s and Molnar’s, from an attitudinal
account of the absences themselves. Whilst my perception of the absence of the dot
from the right hand circle may require the belief that the circle is empty of dots, this
in itself gives no reason to think that the absence of the dot is somehow dependent
on my belief or other attitudes. And none of this is to deny that there might be some
genuine phenomenology of experiencing the cat’s not being blue or the circle’s
being empty of dots— it’s just that this phenomenology will be influenced by one’s
belief that the cat is not blue, or the circle empty of dots. This is also consistent with
28 But see Taylor (1952), whose example this is. Taylor takes it that we perceive the absence of the
dot in the right-hand circle without inference and thus directly: in the same way that we perceive its
presence in the left-hand circle. CB Martin (1996) also takes absences like this one to be perceptible.
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the view that all perceptual phenomenology is, to some extent, influenced by our
beliefs and other cognitive attitudes. The point is that in these cases of perceiving
that some absence obtains, a belief specifically with the content that the relevant
absence obtains is required, and is responsible for the phenomenology of
experiencing that absence.
Seeing empty space, I suggest, should not be assimilated to seeing that the cat is not
blue or that the circle is empty of dots. Whilst I don’t deny that perceptual
phenomenology can be affected by our cognitive attitudes, or that we should
understand some kinds of perception of absence as ‘perceiving that...’, there seems
no reason to think that this is how we should understand seeing empty space. It
seems unmotivated to say that, for example, I have a positive experience of the
bookends, that (perhaps in the context of an expectation that the space between them
will be occupied) gives rise to a belief that the space is empty. As Mike Martin puts
it, we seem to be visually aware of empty space, in the same way as we are visually
aware of objects. Seeing the empty space between my bookends, is not contingent
upon my having a belief or other cognitive attitude with the content that the space
between them is empty.
We said, in section 3, that some philosophers argue that there is no perception of
absence, and discussed there some factors that motivate this view. Richard Taylor
takes this view to be a ‘curious prejudice, which it is difficult to see how experience
or reason could ever have yielded’ (1952: 443). One reason we might agree with
49
Taylor is that, as we have seen in the current section and in section 4, it seems rather
obviously characteristic of vision that we see empty space, and that our doing so is
not merely ‘seeing that…’ In the next section I argue that seeing empty space
involves a structural feature of visual experience. One reason for the denial that there
can be perceptions of absence, such as seeing empty space, might be the neglect of
such structural features. And since, I will argue, this structural feature is one that
makes an enabling condition for seeing manifest in visual experience, neglect of
structural features is also an obstacle to recognizing the way in which such enabling
conditions are manifest.
6. Seeing empty space and structural features of experience
I want to argue that we need to understand seeing empty space as involving a certain
structural feature of experience. This structural feature, I will claim, also constitutes
our awareness of our sensory limitations, and thus, there being a visual field, in
Martin’s sense. My first task is to say what the relevant feature of experience
involved in seeing empty space is. Then I will say how this feature also constitutes
our awareness of our sensory limitations, and explain the sense in which this feature
of the conscious character of experience is a structural one. In the final section of the
chapter I will suggest that this structural feature of visual experience makes manifest
to us an enabling condition for seeing.
The key to understanding the structural feature of visual experience that is involved
in seeing empty space is to be found by looking at the way in which seeing empty
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space is genuinely a perception of absence (and thus, incidentally, a genuine
counterexample to the claim that perception is ‘positivity all the way’).
One way in which it might be thought that we could make the intuition that we see
empty space consistent with the claim that there can be no perception of absence is
by denying that seeing empty space is an experience of absence. This suggestion
might be bolstered by pointing out that in fact, there is no empty space around here
to be seen. All the space between the objects we see is full of very tiny objects. We
can’t usually see these tiny objects of course, but the point is that the space is not
empty. And if there’s no empty space, we certainly can’t see any of it.29
But experience of absence should not be confused with experience of a void. As
C.B. Martin writes:
Absences only exclude what they are absences of from their spatio-temporal
region, whereas voids exclude everything. (1996: 62).
The space between the bookends in my example is not a void. It contains tiny
invisible objects, and it also contains light. My experience of this space is an
experience not of the absence of everything, but of something in particular. And
29 Another way in which one might deny that seeing empty space is a perception of absence might be
by assimilating cases such as my ‘bookends’ example to the seeing of holes, and then to argue, as
O’Shaughnessy does, that holes are not absences (2002: 333 n.6). On O’Shaughnessy’s view a hole is
not intrinsically an absence, rather, it is a spatial property of its owner. The difficulty with this
suggestion is that it does not capture the difference between our seeing empty space in, for example, a
hole in an object, and our being tactually aware of the shape of an object with a hole, such as a polo
mint, without having any tactile awareness, analogous to seeing empty space, of the empty space
within the hole.
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what it is an experience of the absence of, is visible objects. To see a region of space
as empty, is to see it as empty of visible objects. And to see a space as empty of
visible objects is to see it as, in Mike Martin’s words ‘a place where something
could be seen’ (1992: 199). I see the place between the bookends as empty in that I
see it as a place in which if some visible object were there, I would see it.
Now, I don’t want to say that some such conditional is part of the content of my
experience of seeing empty space. Rather, what I do want to say is that my seeing
the region as a place in which if a visible object were there, I would see it, involves a
structural feature of visual experience. And in order to understand the sense in which
the feature is a structural one, it helps to see that this is the same feature that
constitutes our awareness of our sensory limitations, to which I now turn.
One thing that distinguishes structural features from other kinds of feature that
experiences have, is that they are features of the conscious character of experience
that are not a matter of what the apparent objects of such experience are.30 Seeing a
location as one in which if some visible object were there, I would see it, is not
seeing some object to be some way— this is obvious enough. But this feature of
experience is also independent of the apparent objects of experience in a more
substantial sense: it is a feature that visual experience has whether or not it has any
30 This might also make us doubt whether it’s true to say that Martin’s account of the visual field is
not committed to, or at least, does not rule out, any particular theory of perception. Vision having a
field is to be understood in terms of features of visual experience that are not representational—
structural features. If a representationalist holds the view that all the features of the conscious
character of perception are representational features, then this representationalist will not be able to
accept the account of the visual field given here.
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apparent objects. It is a feature of seeing empty space, and also, I suggest, of our
visual experience of visible objects— of occupied space. When I see something —
say, an apple— in the space between the bookends, it does not just seem to me that
there is an apple there, at that location. It also seems to me as if the apple is located
in a region of space in which it is visible to me.
In giving his perceptual account of bodily awareness, Martin writes that the sense of
ownership involved in such awareness is ‘structural’ in that it is not some quale that
each bodily experience has and could lack. Rather, it has to be something intrinsic to
the qualitative character of bodily awareness, generally (1998a: 271, 73, 79).
Otherwise, we could conceive of our feeling bodily sensations that seem to have
extra-bodily locations. And this is not conceivable for us. Similarly, the structural
feature of visual experience involved in seeing empty space is intrinsic to the
qualitative character of visual experience generally, rather than some quale that each
visual experience has and could lack. It is in this respect a feature of visual
experience generally, and not just of visual experience of empty space.
This structural feature, characteristic of visual experience generally, whether or not
we seem to see any objects, is constitutive of our awareness of our visual sensory
limitations. There being a field in vision is, I have argued, to be understood in terms
of our being aware of our sensory limitations. And we are aware of our sensory
limitations in that it always seems to us, no matter how far we see, that there is more
to be seen that we cannot see: it seems as if the space delimited by the visual field is
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a sub-region of a larger space. But it doesn’t just seem to us that there is a region
beyond the limits of which things can’t be seen. It also seems to us (as corollary)
that there is a space within which things can be seen. These two seemings are, as it
were, two sides of the same coin. It only seems to me that there is a region within
which things can be seen, in that it seems to me that there is a region beyond which
things can’t be seen, and vice versa.
This is what the structural feature involved in seeing empty space contributes to the
conscious character of visual experience generally. It contributes to it our awareness
of our sensory limitations, and therefore vision’s field-type character. Whether or
not we seem to see objects, it seems to us as if there is a region in which one could
see them. It’s not, as we have said, that some region of space, in which it seems to us
that things can be seen, is always an additional object of visual awareness. Rather,
what we are aware of are our own visual sensory limitations, which delimit a region
in which things can be seen. What I am aware of, in being aware of my sensory
limitations, is of there being limits to where something can be, and be visible. It
seems as if there are such limits, in that it seems as if things are visible, but only so
far. In vision having this feature, it seems to me as if I am limited, sensorily. Bodily
awareness, as we have seen, does not have this feature. The limits of which I am
aware in my awareness of my body, are not my sensory limitations, but the limits of
some object, that is, my body.
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Before discussing, in the next section, the way in which this structural feature makes
manifest to us an enabling condition for seeing, two points of clarification are worth
making: the first is that the account given here does not imply that it is necessary for
a region of space to fall within the limits fixed by the visual field that it be seen as
empty, or indeed, as occupied. Much of the space delimited by the visual field is
occluded and so is unseen, whether occupied or empty. The claim made here is not
that a region of space falls within the visual field only if it is seen. It is only that our
seeing empty space, understood as seeing spaces as potential locations for visual
objects, involves the same structural feature that constitutes our awareness of our
sensory limitations that is that in virtue of which vision has a field, and bodily
awareness does not. 31
The second point of clarification relates to the fact that superficially, the space
beyond occluding objects, and even the space beyond the limits of the field, is space
that we might want to say we are ‘aware of as a potential location for objects of
vision’. The space beyond the walls of the room, which falls within the visual field, I
am aware of, in some way, as space in which I could see things. My awareness of
there being more space than currently falls within my sensory limitations, and more
things to be seen there than I can see without changing those limits is (as I have
argued) what gives visual experience its field-type character. Given this, the space
31 It might be argued that my awareness of the occluded parts of the visual field, whatever such
awareness might amount to, is also awareness of space that falls in some sense ‘beyond’ my sensory
limitations (though still within the visual field). In this case, the limitation is one that applies ‘within’
the visual field. The limitations of vision are such that I can’t usually see beyond a visual object to
another, smaller one, beyond it (backlit conditions aside- see Sorenson 2008). The same is not true of
hearing, for example. There is much more to be said about these other ‘within field’ sensory
limitations and our awareness of them.
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beyond my limitations might also be described as somewhere I am aware of as a
potential location for objects of vision. But in both these cases, the way in which this
space is present to me is very different to the way in which the unoccluded empty
space within the field is. In these cases, the ‘awareness’ I have, like the awareness I
have of the space beyond my body in bodily awareness, is neutral as to the presence
or absence of objects in these spaces. I do not have an experience of absence at the
locations beyond the limits set by the field, or beyond occluding walls, merely an
absence of experience. I do not see them.
7. Structural features and manifest enabling conditions
One way in which the feature of visual experience currently under discussion is
structural, I have said, is that it’s independent of the apparent objects of
experience— it is a characteristic of visual experience ‘in general’. Martin writes, of
occluded areas of the visual field that:
…one could come to be aware of something at that location without altering
the limits of the visual field provided by the angle of vision at that time. An
area can come into view simply by a rearrangement of things within the field,
rather than by changing the field itself. (1992: 198)
We can mess around with the objects in the field all we like— rearrange them so as
to unocclude new regions, even remove them all together without ‘changing the field
itself’. What remains unchanged, when we mess with the objects, is the structural
feature of experience which constitutes our awareness of our visual sensory
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limitations. The feature also deserves to be called ‘structural’ because what it
contributes to the qualitative character of visual experience, in general, is something
quite distinctive: it ‘structures’, or ‘organises’ it. It imposes a certain form on visual
experience. I will argue in this section that the form it gives visual experience is that
of seeing seeming to explained in a certain way. It’s in the way in which seeing
seems thus to be explained that an enabling condition for seeing is manifest in visual
experience.
We said in the previous section that when I see some object, for example an apple, it
seems to me not only as if there is an apple there, at that location, but as if it is in a
location in which it is visible to me. What I mean by this is that it seems to me, as
part of the conscious character of my visual experience of the apple, that it is
explained by its being in that location. When I see the apple, it seems to me as if I
see it because it is at that location. It seems to me that its being at that location
explains my seeing it. And it’s this awareness of my experience as explained in
such-and-such a way that, I want to argue, makes manifest to me a visual enabling
condition.
One’s visual sensory limitations, we have said, delimit a region of space within
which things are visible to one. It is necessary, if something is to be seen by me, that
it fall within my visual sensory limitations— in front of me, rather than behind or
above me, for example, and not too far away. Thus we can say that it is an enabling
condition for my seeing a visible object that it falls within my sensory limitations—
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within the space they delimit. Seeing some object o is enabled by its being in the
right place in relation to me, or, if you like, my being in the right place with respect
to it. We will discuss this enabling condition more in the next chapter. And for it to
be the case that o is in the right place to be seen (or for me to be in the right place to
see it), o must fall within my visual field. And, I want to argue, I am aware of an
object falling within my visual sensory limitations as an enabling condition for my
seeing it, in that it falling within them seems to explain my seeing it. It seems to me
as if I see my cup because it falls within those limits— because it is in the right
place to be seen. And this enabling condition is manifest to me no less in seeing
empty space, in which it seems to me, as I have argued, that were anything visible to
fall in the relevant location, then I would see it.
Care is needed with this claim. Searle (1983) argues that when we see an object, our
experience represents not only the object, but also that the object is causing our
experience of it. On this sort of view, our experience has as part of its content
something like ‘this visual experience is caused by…’. It might be thought that my
seeming to see the cup because it falls within the field should be understood
analogously, that my experience has the content ‘I see the cup because it falls within
the field’, or, in the case of seeing empty space, ‘I don’t see any objects because
there are no visible objects there’. This is not how the claim that enabling conditions
are manifest in the phenomenology of visual experience should be construed.32
32 There is much more to be said about the relation between my claim here and Searle’s claim that
experiences are ‘causally self-referential’.
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Enabling conditions are not represented in the content of experience, but are
manifest to one in virtue of a structural feature of visual experience.
Neither is my claim that the visual field is an object that I see and that it seems to me
that I see the cup because I see the this unusual object, the visual field. In my
discussion of the visual field I have emphasized that our awareness of the limits
fixed by the field is not awareness of some ‘thing’. This awareness, I suggested, we
should understand rather as a structural feature of visual experience. It is a feature of
the way in which our experience of objects seems, and not an apparent way in which
those objects seem. The structural feature in virtue of which a visual enabling
condition is manifest in seeing does not introduce some extra ‘thing’ that is seen, but
rather structures our experience of the things that we do see. Our experience
(whether of objects or empty space) is ‘structured’ by this feature, just in that, as I
have argued, it seems to us as if our seeing the things we see is ‘explained’ in a
certain way.
Since what we are aware of in this enabling condition being manifest in experience
here are not objects of experience (things that we see), we do not become aware of
them by attending to them, as we do in the case of the objects that we see. There is
no further ‘thing’ for us to attend to, in experiences having this structural feature,
other than the objects our awareness of which it structures. It is nevertheless present
to us in the conscious character of experience. One way to make this clear is to
consider how we would convince (and have been trying to convince) someone that
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vision has this structural feature, and thus that the enabling condition is manifest in
seeing. What we would not do is to get them to visually attend to their sensory
limitations, as we visually attend to objects of experience, since they are not objects
in this sense. Neither would we get them just to introspect. This last point is
important because enabling conditions being part of the conscious character of
visual experience need not be something that is obvious to one. For some aspects of
the phenomenology of experience, what is required is not (or not just) attention to
either apparent objects of experience, or to the experience itself, but argument.
In O’Shaughnessy’s view, that we see light is one such aspect. In order to convince
his reader that we see light, which it is not at all obvious from introspection that we
do, we must, he writes, ‘avail ourselves instead of tools of an altogether different
and non-observational kind: namely, those of argument.’ (2002: 439). And again:
‘The only picking out that is possible is a…picking out by conceptual rather than
attentional tweezers, aided and abetted by argumentation’ (2002: 452).33 To be
clear— the point is not just that the aspect of phenomenology with which I’m
concerned is a way that experience would seem to someone with the relevant
concepts. The idea is that the enabling conditions are there anyway, in the conscious
character of experience, but that it requires argument to be convinced of their
presence, rather than just introspection.
33 See also Martin (unpublished) Chapter 1: ‘…it is commonly assumed that one does just know
whether things are appearing to one in a certain way or not, and what such appearances in themselves
are.’ Martin questions this assumption.
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So there is no implication that one is aware of the enabling conditions only once one
has reflected on one’s experience. The idea is that though one had to be made to
reflect on these features of one’s experience, they were there all along, before one
reflected. This is a point worth emphasizing. I have described a visual enabling
condition being manifest to us in it seeming to us that we see objects because they
fall within the field. This carries no commitment to the thought that the subject of
such experience need have the concepts of the visual field, or other kinds of
concepts that might be thought to be involved in this ‘because’. Nevertheless, since I
am concerned to a large extent with phenomenology, it is adult, human experience
that I discuss. The phenomenology of the experiences of animals or pre-linguistic
infants who we might think do not, incidentally, have the relevant conceptual
capacities is, of course, something to which I don’t have access.
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Chapter 3: Enabling conditions and active attention
We have seen in Chapter 2 that a certain structural feature of visual experience
makes manifest to us a visual enabling condition. The structural feature is that in
virtue of which vision has a field. Bodily awareness does not have a field in this
way— we are not aware, in bodily awareness, of sensory limitations in the way that
we are in vision. In chapters 4 to 6 I will argue that enabling conditions are manifest
in the conscious character of touch, hearing, taste and smell too. And it is not the
case, in all these modalities, that the features that make manifest the enabling
conditions are structural features that constitute awareness of sensory limitations.
The idea of a field is not applicable to all our senses, though enabling conditions of a
certain kind are manifest in all. My first aim in this chapter is to argue that bodily
awareness has no enabling conditions of this kind.
The place that the enabling conditions that the five senses have and which bodily
awareness lacks has in our account lies not only in their being manifest in the
conscious character of sense-experience. I will argue also that we exploit our grasp
of these enabling conditions in active perceptual attention. I will argue in the current
chapter that we exploit our grasp of the enabling condition that is made manifest in
visual experience in active visual attention, which is to say, in looking. In section 3 I
argue that there is a bodily equivalent to looking, in that one can attend to one’s
body in a way that is analogous in a number of ways to the way in which we can
actively attend to objects of vision. However, no enabling conditions are exploited in
actively attending to one’s body, as they are in looking (section 4). First though, in
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sections 1 and 2, I describe the kind of enabling conditions that vision has (and
which we will see later that the other senses also have) and bodily awareness lacks.
1. Sense-organs
We said, in Chapter 1, that on the face of it, one very salient difference between the
senses, on the one hand, and bodily awareness, on the other, is that there is no
obvious sense-organ associated with the latter. Considering this difference will help
in understanding the kind of enabling conditions that are absent from bodily
awareness. In order to do so we must say something in answer to the question ‘what
does it mean to say that some part of the body is a sense-organ?’
Nudds (2003: 33) points out how natural an answer to the question of how the senses
are distinguished from one another is that which takes them to be individuated by
sense-organs. When asked how the senses are distinguished from one another, he
suggests, most people will refer to the fact that different parts of the body are
involved in perceiving in each modality. Given the naturalness of the sense-organ
criterion as an answer to the individuation question, it is surprisingly difficult to give
the conditions under which some part of the body counts as a sense-organ.
Armstrong suggests that one ‘mark’ of a sense-organ is that ‘it is a part of our body
which when stimulated produces a characteristic range of perceptions’ (1993: 212).
But if we want to identify sense-organs as body-parts that produce characteristic
ranges of perception, we shall have to find independent criteria for picking out the
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relevant characteristic ranges of perception. Without some such criteria, we might
well identify the right hand side of the body as a sense-organ, in virtue of the range
‘perceptions as of things on the right’ being produced by the stimulation of this part
of the body. And it might well be that in order to find relevant criteria, we must first
answer the question of how the senses are distinguished from one another, which it
is not my concern to do here.
A second ‘mark’ of a sense-organ, Armstrong writes, is that it is ‘a portion of our
body which we habitually move at will’ in order to perceive (1993: 213). This is
Anthony Kenny’s suggestion, too:
…we shall not be far wrong if we say that an organ of perception is a part of
the body which can be moved at will in ways which affect the efficiency of
the sense in question (1963: 57).
There are two problems with identifying sense-organs with parts of the body that we
habitually move at will in order to affect perception. One is that, if this is how sense-
organs are identified then at least without further elucidation, the whole body would
count as a sense-organ. In order to perceive what’s going on in the corridor, I get up
and move my whole self there. The second problem with identifying sense-organs in
this way is that applying it might lead us not to count as sense-organs some body-
parts that we usually think of as sense-organs. For example, it is far from clear that
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the ears count as sense-organs if sense-organs are parts of the body that are moved at
will in order to perceive. As Baldwin remarks:
Though we often turn our head in the direction of a sound, shifts in auditory
attention do not require movement of the ears (2003: 195)
Neither is it clear that taking Armstrong’s two ‘marks’ of a sense-organ together, we
have ‘criteria that are necessary and sufficient for calling something a sense-organ’
(Armstrong 1993: 213).
Neither can we identify sense-organs naturalistically, as physiological mechanisms
‘whose functioning is necessary for parts of the body to function in perception’
(Nudds 2003: 34). This is because, as Nudds points out, there are diverse
mechanisms involved in the functioning of each sense. Thus, if we identify sense-
organs with these physiological mechanisms, we will identify far more sense-organs
than we usually count. Nudds uses the example of touch to illustrate this point.
There are, he writes, at least fifteen different physiological mechanisms involved in
perceiving that we would usually think of as tactile (Nudds 2003: 34) Of course, one
might hold that we should think of all fifteen mechanisms as distinct sense-organs.
But the problem with such a move, for our purposes here, is that the way in which
we would then be thinking of sense-organs would not be one on which bodily
awareness involved no such organs. Bodily awareness involves the functioning of
physiological mechanisms no less than do the senses. But it seems that there is some
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way in which it is right to say that it does not involve a sense-organ, as the senses
do, even if we cannot give any very clear conditions under which some part of the
body counts as a sense-organ. It might be that, as Kenny suggests, the concept of a
sense-organ is not ‘entirely precise’ (1963: 57).
For our purposes here, our inability to give such conditions need not be too
disquieting. We can, for the purposes of this thesis, work with a minimal conception
of a sense-organ as a place from which things seem to be perceived. Our everyday
conception of a sense-organ may, and probably does involve more than this. But it
seems right to say that the parts of the body we usually think of as sense-organs are
places from which things seem to be perceived, even if they are also, and we also
think of them as being more than this. In vision, we can easily identify such a place:
the place, roughly, where one’s eyes are. But two points of clarification need to be
made here. Firstly, the claim is not that things seem to be perceived, visually, from
our eyes, if this is understood as meaning that our eyes, considered (roughly)
anatomically somehow figure in visual experience as its point of origin. Rather, the
claim is just that there is a bodily location, which as a matter of fact is roughly that
of our eyes, which seems to be the place from which we see things. This place is the
sense-organ, minimally conceived. Secondly, there seeming in vision to be a place
from which things are seen does not mean that this ‘place from which’ is itself seen.
It is not, as Martin puts it, ‘an explicit element in how things are presented as being’
(2002: 409). Rather, the place from which one apparently sees is implicitly ‘marked
in one’s…experience through it being the point to which the objects perceived are
66
presented’ (ibid. 410).34 It is this aspect of the phenomenology of sense experience
with which AD Smith is concerned when he remarks on the, as he puts it,
…spatial over-againstness with which perceptual objects are given to
awareness: an over-againstness which involves a part of the body functioning
as a sense-organ (2002: 134)
There is this over-againstness in the conscious character of sense experience in that
it presents objects as ‘literally external to’ (ibid.) one’s body. It presents them as
literally external to the body by presenting to one the spatial separation between part
of the body serving as a sense-organ, and that which is perceived.
In bodily awareness, there is quite clearly no sense-organ in the sense of a place
from which things seem to be perceived in such awareness. Obviously, the pain one
feels isn’t presented when one has a headache as spatially separated from one’s
head. There is no ‘over-againstness’ in pain experience. Rather, as Smith puts it, ‘a
bodily sensation such as a headache is experienced as in your head; It is not
perceived as an object with your head’ (2002: 134). When I have a sensation of pain,
or warmth, or pins and needles, I feel these qualities in parts of my body. And, as
Kenny puts it,
In general, to sense something in a part of one’s body is not at all the same as
to sense something with a part of one’s body. (1963: 57).35
34 Cf. Wittgenstein 1955: §5.633
67
Similarly, in states of bodily awareness other than bodily sensation, such as
proprioceptive awareness, there is no place from which what I feel is felt. I do not
seem to be aware of, for example, the relative position of my hands as I hold them
out in front of me with my eyes closed, from anywhere. There is no sense-organ for
bodily awareness in the minimal sense that there doesn’t seem to be any place from
which we perceive things in such awareness. And this is very closely related to there
not being for bodily awareness the kinds of enabling conditions we have seen there
are for vision and which we will argue there are for the other senses.
2. Being in the right place
From there being no organ (minimally conceived) of bodily awareness it follows
quite straightforwardly that it lacks enabling conditions of a certain kind. The kind
of enabling conditions it lacks are had by all five of the commonly identified senses
and are those which I will argue over the course of the thesis are distinctive of the
senses. Perception in the five familiar senses is enabled, very loosely speaking, by
being in the right place. And having to be in the right place in order to perceive in
some modality is just the upshot of there being, for that modality, a sense-organ in
the minimal sense described in the previous section. I expand on this claim in this
section.
35 Kenny also emphasizes the absence of organs of emotion, and in this, the similarity of emotion to
bodily sensation (1963: 56-8).
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Because there are sense-organs involved in perception in the five familiar
modalities, perception in these modalities requires ‘getting the appropriate organs
into an appropriate relation to the object of perception’ (Shoemaker 1994: 252). In
Chapters 4–6 I will argue that this is true of touch, hearing, taste and smell.36 For
now, I will focus on vision. The ‘appropriate relation’ into which one must get the
organ, in each of the five modalities, is spatial. One must get the organ, and thereby
oneself, into the right place in order to perceive things. If there is a place from which
things are perceived, then that place (the organ) must be suitably located in order for
things to be perceived. I see things from here, where my eyes are, and so here, where
my eyes are, must be suitably situated in relation to an object if I am to see it. The
enabling condition that I argued in the previous chapter is manifest in the conscious
character of visual experience is a matter of having to get oneself, and specifically,
one’s organs of vision, into the right place in order to visually perceive things.
We said there than an enabling condition for seeing an object is its falling within the
limits fixed by the visual field— its being in the right place to be seen. Something
falls within the limits fixed by my visual field, and is thus in the right place to be
seen by me, if and only if I, and specifically, my organ of vision, is ‘in the right
place’ in relation to that object, to see it. Locating oneself such that an object falls
within the limits of the visual field is then a specification of what is meant by ‘being
in the right place’, in the case of vision. We can equally well see the condition as a
defeating or disabling condition for perception of an object. One way in which I can
36 Though we will see later in the thesis that not all of the enabling conditions that are manifest in
experience are so straightforwardly spatial- see especially Chapter 5.
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fail to see the cup on my desk is by moving my gaze so that the cup no longer falls
within those limits. Some object o’s falling in my visual field is an enabling for my
seeing it, its falling outside of the field is a disabling condition for my seeing it.
An object falling within my sensory limitations is not, of course, sufficient for
seeing it. There are also many other enabling conditions for seeing, some of which it
might also be argued are manifest in the conscious character of visual experience.
One such condition is the absence of occlusion. There being nothing in between
myself and some visible object enables me to see it, and there being some such
occluder disables visual experience.37 This enabling condition is also, like falling
within the field, a specification of what it is to be in the right place to see something.
I will not be in the right place in order to see my cup if the cup is behind the
computer. This enabling condition is manifest in the conscious character of seeing in
that it seems to us, when something becomes unoccluded, precisely as if this is what
has occurred. When something passes behind a barrier and then back into view, such
as a cat walking behind the wheels of a parked car, it seems to us as if we see it,
don’t see it, and see it again. When something which I can see becomes suddenly
occluded, as when the blinds are drawn and I can no longer see the tree outside my
window, it seems to me as if the tree has been suddenly occluded. It seems this way
in that there is a phenomenal difference for me between the tree being suddenly
occluded, and the tree disappearing. I am aware of occlusion, ‘as such’.38 Though
37 Backlit conditions aside. (See Sorensen 2008)
38 Perhaps we are also aware, in seeing the empty space between ourselves and the objects we see, of
the absence of occluding objects. The kind of over-againstness present in vision as Smith writes,
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the absence of occluders is an enabling condition for vision, in most of what follows
I will focus on the first enabling condition we discussed, that is, falling within the
field.
We can see then that lacking a sense-organ, bodily awareness will lack enabling
conditions that involve being in the right place to perceive. Generally, if for some
variety of perception there is no place from which things seem to be perceived, then
one will not have to get into the right place in order to perceive in this way. And we
have seen that there is no place from which things seem to be perceived in bodily
awareness. There being no place from which I feel my hurting foot, there is no
question of getting in the right position to feel it.39 There is no question of my being
suitably (or unsuitably) placed in order to feel the pain in my foot, or the relative
position of my hands. Wherever I go, or turn, I am aware of my feet and hands, and
my going and turning is not responsible for my feeling them.
So I have argued, in Chapter 2, that a visual enabling condition is manifest in the
conscious character of seeing. And in this section, I have said more about the kind of
enabling condition that this is, and have tried to make it clear that bodily awareness
lacks conditions of this kind. In the rest of this chapter I discuss another feature of
the enabling condition that I have been arguing is manifest in the conscious
‘implies as a possibility…that something should interpose itself between ourselves and the perceived
object so as to occlude it’ (2002: 137).
39 It might also be argued that it doesn’t seem to us that there is an organ of bodily awareness because
of the absence of manifest enabling conditions from the conscious character of this kind of
experience. This is consistent with what I say here- I do not claim that the minimal conception of a
sense-organ is explanatorily prior to that of enabling conditions being manifest to us. I return to this
point in Chapter 7.
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character of visual experience. We exploit our grasp of this condition, I argue, in
active visual attention, which is to say, in looking. There being no such enabling
conditions for bodily awareness, none are exploited in attention to one’s body.
3. Looking and bodily attention: what they have in common
It is notable that for bodily awareness we have no word to denote an activity
analogous to the visual activity we call ‘looking’. Looking is a variety of attentive
perceptual activity, along with listening, tasting, feeling, and smelling, which I will
discuss in later chapters.40 Though we have no word for it, we do actively attend to
our bodies, in bodily awareness. I want to point out, over the course of this section
and the next, a difference between looking and bodily attention, by which I mean the
kind of attention to one’s body that is possible in bodily awareness.
First though, in this section, I consider what looking and bodily attention have in
common. My purposes in pointing out these similarities are twofold. Firstly, I want
to make clear that though there is an important difference between looking and
bodily attention, none of the ways discussed in this section are ways in which these
two kinds of attention differ. Secondly, the details of the features that looking and
bodily attention have in common are crucial to the explanation of what the
40 I take it for granted that there is nothing incoherent in the notion of active perceptual attention. One
potential worry is that perception ‘owing its existence to the will’ is inconsistent with perception
being that which gives us evidence for our beliefs about the world. See Baldwin 2003 and also
O’Shaughnessy 2002 and Crowther forthcoming (a). O’Shaughnessy’s solution to this worry (which
he calls the ‘antitheticality puzzle’) is that the causal property of active perceptual attention is that of
causing external objects to cause us to perceive them (2002: 207; 398). On his view, active attention
is essential to perception playing its epistemological role (see 2002: 207).
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difference between the two kinds of attention in fact is. I will give this explanation in
the next section (section 4).
3.1 Selectivity
Looking is a form of selective attention. The selectivity of attention, as William
James puts it, ‘implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal more
effectively with others’ (quoted in C O Evans 1970: 74). One effect of this is that
when I attend, my experience has a foreground/background structure which,
arguably, is the ‘hallmark of attention’ (C O Evans: 1970: 75). In looking at the tree
outside my window, the tree comes to the ‘forefront’ of my awareness, whilst the
other things that I can also see from here (the buildings, the window I’m looking
through) recede: they are ‘recessive’ in my experience. John Campbell calls this
‘experiential highlighting’ (Campbell 2002). Bodily attention is also selective. I can
selectively attend to a particular sensation —say, a pain in my foot— or a particular
body-part —such as my left arm— or to some occurrence in my body —my heart
beating— or something that I’m doing with it, such as moving my fingers. And
when I attend in this way to my body, as in the visual case, other things of which I
am also bodily aware recede.41 The difference between bodily attention and looking,
is not then one of selectivity.
41Proprioception (our awareness of the layout and location of our body-parts) is usually experientially
recessive. See O’Shaughnessy (1989).
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3.2 Activeness
Looking is active. By this I don’t mean to suggest that it is always, or even ever, a
‘full-blooded’ action. All I mean is that looking is something that is to be contrasted
with things that merely happen to, or in one, like catching a cold, or the circulation
of blood. Looking is a form of ‘active’ attention in this way.
To say that looking is active even in this undemanding way is thereby to distinguish
it from some other things that we might call attention, for example, some of the
things that the word ‘attention’ has been used to denote in cognitive psychology.
‘Attention’ is used in the psychological literature to refer to a whole range of things
of different kinds: kinds or instances of processing, and both resources and the
distribution of those resources, for example. Shiffrin writes: ‘[a]ttention has been
used to refer to all aspects of cognition that the subject can control...and to all
aspects of cognition having to do with limited resources or capacity, and methods of
dealing with such constraints’ (quoted in Styles 2006: 1). Whilst this leads some
psychologists to deny that there is any such thing as attention, a more guarded
response is that, as Driver et al put it, ‘attention’, as the term is used in cognitive
psychology is ‘best thought of as the umbrella term for a general topic, subsuming a
host of questions about selective processing, not a single explanatory process’ (2001:
64). It is, at the very least, unclear whether any of the things that fall under this
umbrella term are things that subjects do, as looking is. It is also unclear —and there
is apparently no consensus— as to how these phenomena relate to the relatively
common-sense notion of attending as something that subjects do. Sometimes
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psychologists and philosophers talk about ‘attention’ as the subject themselves
having an effect on the information processing mechanisms psychologists postulate
in their talk about attention. It is for these psychologists and philosophers a sort of
level-crossing phenomenon, linking the conscious and sub-personal states of the
subject. Driver et al (2001) talk of ‘the attentional state of the observer’ modulating
processing. Eilan (1998) and Campbell (1997; 2002) describe attention as the
selection by the subject of information for further processing. In any case, the variety
of active perceptual attention we call looking is something that can be described and
understood without reference to the psychological story of what happens,
subpersonally, when a subject attends.
Looking being ‘active’ also distinguishes it from exogenous attention. Exogenous
attention occurs when, as we say, my attention is ‘caught’, as when a loud noise
distracts me from my reading, or a flash or sudden movement ‘catches’ my eye. (See
C O Evans 1970: 83 and 98). It seems right to say that having my attention attracted
in this way is something that happens to me, and not something that I do. It is worth
saying a bit more though about the sense in which looking is something that one
does, and thus, ‘active’.
Whilst looking is active, and just having my attention caught is not, looking is
nevertheless not something over which I always have control, or can exercise choice.
Very attractive, or novel stimuli, especially, may be very difficult, if not impossible,
for me not to look at. And neither can I always choose how much attention to give to
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the things at which I look. Just as I cannot prevent my attention being caught by very
novel or intense stimuli, so I may not be able to stop looking at something. And
some things, perhaps because they’re very stimulating, I may not be able to give
much less than all of my attention to. What nonetheless marks out looking, even in
such limiting cases, as active, is that we can speak of the way in which the subject
looks. Even when I can’t stop looking at something, or reduce the amount of
attention I give to it, we can talk of my looking more or less carefully, or
deliberately, or intensely, for example, or even lovingly or disgustedly. It is the mark
of something that one does, as opposed to something that merely happens, that we
can talk about the way in which one did it. Something doesn’t ‘happen’ to me
carefully, carelessly, lovingly, or disgustedly, and I cannot have my attention caught
in any of these ways.
Another aspect of what is meant by looking being active is that it is purposeful.
When we look, we look for a reason. This is not a feature of looking that is
additional to its being active. Looking, we have said, is active in the sense that it is
something that one does. Things that you do have success conditions which you may
fail or succeed in meeting. Things that just happen do not. Meeting these success
conditions can be said to be the purpose of the activity. There are very many
purposes with which we look, and we may have more than one of these at a time.
We look simply in order to see an object, or to see what properties it has, or what it’s
doing. We look in order to see what’s going on at a location, or to see whether
there’s anything there. We look in order to successfully perform actions and in order
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to acquire knowledge about the world.42 Looking then, understood as something
which we do, is purposeful. That is not to deny that there is a sense of ‘looking’ with
which this claim is completely at odds, as in the expression ‘looking without seeing’,
used to describe a state familiar, so I’m told, to drivers. One counts as looking in this
sense if one is merely pointed in the right direction with one’s eyes open. Certainly,
such looking does not involve any purpose. But neither is it something one does: one
does not ‘look without seeing’ carefully or intensely (or carelessly, or with a lack of
intensity, for that matter). This sense of looking is not that with which I am
concerned— what I’m interested in is looking understood as actively attending.
Bodily attention is also active in the same way that looking is. I attend to my bodily
sensations, posture, goings-on and the like more or less carefully or absent-
mindedly, and so on, and do so with a variety of purposes. One might attend to one’s
foot for example, in order to discover where it is in relation to one’s hand, or to
ascertain whether it hurts. We attend to pains and other sensations for the purpose of
discovering their intensity and quality or for less simple reasons such as determining
whether they feel worse than they did yesterday or (even) whether one should take a
day off work. Thus bodily attention and looking cannot be distinguished by
reference to one or other of them being ‘active’.
42 In this latter case, our purpose in looking might be described as getting an answer to a question, in
which case the attention is interrogative (see C O Evans 1970).
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3.3 Variety
Another way in which we can’t distinguish between acts of looking and acts of
bodily attention is less straightforward to describe than are the similarities discussed
in the previous two subsections. Understanding this feature will be
crucial to understanding the difference between looking and bodily attention that I
will discuss in the next section. Thus I will spend some time here trying to make it
clear. The account I offer owes a great deal to Thomas Crowther’s discussion of
these issues in his ‘Perceptual activity and the will’, and ‘Watching, sight and the
temporal shape of perceptual activity’ (both forthcoming).
To begin with, note that looking comes in different varieties, which we have ready
linguistic resources to pick out. We talk of looking at things, looking for or looking
out for them, and also of watching. And these different modes of expression
correspond to genuine differences amongst the kinds of perceptual activity they
denote. Here I want to point out that we can divide the varieties of looking into two.
On the one hand, we have ‘looking at’ and watching. On the other, ‘looking for’ and
‘looking out for’.
If I look at something, or watch it, I see it throughout the period of time during
which I look at or watch it. For example, if I look at my cup for two minutes, I see it
throughout that two minutes. Otherwise I do not count as looking at it. Similarly, I
only count as watching a TV programme for half an hour if I see it during that half-
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hour.43 The same is not true of all instances of looking. For example, if I look out for
something, say, the arrival of a particular bird in the tree outside my window, I do
not see the object of my attentive activity —that for which I look out— throughout
the time that I look out for it. Quite the opposite. My seeing the bird comes at the
end of my looking out for it, and brings an end to my looking out for it. And
similarly, if I look for something, say, my lost keys, I do not see them throughout the
period of time during which I look for them. Once I see them, I stop looking for
them.
In the case of bodily attention, we do not have to hand the linguistic resources that in
the visual case, make salient to us the fact that looking comes in these different
varieties. But we can nevertheless make the same distinctions amongst different
kinds of attention to one’s body as we have seen can be made in the case of looking.
If I attend to, for example, my breathing for five minutes, I am aware of my
breathing throughout that five minutes. This then is equivalent to looking at, or
watching. Though we don’t usually talk of what we might call ‘feeling for’ or
‘feeling out for’ in the same way as we do their visual equivalents ‘looking for’ and
‘looking out for’, examples of bodily attention that are analogous to these visual
cases are not difficult to find. For example, say I have reason to expect that I will get
a headache this afternoon. Perhaps I’ve taken some drug that has headaches as a side
effect, or that I always get a headache on a Wednesday afternoon. I may ‘feel out’
for a headache, just as I look out for the arrival of the bird in the tree. And as in the
43 See Crowther forthcoming (b) for some comments on the difference between ‘looking at’ and
watching.
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case of ‘looking out for…’ when I feel out for my headache, I am not aware of it
throughout the period of time in which I feel out for it. I stop feeling out for my
headache once I feel it.
We have said, in 3.2, that both looking and bodily attention are active, and therefore
purposeful. And in both varieties of looking and bodily attention the purposes one
might have are limitless. But in looking at, or watching, and in their bodily
equivalents, whatever other aims or purposes I might have, I will also have a certain
minimal aim. If I look at my cup for two minutes, or attend to my breathing for five,
my minimal aim is, as Crowther puts it, the ‘agential preservation or maintenance’
of a certain state of awareness throughout that period of time (forthcoming (a): 22).
For now, we’ll say that what one aims to maintain, or preserve, is one’s ‘selection’
of the object of one’s attentive activity— that at which one looks, or which one
watches. In looking at my cup, I aim to keep it singled out, or highlighted, in the
foreground of my experience. Similarly, in attending, bodily, to my breathing, I aim
to keep it singled out, amongst all the other potential objects of attention. And the
meeting of this minimal aim of maintaining selection occurs throughout my
attending. I keep my breathing, or my cup, singled out, so long as I attend to my
breathing, look at my cup. Let’s call cases of attention that have this minimal aim,
after Crowther, perceptual monitoring.
So we have seen, so far, that attention, whether visual or bodily, can come in two
kinds. In one case, we perceive the object of our attentive activities throughout our
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attending to it. In the other we don’t. We have called the former kind of case
‘perceptual monitoring’, and have said that these cases involve the minimal aim of
maintaining selection of the object of attention. Exemplary of the second kind of
case are ‘looking for…’, ‘looking out for…’ and their bodily equivalents. In these
cases we do not perceive the object of attention (that for which we look, or look out )
throughout our attending, thus we do not in these activities aim to maintain selection
of the object of our attentive activity. If we perceive that for which we look, or for
which we look out at all, it brings an end to our looking. Now, I want to argue that
perceptual monitoring is ubiquitous, in the following sense: ‘looking for…’ and
‘looking out for…’, and their bodily equivalents, themselves involve perceptual
monitoring, though not of course monitoring of the object of attention, considered as
that for which one is looking, or looking out (or the bodily equivalent).
In order to look out for, or look for something, I look at something else— I
perceptually monitor it. For example, when I look out for the arrival of the bird in
the tree, I look at the tree, with the minimal aim of maintaining selection of it. I
perceptually monitor the tree. And when I look for my keys, whilst I do not monitor
the keys, I may, for example, look at, and therefore successively monitor a series of
locations at which I hope to find them, or a series of objects which I hope might be
my keys. Something analogous is true in bodily attention. What I do in order to meet
the aim of ‘feeling out for’ my headache, for example, is to monitor my head. I keep
my head in the foreground of my bodily awareness, in the hope that when my
headache comes, I will notice it straight away.
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In the next section, I want to argue that despite the similarities essayed in this
section, bodily attention and looking differ in an interesting way. The interesting
difference between looking, and bodily attention, lies in what one does in each case
in perceptual monitoring. This is why it has been important, in this section, to note
not only the different kinds of both bodily attention and looking, but also the
ubiquitous nature of one of these kinds, namely, that of perceptual monitoring.
4. Looking and bodily attention: how they differ
I have argued that bodily attention and looking are both selective, active (and so
purposeful) and that both, despite the relative poverty of our linguistic resources for
talking about bodily attention, can be subdivided into different kinds. In this section
I argue that despite these differences, the two differ in an interesting way.44 The
interesting way in which they differ, I argue (in 4.1), is in what one does in what, in
the last section, I called perceptual monitoring. In visual perceptual monitoring, one
exploits one’s grasp of the kind of enabling conditions discussed in section 2 above,
in order to maintain perceptual contact with the things to which one attends. In
bodily monitoring, there are no enabling conditions one’s grasp of which one
exploits, and it does not seem right to think of what one does in bodily perceptual
monitoring as maintaining perceptual contact with anything. In section 4.2 I argue
that the kind of grasp one need have of the enabling conditions one exploits in
looking is implicit, or practical knowledge.
44 One way in which they differ that is not interesting is that in one case what one attends to is one’s
body and in the other, one can attend to very many other things that this.
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4.1 Exploiting enabling conditions
We saw in section 3.3 that both bodily attention and looking can be subdivided into
two different kinds. On the one hand, there are instances of looking, and of bodily
attention, in which one does not perceive the object of one’s attentive activity until
the end of that activity. On the other, there are those instances in which we see or
feel the object of attention throughout our looking or feeling. These latter instances
we have called perceptual monitoring. And we have argued that perceptual
monitoring is ubiquitous, in that it is also involved in the former kind of case.
Though I do not perceptually monitor the bird throughout the time during which I
look out for it, I do perceptually monitor something, the tree, in order to look out for
the bird. And though I do not feel my headache whilst I ‘feel out’ for it, I
perceptually monitor my head during this time. It was important to see that cases of
attending that are not themselves cases of perceptual monitoring nevertheless
involve such monitoring for the following reason. I want to argue that looking and
bodily attention differ in what one does in perceptual monitoring. Without taking
note of the ubiquity of perceptual monitoring, we cannot claim sufficient generality
for our account.
Both visual and bodily perceptual monitoring involve, we have said, maintaining
‘selection’ of the object of attention— keeping the cup or the headache or whatever
in the foreground of my experience, continuing to ‘highlight’ it. However in vision,
and not in bodily attention, monitoring in this way involves maintaining perceptual
contact with something, in this case, the cup. In visual perceptual monitoring, part of
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the task of monitoring is just keeping seeing the thing, or, as we often say, not
‘losing sight’ of it. In other words, in visual perceptual monitoring, one has to
maintain perceptual contact with the object of attention. And it’s in maintaining
perceptual contact with objects of visual attention that we exploit our grasp of the
enabling condition that we have been discussing here.
We have said that in order to see something, such as my cup, I have to be in the right
place. More specifically, I have to locate myself such that the cup falls within the
space delimited by my sensory limitations— within my visual field. So, in order to
keep seeing my cup, which is to say, to maintain perceptual contact with it, I have to
keep the cup within my visual field. For example, I have to not let it get too far
away, or go too far away from it, or turn my back on it. It’s in this way that I exploit
my grasp of the enabling condition in looking. I exploit it in order to maintain visual
perceptual contact with my cup, or with whatever else that I’m looking at. And
since, as we said in section 2, the enabling conditions with which we are concerned
here can just as well be understood as defeating or disabling conditions, I can also
exploit my grasp of them in order to put an end to perceptual contact with my cup. I
can exploit my grasp of them in order to stop seeing my cup. I can turn away from it,
or get very far away, or fail to follow as it is carried out of the room.
In bodily attention, maintaining my ‘selection’ of the object of attention, such as my
headache, does not involve maintaining perceptual contact with my headache.
Thinking of it being ‘perceptual contact’ that is maintained in bodily perceptual
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monitoring doesn’t seem right. Keeping my headache at the forefront of my
awareness, I am not keeping feeling it. I am doing something, namely, maintaining
my selection of it. But I am not actively keeping feeling it, as I actively keep seeing
my cup. I am woefully unable to stop feeling it, at least, in the way in which I can
stop seeing my cup. I cannot stop feeling my headache in the sense that there are no
enabling conditions analogous to those there are for vision, that I can exploit in order
to do so. There is nothing analogous to turning away, or getting further away that I
can do in order to no longer feel my headache, or the relative position of my hands,
or the itch in my foot. And correlatively, there is nothing like this that I do in order
to keep feeling these things. I don’t keep my body-part or sensation within some
bodily field in monitor it. I don’t more generally, ‘stay in the right place’ to feel my
headache.45 There are no relevant bodily enabling conditions my grasp of which I
can exploit in bodily attention.
The point is not that we are unable to do things to stop bodily awareness just because
the things of which I can have bodily awareness are extremely good at attracting our
attention, and very difficult not to attend to, though this is no doubt true. There are
also potential objects of vision that, as discussed above, it might be very difficult for
me not to look at, because they are very novel or otherwise interesting. Nevertheless,
in order to maintain visual contact even with the exciting, novel stimulus at which
one finds it hard not to look, one has to exploit one’s grasp of an enabling condition.
One has to keep even these exciting things within one’s visual field. And one could,
45 Similarly, I don’t have to get into or stay in right place to feel an emotion. Kenny (1963: 57)
emphasizes this consequence of there being no organs of emotion as there are sense-organs.
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in principle, turn away from them and thus stop seeing them. There is nothing
analogous that I could do to stop feeling my pain, or the position of my hands, even
in principle.
The qualification that there is nothing that I can do to put an end to bodily awareness
that is analogous to what I can do in the visual case is an important one. There are of
course things I could do to alleviate or stop pain, or other bodily sensations. I can
scratch an itch, or rub a sore knee, or take paracetamol and if I’m lucky, the itch or
the pain will go away. But this is not exploiting a defeating condition for awareness
of a bodily sensation. Rather, it seems to be best understood as an alleviation or
reduction of the painfulness or itchiness itself, analogous to rubbing out a picture in
order no longer to see it, rather than to turning away from it. And since I have only
so much attention to go round, I can also find ways of distracting my bodily
attention from pain, or my posture, or movement, by deliberately devoting more of it
to something else. I might, for example, concentrate very hard on the movement of
my fingers in order to distract myself from my headache. Doing this is not like
moving one’s gaze away from something that one sees, and no longer wants to see,
by turning around, or moving away. Rather, it’s a matter of our being able,
sometimes at least, to give more or less attention to some of those things of which
we are aware. Simply giving more or less attention to something is not exploiting an
enabling condition. The visual analogue for distracting oneself from pain is not
moving one’s gaze away from something, but instead the way in which we can shift
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our attention between the things that we can see, within the visual field, without
moving our gaze.
4.2 Grasp of enabling conditions
I have spoken, in this section, of enabling conditions for visual perception being
‘grasped’ and ‘exploited’ in looking. I argue in this final subsection of this chapter
that one need not have an explicit grasp of these conditions in order to exploit them
in looking in the way in which I have argued that we do. One’s grasp of these
conditions can be merely implicit or practical.
One way in which we might grasp the enabling conditions for visual perception is
‘explicitly’. By having an explicit grasp of visual enabling conditions one might
mean that someone who has such a grasp can say what the enabling conditions for
visual perception are. Or, less demandingly, one might mean that one who has
explicit grasp of the enabling conditions for visual perception can give appropriate
explanations of why they perceived what they did, or of what they did in order to
perceive, on a given occasion.46 So, for example, someone who was able to give
explanations such as ‘I saw the cup because I was facing it and there was nothing
between me and it’, or ‘I didn’t see it because I turned my back on it’ might count as
having this kind of explicit grasp of enabling and defeating conditions for visual
46 This is what John Campbell has in mind by an ‘explicit’ grasp of the simple theory of perception
and action that, in his view, plays an important role in self-consciousness (see Campbell 1995).
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experience. The ability to give such explanations might be based on actually being
able to say what the enabling conditions for vision are, or it might not.
If the enabling conditions are grasped ‘explicitly’, in either of these ways, then how
might we think of the enabling conditions as exploited in looking? If the grasp one
has of the enabling conditions for vision is explicit, then one might exploit that grasp
by, as Roessler puts it, ‘engaging in practical reasoning about what to do in order to
acquire…information’ (1999: 58). One’s exploitation of one’s explicit grasp of the
enabling conditions would consist in this practical reasoning about what to do. Such
reasoning might be along the lines of ‘I want to keep seeing at the cup, in order to
keep seeing something I must keep facing it, therefore I will keep facing the cup’.
Perhaps.
It’s not easy to give a general account of the distinction between explicit and implicit
grasp, and I don’t intend to try to do so here. It’s enough for us to say, here, that
one’s exploitation of the enabling conditions involving only grasping them
implicitly, would involve just doing the right things in order to see things, and not
doing things that are obviously wrong. For example, one would count as implicitly
grasping the enabling condition discussed in this and the previous chapter (keeping
things within the field) if one followed things with one’s gaze in order to keep
seeing them, and did not turn one’s back on them. We might think of the implicit
grasp of the enabling conditions as a kind of practical knowledge or know-how, just
constituted by doing the right things, in the right circumstances, in order to maintain
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perceptual contact with the objects of perception. I think that we should say that the
grasp of enabling conditions exploited in looking is implicit, and not explicit.
To see why I think this, consider first that whatever kind of grasp of enabling
conditions is involved in their exploitation in looking, it’s required that we be able to
attribute that kind of grasp to any creature that can look. Nothing to which we cannot
attribute this grasp can be said to look, in the active, attentive sense described here.
This, I think, is just intuitive. We wouldn’t count someone or something as looking
unless they did the right things in their looking— moving their gaze to follow
moving objects, or to maintain contact with stationary objects as they themselves
move, for example. The question is whether their doing the right things constitutes
their grasp of the conditions thus exploited, or if it is to be explained by an explicit
grasp of the conditions.
Now, children, even those under three, are able to look. They are able to, for
example, follow things with their gaze. And they can acquire knowledge about the
world from their looking. From this, we can conclude that they have at least an
implicit grasp of the enabling conditions. These young children are sensitive to
enabling conditions in other ways, too— they are sensitive to the fact that different
factors affect whether someone else will be able to touch, smell, see (and so on) a
stimulus, in certain circumstances. In an experiment conducted by Yaniv and Shatz,
even three year olds ‘made meaningful judgements about the effects of occlusion
and distance on perceptibility of stimuli to other perceivers’. They also understood
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‘the differential effects of occlusion on hearing versus touching’, i.e., that something
can be heard, but not felt through a barrier, and ‘assessed correctly the effects of
distance on hearing and seeing versus touching’ (1988: 100). It was found that older
children —four and five year olds— made fewer mistakes and were able to take
account of intensity of stimuli on whether it would be perceived. Nevertheless, even
the three year olds had some sensitivity, though perhaps incomplete, to the enabling
conditions there are for different modalities.
What Yaniv and Shatz found that the three year olds are not able to do —or at least,
much less able to do than the older children— is to give explanations of their own,
or other’s perceptions, or lack thereof, in certain circumstances. They can answer
‘Can Ernie see the duck?’ when the duck is behind a wall, correctly (‘No!’) but they
cannot say why Ernie cannot see the duck. And this, at the very least, means that we
have no reason to think of the children’s grasp of the enabling conditions as anything
more than implicit. They grasp the enabling conditions just in that they do the right
things in order to look. Other studies have shown that children under the age of four
have a more general inability to say how they acquired a certain item of knowledge,
for example, by seeing, feeling, or even by being told. O’Neill and Chong (2001)
found that this is so even when the children are given the opportunity to show
experimenters how they found out, rather than telling them.
The —or at least one— reason why these findings are so surprising and puzzling is
that we have every reason to think that children can look at things, and, by so doing,
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find out about them. We would not count them as looking, I have suggested, if they
did not ‘do the right things’ in order to see, or keep seeing. Whilst they may in some
circumstances have trouble understanding which properties or features can be
discovered by looking, as opposed to feeling, there doesn’t seem to be any evidence
at all to suggest that they ever expect to see things to which their backs are turned, or
which are behind opaque barriers.47
So, if children did not ‘do the right things’ in order to see, we would not say that
they look. And since they cannot apparently give explanations even of particular
perceptions, we cannot say that their grasp of the enabling conditions is explicit.
And of course, neither do we have reason to think of animals as having an explicit
grasp of the enabling conditions for vision, though they competently track objects in
their environment, in a way that exhibits implicit grasp of the conditions. We have
said that the grasp of enabling conditions involved in their exploitation in looking
had better be attributable to creatures that we think can look. Since we cannot
attribute explicit grasp of enabling conditions to children under the age of three, or
to animals, and yet, both can look, then the grasp of enabling conditions attributable
to any creature that can look must be implicit.
I should say, finally, that none of this is to deny that adult human perceivers do in
fact have an explicit grasp of the enabling conditions for seeing, or perceiving in any
other modality. Neither is it to deny that this grasp has some significance for us,
47 See for example Robinson et al (2008) for more details on what children of different ages do and
do not know about how they have gained a particular item of knowledge.
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perhaps allowing us to do things of which animals and pre-school children are
incapable.48 And, I have said that I am concerned in this thesis primarily with the
senses of adult human perceivers. But this is not because our possessing senses
somehow depends on our having an explicit grasp of the enabling conditions I will
be discussing over the next few chapters. There is no reason to think that, for
example, our ability to maintain visual contact with objects depends on this explicit
grasp. And nothing I say about the significance of counting all and only those
perceptual faculties as senses that have these enabling conditions, will depend on
these conditions being ones that are grasped explicitly by perceivers. My focus on
adult human perception is entailed, as was said at the end of the previous chapter,
largely by my concern with the phenomenology of experience.
In this chapter and in Chapter 2 I have argued that bodily awareness lacks a certain
kind of enabling condition that vision has, and that these enabling conditions are
manifest in the conscious character of visual perceiving, and exploited in actively
visually attending (looking). It is having these enabling conditions, which bodily
awareness does not have, that, I will argue, is distinctive about the senses. In the
next chapter, we discuss the sense of touch.
48 Child argues that mastery of the enabling conditions for seeing is required for one to have the
concept of vision (1996: 164ff)
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Chapter 4: Touch
In Chapters 2 and 3, I identified a way in which vision and bodily awareness differ:
enabling conditions for perception are manifest in the conscious character of visual
perception, and not in bodily experience, though that experience, we are assuming, is
also perceptual. Furthermore, I argued, these manifest enabling conditions are
exploited in looking. In this chapter, I will argue that in touch, enabling conditions
are manifest, and exploited in active perceptual attention, too.
Whilst touch and vision thus share a common feature, they also differ in ways that
are significant for the argument of this chapter. Perhaps the most obvious is that
there are different enabling conditions for touch than for vision. We spoke, in the
previous chapter, of making and maintaining perceptual contact with objects of
vision. To make and maintain visual perceptual contact in this way with an object is
just to see and keep seeing it. We may talk, analogously, of keeping feeling an object
as maintaining tactile perceptual contact with it. But to touch an object, one makes
contact with it in a much more literal way than one does in vision. Something that I
touch is in literal contact with me, in that there is no space between me and it; it is
‘on’ me. That tactile perception is enabled by literal contact I will not need to argue,
since it is, I take it, obvious. It being obvious, I need not argue, either, that this
enabling condition for touch is, in some way, manifest to us. But considering
features specific to touch, which it does not share with vision, will help us to see
how it is that contact enables touch, and also how it is that in touch, as in vision,
enabling conditions are manifest and exploited.
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In section 1 I argue that, touch being enabled by literal contact with the body, we can
make sense of the notion of a tactile sense-organ, despite first appearances to the
contrary. However, touch being thus enabled means that parts of the body serve as a
place from which things are perceived in a very different way from the way in which
the eyes do in vision. In section 2 I discuss what is involved in contact with a part of
the body serving as a sense-organ enabling tactile perception. On Mike Martin’s
account, when this contact is made, one has bodily sensations that are also tactile
perceptions. I will point out the significance to this account of a certain structural
feature of bodily sensation, in virtue of which feeling one’s body to be a certain way
can, in certain cases, be to have an experience of touching something that is beyond
one’s bodily boundaries. I argue in section 3 that this structural feature of bodily
sensation is one of the aspects of experience implicated in tactile enabling conditions
being manifest to us, and in section 4, I discuss the way in which we exploit our
grasp of this condition in feeling.
1. Organs and enabling conditions in vision and touch
In this section I argue that despite first appearances the notion of a sense-organ is
applicable to touch as it is to vision (1.1). However, tactile perception having the
enabling condition that it does, parts of the body do not serve as sense-organs in
touch in the same way as the eyes serve as the organ of vision (1.2).
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1.1 Parts of the body as tactile sense-organs
On the face of it, the idea of a tactile sense-organ faces serious difficulties. Whilst in
vision, and also in hearing, smell and taste, there are relatively discrete body-parts
involved in perception of the relevant kind, in touch, there doesn’t seem to be any
such body-part. The obstacle in the way of identifying such a body-part, as
Armstrong points out, is that the whole body is tactually sensitive (1993: 211). More
often than not, tactile exploration is carried out with one’s hands, no doubt because
of their dexterity and the fact that unlike other body-parts, we can also, and with
ease, use our hands to pick up the objects we touch. But we can and do touch things
with parts of our body other than our hands. I can currently feel the floor beneath my
feet, and when I drink from my glass, I feel it against my lips. And so on. The whole
body is tactually sensitive in that tactile perception of an object is enabled by
bringing that object into literal contact with any part of the body. This is true even of
tactile perception of such insubstantial things as the warm air in the room.
Perception of the warm air is enabled by its being in literal contact with me. I feel
the warm air in the room because it, or at least, some part of it, is on my skin.
If, in asking what the organ of touch is, we want to know which part of the body this
organ is, we shall not then get an answer to satisfy. Nevertheless, it being the case
that touch is enabled by contact with any part of the body, we can say that on any
occasion of tactile perception, there is always a part or sometimes several parts of
the body that serve as an organ in the minimal sense of a place from which things
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seem to be perceived, as introduced in Chapter 3.49 The part of my body that, on
some occasion of tactile perception, serves as the place from which things are
perceived is the part of my body with which I feel that which I feel, by making
contact with it, understanding ‘body-part’, here, as being loosely anatomical.
Usually, I feel something, such as my cup, with a part of my body, such as my hand,
by making direct contact between object and body-part, that is, between cup and
hand. I can only feel some of the properties of which I may be aware in tactile
perception, such as the temperature either of the air or of objects, by making direct
contact with that which has the property. But the contact that is made with such
body-parts and enables tactile perception can also be, in a certain respect, indirect.
Tactile perception of temperature aside, I can feel things, in ‘extended touch’
without making direct contact with them.50 The most obvious example of extended
touch is the use a blind person makes of a stick, to feel their way around. Other,
everyday cases of extended touch are my feeling the board at the end of the chalk
with which I write, or the ground through the heels of my shoes. When a blind
person, or anyone else for that matter, uses a stick to feel around, what they feel
seems to be not in the hand that holds the stick, but where it is, at the far end of the
stick. This seeming has been experimentally confirmed. It has been found that
getting a subject to cross their arms can cause them to misjudge the temporal order
49 In many cases, there is not one, but several places on one’s body from which one simultaneously
feels things. For example, if I grasp the rim of a glass with my fingers, I feel it at five points on my
body. Or, stamping on the ground, I feel the floor on the soles of both my feet. These all seem to me
to be distinct places on my body from which I feel things- this is unlike vision, in which, though we
have two eyes, normal visual experience has only a single apparent point of origin.
50 There are other properties which I can only feel by making direct contact with the bearers of those
properties, for example, wetness and dryness.
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of stimuli delivered in quick succession to each hand. Shinya Yamamoto and
Shigeru Kitazawa (2001) report similar findings when the stimulation is delivered
instead to the tips of crossed, unseen drumsticks, held in uncrossed hands. As
Moizumi et al. comment on these findings:
If individuals perceive stimuli exclusively at their hands where skin receptors
are actually located, the subjective temporal order would never depend on the
stick configuration when the hands remain uncrossed (2007: 61)
It has been argued that in extended touch, the body itself seems to be extended so as
to incorporate the tool with which things are felt. Iriki et al (1996) found bimodal
(vision and bodily awareness) neurons in monkeys which appeared to encode the
‘schema of the hand’. During tool use, the visual receptive fields of these neurons
extended to include the tool. This, they argue, suggests that the tool was
incorporated, temporarily, into the ‘hand schema’ in the monkeys’ brains. This
might be thought to suggest that we should understand our feeling something at the
end of a stick as an unusual case of feeling something as on the surface of the body.
Of course, the stick is not really part of one’s body, but, on this view, it seems as if it
is when we feel something at the end of it.
However, this would be too incautious a conclusion. The body schema, at least as
the term is usually used, is a subpersonal representation of the body that plays a role
in movement and posture (Gallagher and Cole 1995). That this schema is sometimes
extended to include tools does not show that one’s own conscious representation of
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one’s body comes to include the stick in one’s hand when one feels something at the
end of it. It does not show that the stick seems to one to be part of one’s body. And,
in fact, introspection tells us that that this is not how things seem. Though the object
I poke with a stick seems to be at the end of the stick, I feel no sensation at the
location where stick and felt object meet. The sensation I feel is in my hand. My
body doesn’t seem to me to extend to the end of the stick, though that which I touch
does feel to be at the end of the stick, and not in my hand.
Nevertheless one still makes literal contact with the things one feels in extended
touch in a way that one does not with things that one sees. Feeling things that are not
in direct contact with my body is not like seeing things at a distance. One still makes
literal contact with the things one feels in extended touch, but the contact one makes
with them is indirect, via contact made with another object. I make contact with the
board on which I write indirectly, by making direct contact with the chalk, that is in
turn in direct contact with the board. There are no instances of what we usually think
of as tactile perception in which no contact is made, or seems to be made, with that
which is felt, even indirectly.51 Thus, we can say, we always feel things as being at
the limits or boundaries of some object, either those of our bodies, when we make
direct contact with the objects of touch, or those of some other object, such as a
stick, when the contact made is indirect.
51 That’s not to deny that we can imagine some kind of ‘virtual touch’ device that simulates normal
touch, without actual contact being made with one’s body. Still, if such a device were to be
sufficiently touch-like then it would have also to simulate such contact being made.
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It should not be thought to follow from the fact that in extended touch one feels
something at the boundaries of some other object, that the place from which I feel
things in extended touch, and thus that which serves as the organ of touch, is the end
of the object which is in direct contact with the things which I feel. Rather, what
these cases show is that the place from which one feels, that is, the body-part serving
as an organ on some occasion of touching, is not always the place at which one feels
that which one touches. As in vision, the place from which things are perceived in
touch is the phenomenal point of origin of the experience, that is, the place in
relation to which that which is perceived seems to be perceived.52 And in all touch,
even extended touch, the point of origin is a part of one’s body. If I poke an object
with a stick I hold in my hand, my hand is still the place from which I seem to feel
the object, even though the object is not in direct contact with my hand. Thus, parts
of the body can serve as the organ of touch without being in direct contact with the
objects thereby felt. Nevertheless, these body-parts are, as we have said, in indirect
contact with felt objects, by being in contact with tools that are in direct contact with
them. So, though the fact that touch, unlike vision, is enabled by literal contact with
the body means that the notion of a sense-organ is, despite first appearances,
applicable to touch, it also follows from touch being thus enabled that parts of the
body serve as a tactile sense-organ in a rather different way from that in which the
eyes serve as the organ of vision. For one, they do not serve, as the eyes do in vision,
as the origin of a field, as I will discuss in the next subsection.
52 Sorenson (forthcoming) calls this phenomenal point of origin the ‘station point’.
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1.2 No tactile field
Things don’t of course have to be in literal contact with my eyes in order for me to
see them. This is not the way in which my eyes serve as the place from which things
are seen— the visual sense-organ, minimally conceived. Rather, in vision, the eyes
serve as the point of origin of visual experience by being at the apex of the cone-
shaped boundaries our awareness of which constitutes vision having a field. The
place from which things are seen, we can say, is the origin of the field, whereas
places from which things are felt, I will argue, serve as the points of origin of tactile
experience, without being the origin of a field. In Chapters 2 and 3 we saw that there
being a visual field is to be understood in terms of visual experience having a certain
structural feature in virtue of which we are aware of these visual sensory limitations.
Visual perception of an object, o, is enabled by o falling within the region delimited
by one’s sensory limitations, and defeated by o falling beyond them. The idea of a
field, and thus of awareness of sensory limitations is not applicable to touch.
To see that it is not thus applicable, consider the way in which, in vision, I move my
gaze in order to affect what falls within my visual sensory limitations. Looking
straight ahead of me, I see some papers on a desk. Turning my head, and thus my
gaze, these things no longer fall within my visual sensory limitations. Now, what
falls there, and thus what I can see, is a window, and beyond that, a tree. As I slowly
turn my head, the papers gradually pass out of view, the window gradually into it.
Now consider a tactile experience as I feel my way along a wall in a dark room. As
my hands move along the wall, I feel one part of it after another. If there are tactile
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sensory limitations, analogous to those there are in vision, there should be some
principled way of saying what falls within them, at a particular time. So, for
example, we should be able to say whether what falls within my tactile limitations
are just the parts of the wall with which I am currently in contact, or larger portions
of the wall than this. This is not to say that in vision, one is always, or even ever,
aware of where the boundaries of the region of space fixed by one’s sensory
limitations lie. We saw in Chapter 2 that one is aware of these limitations not in that
one can tell where they are, but in that it seems to one that the region of space within
which things are visible from where one is, does not stretch on indefinitely. The
point, for our purposes here, is that there is a distinction between things or places
that do fall within the visual limitations, and things that don’t. Someone standing
behind me, for example, does not fall within them.
Furthermore, there is for vision an explanation for why something that falls within
the limitations might nevertheless be unseen. If something gets directly in front of
me, as I turn towards the window, I will not see the window, and the tree beyond.
Occlusion by the intervening object explains why not. There is no such explanation
to be had for touch. As Martin writes, ‘there seems to be no possible explanation,
analogous to occlusion in the visual case why one fails to tactually perceive’ (1992:
200–1). And this is an obstacle to the notion of a tactile field. Given the absence of
an explanation, analogous to occlusion, for why something that falls within the
postulated tactile field is nevertheless unseen, we would have to say that what falls
within this tactile field at a given time is either (a) only what is perceived at that
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time, or (b) everything, On (a), what falls within my supposed tactile sensory
limitations as I creep along the wall are only the parts of the wall with which I’m
currently in contact. On (b), the whole of the wall, from beginning to end (and a
great deal else besides), falls within the limitations of which I am purportedly aware.
If we accept either of these options, it’s not clear what the force of saying that we are
aware of tactile sensory limitations would be. If only what is currently felt falls
within them, in what sense do we have in tactile experience limits within which
things are perceptible, which is what our awareness of sensory limitations gives us
in vision? And if the limits stretch out indefinitely, as in (b), then it doesn’t look as if
we’re talking about anything recognizable as ‘limits’ any more. There is not the
requisite ‘boundedness’ for talk of awareness of sensory limits to be meaningful.
Limitations within which everything falls, are just not limitations.53
So, whilst in vision, the place from which things are seen is the apex and origin of
the visual field, there being no tactile field, the place from which things are felt on a
given occasion does not serve as the origin of a field. There being no tactile field,
we do not feel things as being within a space within which things are tactually
perceptible, as we see things as being within a space within which they are visually
perceptible. Instead, as we have said in this section, one feels the things one feels at
the boundaries of an object— usually, one’s body. In cases of extended touch, we
53 A mark of there being no awareness of sensory limitations in tactile experience, as in bodily
awareness, is that we are not tactually aware of empty space, or at least, not in a way that is analogous
to the way in which we see it. If I place my hands on the bookends in my example from Chapter 2, I
am tactually aware of their locations, and of the distance between them. But my tactile awareness,
just like my bodily awareness, is neutral as to the presence or absence of anything between the two
bookends.
102
feel things as at a distance from our body not at a distance from us in space, but at
the far end of another object, with which we are, in turn, in direct contact.
This is not to say that we are only aware of those parts of objects with which we are
in literal bodily contact, directly, or indirectly. We can also be aware of objects we
feel extending beyond the parts of them with which we are in direct or indirect
contact, and in some cases we are quite good at judging, on the basis of such
awareness, how far the objects we feel extend beyond their surfaces with which we
are thus in contact.54 Solomon and Turvey (1988), for example, report that subjects
can perceive the distances reachable by unobserved rods, held in the hand, and
moved around from the wrist. Though one can be aware, in touch, of the things one
feels as extending beyond the surface with which we feel them, and against which
they are felt, one can only be thus aware of any part of something which one feels,
by being in bodily contact with it, directly or indirectly.
In this section I have made much of the fact that tactile perception is enabled by
contact being made with the boundaries of one’s body. The point has not of course
been to argue that this is so, since I take it that this is quite obvious. However, from
the fact that touch is thus enabled it follows that despite first appearances, the idea of
a sense-organ (minimally conceived) is applicable to touch. It is applicable in that on
each occasion of tactile perception there is some part of one’s body that is the place
from which things are perceived. However, we have seen that touch being enabled
54 Tactile perception of ambient temperature provides an interesting case. Though I feel the warmth of
the air in the room with the surface of my exposed skin, the warmth doesn’t seem to be just there, on
those surfaces. Rather, it seems to me just to be warm here. See also Chapter 6.
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by literal contact with the body, these parts of the body serve as an organ in a
different way from that in which the eyes serve as the organ of vision. Whereas the
eyes serve as the point of origin of visual experience by being the origin of the visual
field, body-parts serve as the point of origin of tactile experience by contact being
made with the boundaries of an object— one’s body, or in extended touch, those of
another object, with which one’s body is in turn in direct contact.
In section 3 I will discuss the way in which this enabling condition is manifest in the
conscious character of tactile experience, and in particular, the features of the
conscious character of experience that make manifest to us this tactile enabling
condition. In vision, an enabling condition for seeing is manifest in the conscious
character of visual perceptual experience in virtue of the structural feature in virtue
of which vision has a field. Since touch does not have a field, the tactile enabling
condition just discussed is clearly not manifest in virtue of any directly analogous
structural feature of tactile perceptual experience. We need then to appeal to
different features of experience in order to explain this tactile enabling condition
being manifest. I will argue, in section 3, that tactile enabling conditions are
manifest partly in virtue of a structural feature of bodily awareness. In order to see
how it is that tactile enabling conditions can be manifest in an aspect of bodily
awareness, we need to understand the relation between these two kinds of
perception. I will argue in the next section that contact with one’s body enables
tactile perception because when such contact is made, one has bodily sensations that,
in having this structural feature, are also tactile perceptions.
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2. Touch and the structure of bodily sensation
In the section following this one (section 3), I want to argue that one feature of
experience that makes manifest to us the tactile enabling condition is a structural
feature that bodily sensation, and bodily awareness in general, has. In order to
understand how this can be so, we need first to be clear on the relation between
bodily sensation and tactile perception. In Martin’s view, this is a relation of
identity: certain bodily sensations just are tactile perceptions.
In this section, I introduce Martin’s view that certain bodily sensations just are
tactile perceptions. I want to emphasize, in particular, the role played in his account
by a structural feature of bodily sensation that we met briefly in chapter 2— this is
the very same structural feature that makes manifest to us the tactile enabling
condition. AD Smith takes Martin’s account to require supplementation— in
addition to the conscious character of bodily sensation, on Smith’s view, we need to
appeal to a phenomenon he calls the Anstoss to explain how it is that when we have
certain bodily sensations, we have tactile perceptions. I argue that Martin’s view
does not require this supplementation. It is because bodily sensations have the
structural feature to be discussed here that, on Martin’s account, we do not need to
appeal to anything extrinsic to the conscious character of certain bodily sensations to
explain how it is that in having them, we have experiences of touch.
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2.1 The Anstoss
Consider the experience you have when you press your finger against a hard surface,
such as the rim of a glass. An uncontroversial claim about your experience is this:
you have a bodily sensation in your finger— your finger feels to be some way to
you, and also you have a tactile perception— you feel the glass with which your
finger is in contact. But perhaps less uncontroversial is Martin’s view that in this
case your bodily sensation, and your tactile perception are identical. Martin writes:
We should think of this case not as one in which we have two distinct states
of mind, a bodily sensation and tactile perception, both of which can be
attended to; but instead simply one state of mind, which can be attended to in
different ways. (1992: 204)55
Now one might, as AD Smith does, think that this sounds not just controversial, but
also rather mysterious.56 One reason for finding Martin’s claim mysterious would be
thinking, as Smith does, that ‘no sensations…of themselves constitute perception’
(2002: 155, my italics). The pressure sensation I have in my finger as I press it
against the glass, on Smith’s view, could occur without even giving me awareness of
55 On O’Shaughnessy’s view, the bodily state is the representative vehicle for the tactile state. But
this is one of the differences between Martin and O’Shaughnessy’s views that shall not concern us
here.
56 Smith’s assertion that, in order to be illuminating, the claim that certain bodily sensations just are
tactile perceptions requires supplementation might be reinforced by the somewhat misleading
wording of the above quote from Martin (misleading, at least, when it’s taken out of context). For the
wording Martin chooses here makes it sound as if the bodily sensation of pressure in one’s finger
being a tactile perception might be dependent on one attending to it in the requisite way. This
encourages the thought that it is in some respect ‘optional’ whether this pressure sensation seems to
one to be a tactile perception, in the sense that something other than the pressure sensation itself is
required in order for the experience one has, when one has it, to be a tactile perception. It should be
clear from what follows that it is not in this respect optional.
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my body, since sensations of all kinds, ‘of themselves give us notice only of
themselves’ (2002: 157). We need not be bothered by this claim here— we are
assuming that bodily sensation, and indeed, bodily awareness in general does, as
Smith puts it ‘constitute perception’. Bodily sensations are perceptual in that they
‘give us notice’ of our bodies. (I return to this again later.)
However, one might take Martin’s view of the relation between bodily sensation and
touch to be mysterious even if one accepts a perceptual view of bodily sensations.
The apparent mystery here lies in the fact that not all bodily sensations are tactile
perceptions. When I have a headache, or pins and needles in my foot, even if we
accept that I thereby perceive my body, I do not, in so doing, have any tactile
perception at all. And as Smith writes, ‘a throbbing sensation at the end of my finger
does not reveal the rim of the glass to me, even if it is in contact with the glass’
(2002: 168). Thus we might think that some further explanation is required, other
than the nature of the sensation itself, of why some sensations —such as pressure
sensations— are tactile perceptions, when others are not. This is what Smith thinks.
And on his view, that to which we need to appeal, over and above anything intrinsic
to character of the sensation itself, is a phenomenon he calls the Anstoss.
The Anstoss is, he writes, ‘a check or impediment to our active self-movement: an
experienced obstacle to our animal striving, as when we push or pull against things’
(2002: 153; Smith’s italics). As I move my finger out through the space in front of
me, after a brief while, it collides with the rim of the glass and I can move it no
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further. When my finger collides with the glass, I not only feel a sensation at some
location at the tip of my finger, at the place where it makes contact with the glass. I
also feel my movement checked, through, presumably, proprioceptive and
kinaesthetic awareness involving the muscles in my finger, and also in my hand,
arm, and perhaps even more extensive regions of my body. And in feeling my
movement checked in this way, I feel myself to be, Smith says, ‘sensibly
encountering a foreign body’ (2002: 154). I thus, on Smith’s view, feel something
external to my body —in this case the glass— not just in virtue of having a sensation
of pressure in my finger, but because I feel my own resistance to this pressure,
which is to say, the check to my active movement Smith calls the Anstoss. For
Smith, it is this experience of the Anstoss that explains how it is that in the case
under discussion, I have not just a bodily sensation, but also a tactile experience—
an experience of something beyond my bodily boundaries.
I want to argue in this section that there is no mystery to Martin’s account as it
stands— it is not right to think that the Anstoss is required to explain our having
tactile perception when we have certain bodily sensations (though Smith’s
discussion does bring out what is involved in having some of these sensations). We
can see that it’s not required, firstly, if we consider the difference between those
bodily sensations that are tactile perceptions, and those that are not. In those that are,
one’s body seems a certain way that it could not seem without one thereby seeming
to feel something beyond one’s bodily boundaries. In those bodily sensations that
are not tactile perceptions this is not the case. I discuss this difference in section 2.2.
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And furthermore, we get to have bodily sensations that just are tactile perceptions
because our bodily sensations have a certain structural feature. Their having this
structural feature completes the explanation we need to give of why no appeal to
anything extrinsic to the conscious character of the sensations themselves is required
in order to explain how it is that in having them, one has a tactile perceptual
experience— this I discuss in 2.3.
2.2 Different kinds of bodily sensation
So, we have seen that on Smith’s view, something other than the conscious character
of bodily sensation itself is required in order to explain how it is that when one has
certain bodily sensations, such as those of pressure, one also has tactile perceptual
experiences. One reason one might agree with Smith is that it is not the case that
every time one has a bodily sensation, one has a tactile experience. And so, one
might think, in those cases in which one does seem to touch something, there must
be something in addition to the conscious character of the sensation that explains the
tactile phenomenology. To see that nothing additional, such as Smith’s Anstoss is
required, we will start by considering a distinction between two kinds of quality of
which one might seem to be aware in bodily sensation.
Some qualities of which we seem to be aware in bodily sensations, seem to be
objective, mind-independent states of one’s body. Pressure is one of these qualities.
When one has a sensation of pressure one does not just have a funny feeling of one-
knows-not-what at some location in or on one’s body. Rather, one seems to
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experience one’s body as being quite straightforwardly some way at the relevant
location. And the way it seems to feel, obviously enough, is pressed against.
Similarly, in having a sensation of warmth in my arm, I seem to be aware, simply, of
my arm being warm. These bodily sensations are ones we can classify, following
Armstrong’s terminology (1962; 1993), as transitive, in that the qualities of which
one is thus aware are ones that seem, on the face of it, to be distinct from their being
sensed. Thus, we can distinguish between warmth and a sensation of warmth, and
pressure and a sensation of pressure.
To have a sensation of heat in the hand is simply to feel that our hand is hot:
a bodily perception that may or may not correspond to physical reality. To
have a sensation of pressure in the back is simply to feel that something is
pressing into our back. (Armstrong 1993: 309)
Not all bodily sensations are transitive in this way. In other bodily sensations there is
not, or not obviously, any state of or happening in one’s body of which one seems to
be aware in having that bodily sensation. If I have a bodily sensation of pain in my
knee, it does not seem to me, just in having that sensation, that there is some way my
knee objectively is, in being painful. And if I have pins and needles in my foot, there
is no objective quality that my foot seems to have, in feeling that way. These are
bodily sensations that we can classify as intransitive. In intransitive bodily
sensations, there is at least on the face of it, no distinction to be made between the
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quality of which one is aware, and one’s awareness of that quality.57 One cannot,
(and again, it’s enough for us to say here: at least on the face of it) have a pain of
which one is not aware, or feel as if one is in pain when one is not. As Armstrong
puts it —though this he goes on to reject— ‘a pain or an itch is a felt pain or a felt
itch, and an unfelt pain or itch is nothing’ (1993: 311).
Now, as we have said, a sensation of pressure in one’s finger, unlike one of pain,
clearly falls on the ‘transitive’ side of the aforementioned divide. When one feels a
sensation of pressure, the sensation not only seems to have some objective, bodily
location, but there is also some objective way one’s body seems to be at that
location. And this goes part of the way to explaining why nothing in addition to the
conscious character of the sensation, such as the Anstoss, is required in order to
explain how it is in this case that one’s experience is also a tactile perception. To see
this, let’s look in a bit more detail at how things seem to one when one has a
sensation of pressure.
We have said that a sensation of pressure is an experience of one’s body being
pressed against. One feels one’s body being pressed against in that one feels one’s
bodily boundaries resisting pressure. This means, of course, that whilst we locate the
sensation of pressure at the fingertip against which the pressure is exerted, in this
57 Representationalists such as Michael Tye insist that despite first appearances, intransitive
sensations such as pains represent objective states of one’s body (see Tye 1997; 1995) See Crane
(2003) for an argument against Tye’s view, and his alternative perceptual view of intransitive
sensations, on which for example, a headache is to be accounted for in terms not of some state in
which my head is represented as being, but the ‘intentional mode’ in which I am, in having my
headache, related to what is represented.
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case, having the sensation, as we say, in one’s finger might also involve awareness
of the tensing of muscles in one’s hand and arm— Smith’s discussion of the Anstoss
emphasizes this point.58 One feels this resistance as resistance to pressure from
without, that is, from beyond the boundary the resistance of which one is aware. As
Smith puts it, one feels the pressure as an ‘alien force’. No experience that did not
feel like one’s boundaries were resisting pressure from without in this way would be
a pressure sensation. But then, an experience like this of something beyond one’s
bodily boundaries just is a tactile perception. So, far from it being a mystery how an
un-supplemented pressure sensation could be a tactile perception, one would not
count as having a sensation of pressure unless in so doing, one had an experience of
touching something. And there is similarly no mystery in a throbbing sensation not
being a tactile perceptual experience. In having a sensation of throbbing one does
not seem to be aware of some objective way one’s body is, never mind some way
that it could not seem to be, without one thereby seeming to touch something. Thus
the explanation of how it is that this sensation can itself be a tactile perception need
not be sought in anything in addition to the phenomenal character of the sensation
itself, such as the Anstoss.
Now, we said in 2.1 that Smith also finds Martin’s account mysterious because on
his view, bodily sensations are not intrinsically perceptual. This Martin denies. And
58 As we will see more below, another virtue of Smith’s account is the emphasis he places on one’s
awareness of one’s body resisting, in the awareness one has of pressure. But it does not seem right to
say that this resistance need be one’s own active resistance. When I feel things press against my inner
boundaries (as when I feel a fishbone in my throat), I do feel those boundaries resist, but I am in no
position to actively resist pressure to those boundaries. I do not feel the fishbone as a check to my
active movement.
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as we saw in Chapter 2, Martin’s account of the perceptual nature of bodily
sensations involves the claim that bodily sensations have intrinsically bodily
locations. In having such sensations, transitive or intransitive, we are aware of
qualities that seem to be located within our bodily boundaries. Bodily sensations
seeming in this way to be phenomenally bodily involves bodily awareness having a
certain structural feature. In the next section I explain the role that this structural
feature has in our having bodily sensations that are also tactile perceptions.
2.3 The role of the structural feature of bodily sensation
First of all, let’s remind ourselves of what Martin says about the phenomenal
bodiliness of bodily sensation, and look at how this involves bodily sensation (and
bodily awareness more generally) having a certain structural feature. We have
already met Martin’s perceptual account of bodily awareness in previous chapters.
This being his account, Martin would reject —at least one reading of— Smith’s
claim that ‘no sensations of themselves constitute perception’, since on his view,
there is a category of sensations, namely, bodily sensations, which constitute
perceptions of one’s body. Assuming the truth of Martin’s perceptual account of
bodily sensation, we reject the alternative, subjectivist view, on which bodily
sensations are ‘purely subjective states of mind, which are directed at no object at
all, or none that is external or independent of them’ (Martin 1998b). We reject this
view because all bodily sensations, transitive or intransitive are ‘directed onto’ one’s
body, something which is as much a part of the objective mind-independent world as
any other object. When I have a headache, I am aware of my head, hurting, and
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when I have pins and needles in my foot, I am aware of my foot, and of it having
pins and needles.
Bodily sensations are ‘directed onto’ the body in that the qualities of which we are
aware in having bodily sensations seem to be internal to one’s body. Martin points
out that in order for bodily sensation to have this quality of appearing internal to
one’s body, it must incorporate a contrast with ‘external to the body’. Since we
cannot conceive of feeling a sensation to be located, but external to the body, and as
we saw in Chapter 2, Martin argues that one must be aware of the contrast between
internal to and external to one’s body in the following sense:
…wherever one does feel a sensation, to be located, one [also has] a sense
that the world must extend beyond that point, the world extending beyond
one’s limits being composed of regions of space which one couldn’t at this
time be feeling a sensation to be located in. (1992: 212)
This sense that one has in bodily sensation of the world extending beyond the
location of any currently possible sensation is, we can say, a kind of awareness of
one’s bodily boundaries or limits. And it is a structural feature of bodily awareness.
We are not aware, in bodily sensation, of our bodily boundaries in that we can
always perceive their locations. They are not, in this respect, an object of our bodily
awareness. Rather, this kind of awareness of our bodily boundaries is a structural
feature in that it is part of the conscious character of bodily sensation that
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‘structures’ or ‘conditions’ our awareness of the qualities of which we are aware in
having these sensations. It structures this awareness precisely by giving bodily
sensation its phenomenally bodily —and therefore perceptual— character.
We have said that this awareness of our bodily boundaries is structural. And thus
there is a sense in which it is not the case that our bodily boundaries are, in this kind
of awareness, the object of perception. They are not the object of perception in that it
is not the case that whenever one has a bodily sensation, and thereby seems to feel
something internal to one’s boundaries, one’s boundaries figure in the content of the
experience. However, unlike our visual sensory limitations, one’s bodily boundaries
are essentially the limits of an object, namely, one’s body. I can’t feel sensations at
locations that seem to be beyond my bodily boundaries not because I am limited
sensorily, but because that’s how far the object of bodily awareness, my body,
extends. I seem to be limited, bodily— it seems as if my body is not all there is. In
bodily sensations seeming to be located in a space that extends beyond where any
sensation can currently be felt I thus seem to be aware of the boundaries of an
object— of the object that is my body, as bounded.
Now, I said above that given this perceptual account of bodily sensation, Martin
would not accept one reading of Smith’s claim that no sensations of themselves
constitute perception. There is however also a way in which it is consistent with
Martin’s views that there might be a creature whose bodily sensations were not
intrinsically perceptual. We can imagine, he suggests, a creature that had no sense of
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the contrast between its own body and the rest of the world. This creature might feel
a sensation to be located without thereby feeling it to be internal to its body. But
what is important to note about this creature is that in having no sense of its body as
bounded in a world that extended beyond it, its bodily sensations would lack the
structural features that ours have. Martin’s claim is that creatures whose bodily
sensations do have this structural feature are necessarily phenomenally bodily, not
that bodily sensations per se are necessarily phenomenally bodily.
For this reason, Martin’s claim is consistent with the Anstoss playing some role here.
Specifically, it is consistent with Martin’s account that the Anstoss, or something
like it, is involved in bodily sensation coming to incorporate awareness of one’s
bodily boundaries— coming to have this structural feature. Martin is free to accept
that a subject who had never experienced the Anstoss, such as the creature in the
previous paragraph might well be, would not have any awareness of his body as
bounded within a space that extends beyond the location of any possible sensation.59
Smith writes that for a creature who had never experienced the Anstoss:
There would be no sense…of any bodily limits beyond which things might
be located. Such a limit, and hence a phenomenal body itself, and hence a
tactile distinction between inner and outer, and hence a genuine felt space in
59 This might support O’Shaughnessy’s (very plausible) view that touch and bodily awareness are
interdependent (1989). This is because if one accepts that having an experience of the Anstoss is
sufficient for one to have an experience of touch, then if bodily awareness is phenomenally bodily in
virtue of one’s having experienced the Anstoss, then bodily awareness is phenomenally bodily in
virtue of one’s having had a tactile experience.
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which we are located along with possible other things emerges only when
contact is made with something. Such contact…[involves] the Anstoss (2002:
158).
If this is right, then the Anstoss is involved in one’s coming to be aware of one’s
bodily boundaries. And perhaps this is true— it looks like it’s at least partly an
empirical question whether or not it is. But to allow that this may be true is not to
allow that Martin’s account requires supplementing, as an account of how it is that,
on each occasion of having a bodily sensation one feels some quality as being
internal to one’s body. For Martin, one feels this because one’s bodily sensations
incorporate the structural feature, however it is that they get to have this structural
feature in the first place.
So now, what is the role of this structural feature in some of our bodily sensations
being tactile perceptions? We saw in the previous subsection (2.2) that the bodily
sensations that are tactile perceptions are ones that one couldn’t have, without
thereby seeming to be aware of something beyond one’s bodily boundaries. In
having such sensations, our bodies seem ways, such as pressed against, that they
could not seem without it seeming to us that there is something external to the body,
in this case, doing the pressing. And it may well look a bit surprising that we can
have experiences that are bodily but which it is also in the nature of which to tell us
about things external to the body. After all, wherever we feel a bodily sensation, our
bodies seem to extend to that point. So how could we be aware, in having some
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bodily sensations, of something that seems to be beyond the extent of our bodies?
But if we keep in mind Martin’s account of how it is that our bodily sensations are
bodily— that is, because they have the structural feature that we have just been
discussing— we may be less surprised.
One does not of course feel something pressing on one from without —from beyond
one of one’s boundaries— in that one feels a sensation that seems to be beyond that
boundary. Rather, it’s because our awareness of sensations as internal to the body is
constituted by a structural feature that incorporates a sense of a world extending
beyond the body, that we can have some sensations that seem to locate things in that
extra-bodily world. Bodily sensation involving structural awareness of one’s bodily
boundaries in the way that we have seen it does, makes room for sensations, like
sensations of pressure, that are such that when we have them, we feel things
touching us. Only some sensations are tactile perceptions. But those that are get to
be so thanks to the structural feature of bodily sensation.
Whilst we have focussed in this section on the relatively uncomplicated case of
touching something solid with one’s finger, other apparently more involved cases of
tactile perception, can be understood in much the same way. First of all, consider a
case of extended touch, my feeling something with a stick. This too involves a
sensation of pressure. We saw in section 1 that in such cases, that which is felt seems
to be located not in one’s hand, but at the end of the stick. Now, we’ve seen that it is
not the case that the sensation of pressure is felt, in such a case, at the end of the
stick. Rather, one has a sensation of pressure in one’s hand (of one’s hand resisting
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pressure from without) that is such that one could not but have a tactile experience
that locates something at the end of the stick.60
A second case is Martin’s example of grasping the rim of a glass with all of one’s
fingers. This case is less simple than that in which one feels the rim with one’s
finger, in that one is aware of the shape of the rim, though one is only in contact with
it at five points. Still, one can specify here a bodily sensation that one has as of some
objective state of one’s body that one could not have without also having a tactile
experience. In this case, one feels the pressure of something against one’s circular
grasp, and thus something circular beyond one’s grasp, that exerts the pressure.
Both these cases, like the case in which one feels the rim of the glass with a
fingertip, involve sensations of pressure. Most things that we feel seem to exert
some pressure, however slight, on our surfaces. Even feeling a light breeze on my
arm involves feeling the air blow against the skin on my arm, my skin holding up
against this extremely slight onslaught. This feeling is entirely absent, however,
from the tactile experience I have when the sun shines in through the window onto
my outstretched arm. I do not feel the heat press against my skin at all. The bodily
sensation I have in this case is thus not an experience of pressure. Feeling radiant
heat from the sun, or the cool of the still air in the room though is phenomenally
different from just feeling as if one’s body is warm, or cool, as when one has a fever.
In feeling ambient temperature, what I feel is rather ‘warmth (or cool) from
60 It is thought that what is detected in virtue of which the felt object is located at the end of the stick
has to do with the force received back from one’s exploratory activities (Moizumi 2007: 61).
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without’. This, like pressure, is a quality of which one could not have a bodily
sensation without also having a tactile experience. And just as was true in cases
involving sensations of pressure, a sensation of ‘warmth from without’ could only be
a sensation of something from without in virtue of it incorporating the inner/outer
distinction that is conferred upon it by our structural awareness of our bodily
boundaries. One feels warmth from without in the sense that one feels warmth that
seems to come from a location beyond that of any currently possible sensation.61
So, in this section we have looked at the relation that, on Martin’s view, there is
between bodily sensation and tactile perception. We have seen that, on this view,
tactile perceptual experiences just are bodily sensations. This is not, as it might first
appear, at all mysterious. The qualities of body of which we seem to be aware in
such sensations are ones that we could not feel without seeming to touch something.
And we can have bodily sensations like these because bodily sensation (and bodily
awareness more generally) has a certain structural feature. In the next section I argue
that this feature is one of the features of experience that makes manifest to us an
enabling condition for tactile experience.
3. Enabling conditions in tactile perception
That contact with one’s body is an enabling condition for tactile perception requires
no argument. One thing the discussion of the previous section can be seen to have
done is to have helped us to see how it is that contact with one’s body enables tactile
61 I discuss the tactile perception of surface temperature alongside gustatory experience of flavour, in
Chapter 6.
120
perception. It enables tactile perception in the following way: when things come into
contact with one’s body, one has certain bodily sensations which, for the reasons we
have discussed, just are tactile perceptions. Neither do I need to argue that this
enabling condition is manifest to us, since of all the enabling conditions for
perception in all the modalities this is perhaps the most obvious to us. What does
need to be pinpointed is which aspects of experience it is that make the enabling
condition manifest— that is, we need to say how it is as obvious to us as it is. This
will be my task in this section.
One of the features of experience that makes the condition manifest, I will argue, is
the structural feature of bodily awareness we’ve just been discussing. And now we
have given —in the previous section— an account of how it is that some bodily
sensations just are tactile perceptions, we can hopefully begin to see how it could be
a feature of bodily sensation that makes the tactile enabling condition manifest. We
have seen, in section 2, that when one has a tactile experience, one has a bodily
sensation which one could not have without thereby having a tactile perception. That
the bodily sensation is in its nature a tactile perception does not mean that one does
not also feel one’s body to be some way when one touches something. One can still
attend (as Martin states in the passage quoted in section 2.1), when one touches
something, to the experience one has as a bodily sensation. One can attend, that is,
to the way one’s body seems to be, rather than to that which one seems to feel,
beyond the boundaries of one’s body. And it seems right to say that it’s the way
one’s body seems when one has a tactile perception that makes it so obvious to us
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that touch is enabled (or disabled, for that matter) by contact being made (or not
being made) with one’s body.
We have seen that one’s body can seem all kinds of ways when one has a tactile
experience. It can seem to be resisting pressure from something beyond one’s
boundaries, or from something at the end of a tool, or it can seem to be being
warmed by something, for example. And tactile perception, whether of something
solid that presses against one or of such relatively insubstantial things as warm air, is
enabled by literal contact with that which is felt, that is, by that which is felt being
‘on’ one’s body (or sometimes by that which is felt being in contact with another
object which is in turn in contact with one’s body). This is manifest in touch
because all the ways one’s body thus seems are cases precisely of something
seeming to be in literal contact with one’s body— ‘on’ it. Touch being enabled by
literal bodily contact is manifest in the conscious character of tactile experience then
because when we have tactile experiences, we have experiences that are also bodily
sensations of contact. And now we can see that the structural feature of bodily
awareness discussed in section 2 is also implicated in the enabling condition being
manifest to us in this way. This structural feature, recall, is that which gives bodily
awareness its phenomenal bodiliness, and is the structural awareness we have of our
bodily boundaries. This feature is implicated in the enabling condition being
manifest because one could not have a sensation of contact if one’s sensations did
not incorporate a sense of one’s body being bounded within a world that extends
beyond it, a world of other things that can be in contact with one. And as we have
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seen, our sensations do incorporate this awareness of one’s bodily boundaries— just
in virtue of having the structural feature discussed above.
Other features of experience are also implicated in the tactile enabling condition
being manifest to us in the conscious character of tactile experience. One such
feature is its temporal, dynamic character. This is most obvious in instances of
tactile exploration in which one runs one’s hands over things, their properties being
thus revealed to one over a period of time. But even relatively brief sensations of
contact involve one being aware of something that is essentially temporally
extended. Smith’s discussion of the Anstoss emphasizes, as he puts it, ‘the
essentially dynamic way in which objects are revealed to us’ (2002: 168; Smith’s
italics) in touch. In the Anstoss, one is aware of one’s own active resistance to
pressure from without. Actively pushing against something that pushes against one
is a temporally extended happening. But it is no less true of cases in which one feels
one’s boundaries resist without one actively resisting pressure, and may also be true
in cases of touch in which no pressure is involved that what one feels is something
temporally extended. Feeling warmth on one’s skin, at least sometimes, is feeling
one’s skin warmed from without. Being warmed, like being pressed against, is a
temporally extended occurrence. Thus sensations of contact are sensations in which
the quality of body (and thus the external object) of which one is aware is disclosed
to one over time.
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Since sensations of contact involve one’s being aware of something temporally
extended, ignoring the character of experience over time would be an obstacle to
accepting that the tactile enabling condition is manifest to us in the conscious
character of touch. The point here is not of course that in touch, sensations that are in
themselves subjective, or non-spatial, become objective, or gain spatial content as
Martin puts it, ‘as a result of some temporal construction’. But once we pay attention
to the essentially dynamic, temporal character of tactile experience, we can talk of
our being aware of contact, and thus the enabling condition being manifest ‘at an
instant’, in virtue of one’s experiencing resistance, or warming, or some other
quality, over a period of time which encompasses that instant. We will see in later
chapters that being overly concerned with the character of perceptual experience at
snapshot-like instants is also an obstacle to recognizing the way in which enabling
conditions are manifest in the conscious character of perceiving in modalities other
than touch.
Before, in section 4, I look at the way in which we exploit the enabling condition
discussed here in actively feeling, I need to address what might thus far look to be a
problem for my view. The problem is that so far in this thesis I have made two
claims that might look, on the face of it, to be inconsistent. The first claim is that
what is distinctive about the senses is that they have enabling conditions of a certain
kind, that bodily awareness lacks. These enabling conditions are manifest in the
conscious character of experience, and exploited in active perceptual attention. The
second claim is that tactile experiences just are bodily sensations. These two look to
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be inconsistent because from the first claim, and indeed, from the argument of this
section, enabling conditions are manifest in tactile experience. But from this and the
second claim it follows that enabling conditions are manifest in some bodily
sensations (the ones that are also tactile perceptions). And this might look to
contradict the first claim, which says that what is distinctive about the senses is that
they have, and bodily awareness does not have enabling conditions that are, amongst
other things, manifest in the conscious character of experience.
Now, the conclusion that enabling conditions are indeed manifest in some bodily
sensations is unavoidable— they are manifest in touch, and tactile experiences are
bodily sensations. However, this does not threaten the first claim, but rather presents
the need to qualify, or at least, clarify it. Enabling conditions are manifest in the
conscious character of some instances of bodily awareness— on some occasions in
which we seem to be aware of our bodies. But the only occasions on which enabling
conditions are thus manifest in bodily experience are those in which the experiences
in question are, and cannot fail to be, tactile perceptions, such as those occasions on
which the way one’s body feels is pressed against, or warmed from without. We
have, at least thus far, no reason to think that there are any bodily sensations in the
conscious character of which enabling conditions are manifest.
But in any case, my claim in this thesis is not that what is distinctive about the
senses is just that they have enabling conditions that are manifest in the conscious
character of perceiving. The enabling conditions that are thereby manifest are, as we
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saw in Chapter 3, conditions that have to do with being in the right place to perceive,
and are also exploited in active perceptual attention. Since tactile perceptions are
identical to certain bodily sensations, any enabling conditions for tactile perception
will also be conditions under which one has certain bodily sensations too. But the
condition considered here remains an essentially tactile one —it is a condition for
tactile perception of objects of touch— a specification of what it is to be in the right
place to touch something. We saw in Chapter 3 that, there being no place from
which we seem to feel things in bodily awareness, we do not have to be in the right
place in order to be aware of our bodies, in the way in which I am in the process of
arguing that we have to be in the right place in order to perceive in the five familiar
modalities. And in the next and last section of this chapter, in which I look at the
way in which the tactile enabling condition is exploited in actively feeling, I reiterate
the point, made in Chapter 3, that neither this condition, nor any other, is exploited
in bodily attention.
4. Exploiting tactile enabling conditions.
As I shall use the term in this section, ‘feeling’ is to be thought of as the tactile
equivalent of looking. By considering what is peculiar to touch, I have considered,
above, the way in which touch is enabled by contact with one’s body, and how it
being thus enabled is manifest to us. In this final section of this chapter I discuss the
way in which this enabling condition is exploited in feeling. ‘Haptic experience’ is
used to mean experience resulting from active tactile exploration. We explore things
by feeling in a variety of ways: for example, by squeezing, holding and by running
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our hands over and round the edges of things. Babies typically feel things by putting
them in their mouths, biting and squashing them to find out about them. Whilst the
techniques involved in feeling things we feel are various, all are unified by the
procedure of putting these things in literal contact with the surfaces of the body
directly, or indirectly. In feeling around in the dark for a patch of warm or cool air, I
successively put the surface of my body in contact with different regions of air.
Analogous to what we saw to be the case with looking, one way in which we exploit
the tactile enabling condition is in order to maintain tactile perceptual contact with
the objects of perception. In touch, of course, we maintain perceptual contact with
that which we feel, by maintaining literal contact (direct or indirect) with these
things.
The act of feeling equivalent to ‘looking at’, is just the staying in literal contact with
the thing the properties of which we wish to discover. Consider, for example,
holding, and squeezing fruit in the supermarket to discover if it’s ripe. One keeps it
pressed against one’s skin, and thus in tactile contact with it, in order to do so. Or,
shopping for clothes, one might run one’s hands over the fabric, keeping it at all
times beneath, and lightly pressed against one’s skin, in order to discover its texture.
A doctor, feeling for a patient’s pulse, keeps their fingers pressed relatively firmly
against a certain spot on the wrist, maintaining contact with that location on the
patient’s body, waiting for the feel of the blood beating under the skin.
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There is a special place in touch for perceptual activity the goal of which is the
performance of some action. In these activities, too, one exploits the manifest tactile
enabling condition in order to maintain contact with the objects with or on which
one acts. But one exploits the condition in order not to find out about things, but to
act with or on them. A tennis player maintains tactile contact with the racquet in
order to perform a serve, or return a shot. Riding a bike, I keep the soles of my feet
pressed against the pedals of the bike, and my hands against the handlebars. When
writing, I maintain tactile contact with the pen, pressing the fingers with which I
hold it against its surfaces. And I maintain tactile contact with the surface on which I
write, too, feeling it resisting the pressure of the pen that I press against it.
In looking, we have seen, we keep things within a region of space delimited by our
sensory limitations in order to keep seeing them. Touch, as we said earlier in this
chapter, does not involve awareness of a region of space within which things are
tactually perceptible. In order to keep things where I can feel them, I have to keep
them not in a region of space, within sensory limitations, but on the boundaries of an
object, usually, but as we have seen not exclusively, the object that is my body.
Because the whole body is tactually sensitive, I can keep in tactile contact with an
object though it moves from one hand to the other, or moves, say, up my arm and
over my shoulders, for example, as a spider or pet hamster might do. I can keep
track of the ambient temperature around a heat source, such as a radiator, though I
hold in front of it now one hand, now the other, and now a foot. Very large objects, I
can clamber over and around, keeping them in contact with different parts of my
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body as I do. Since it need not be surfaces of the body with which I feel things, I can
keep in tactile contact with an object by pressing against it with a stick, or other tool,
perhaps at the same time as I feel it with a hand or my feet (think of the way a skier
keeps in contact with the ground beneath them using skis and two poles).
I can also exploit these conditions in order to disable tactile experience of things.
Many of my current tactile experiences are not the result of chosen tactile activities
but a consequence of the fact that my whole body is tactually sensitive. So, as I sit at
my desk, I can feel the floor beneath my feet, the chair I’m sitting on, the warm air
on my face. I can put an end to these experiences by moving, so that these things are
no longer in contact with me.
There is, in principle, no limit to the purposes to which one can put feeling. What all
cases have in common is that one must exploit the tactile enabling condition in order
to stay in contact with what one feels (or put an end to that contact) if one is to
achieve these purposes. Though the contact which one makes and maintains with
things in vision is not literal, we saw in Chapters 2 and 3 that one also exploits
enabling conditions that are manifest in visual perception in order to keep perceiving
them, and thus to maintain perceptual contact with them in a non-literal way. In this,
touch and vision differ from bodily awareness. There are no obvious conditions to be
exploited in order to keep in contact with my feet, or my hands. On Martin’s view of
touch, which we have discussed in this chapter, where there is touch, there is also
some form of bodily awareness. There is the bodily sensation that just is a tactile
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perception, and there might also be other bodily sensations too. When I feel the rim
of the glass with my finger there is a pressure sensation in my finger, and if I press
hard enough, there will be a sensation of pain there too. When I feel the warmth of
the sunny patch in the room, there is also the sensation of my skin being warm.
Exploiting the tactile enabling condition in order to disable some tactile experience
also puts an end to a bodily experience. When I remove my finger from the glass, I
no longer feel the pressure sensation in my finger, and though the pain may linger a
little longer, I at the very least shorten its duration by leaving the glass alone.
Moving my arm out of the sunny patch cools my skin. And my purpose in exploiting
the tactile enabling conditions in these sorts of cases can be precisely to end the sorts
of bodily sensation I have.
However, this is not exploiting a manifest enabling condition for bodily awareness.
One may by exploiting tactile (or indeed other) enabling conditions, bring an end to
a bodily sensation of some sort. Similarly, I can scratch an itch, squeeze a stubbed
toe, or rub cold hands to warm them. These too are things I can do to stop bodily
sensations in parts of my body. But what I am unable to do is exploit conditions in
order to put an end to bodily awareness, per se, of the objects of such awareness,
namely, parts of my body. I can scratch an itch on my foot and get rid of the itch, but
I can’t exploit my grasp of any enabling conditions to put an end to my awareness of
my foot. I can’t move out of the place in which I have to be to be aware of my foot,
because my foot insists on coming with me. And concomitantly, because of the
relationship between touch and bodily awareness, my maintaining tactile contact
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with something may also ensure the persistence of a bodily sensation, and this
persistence may be my aim. For example, I might hold my coffee cup in my hands in
order to warm them. Similarly, I can deliberately hurt myself, by pressing something
sharp or hot into my skin: there are things that can be done to bring about bodily
sensations in parts of my body. But what I don’t have to do is exploit conditions in
order to have, or keep, awareness of these body-parts in the first place. I don’t have
to, for instance, keep myself pressed against things, or in warm air, in order to keep
track of my hands and feet and the body of which they are part. There is no staying
in the right place involved in staying in contact with what I perceive in bodily
awareness, as there is in the case both of touch and vision, and, I will argue in the
next chapter, hearing.
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Chapter 5: Hearing
In this chapter I argue that in hearing as in seeing and touching, there are enabling
conditions of a certain kind that are manifest in the conscious character of
perceiving, and exploited in active attention. There are very many questions that can
be asked about hearing, in-depth discussion of most of which will be beyond the
scope of the chapter. Nonetheless, it will be important for me to say some things
about these more general questions, and in particular about the question of what
things we hear, and thus, what things auditory enabling conditions might be
conditions for experience of. I consider this question in the first section of the
chapter. In the second section I argue that enabling conditions for auditory
experience of these things are manifest in the conscious character of auditory
perception. And in the third and final section I argue that we exploit these conditions
in listening.
1. What things do we hear?
The obvious answer to this question is that we hear sounds. ‘Sound’, writes Geoffrey
Warnock,
is the ‘tautologous accusative’ of the verb ‘to hear’; it is logically necessary
that if I hear at all, I hear a sound, and it would be obviously incorrect to use
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‘sound’ as object to any of the verbs ‘see’, ‘touch’, ‘taste’ or ‘smell’
(Warnock 33–34).62
One reason we might doubt this claim of Warnock’s, is that we can also hear silence:
the absence of sound.63 But even if we accept that silence can be heard, we might
accept that when we’re hearing, and are not hearing silence, we always hear sound.
And though this may be true, it is to say nothing at all about the nature of the sounds
that we hear. In the first part of this section (1.1) I will consider the question of what
sounds are. Warnock’s claim that ‘if I hear at all, I hear a sound’ also leaves open
the possibility that I may also hear things in addition to sounds, though only when I
also hear sounds. I argue in the second subsection (1.2) that this is in fact the case: I
argue that we also hear the sources of sounds, and the non-sound events in which
they participate. The questions addressed in this section deserve much more
consideration than I am able to give them here. I consider them only in so far as they
impact upon my claim that auditory enabling conditions are manifest in auditory
experience.
1.1 What are the sounds we hear?
In this subsection I argue that it is most plausible to think of sounds as events.
Several accounts of the nature of sounds are consistent with the view that sounds are
events. It will not be necessary here for me to choose between them; my intention,
rather, is to rule out some views, rather than to rule one particular view in.
62 This claim is not at all threatened by the occurrence of Synaesthesia. As Fiona MacPherson
remarks, there is no reason to think of Synaesthesia as involving experiences in which ‘a property
normally experienced only in one modality is experienced as either being in a different modality or as
being a property of some object or feature normally detected only by a different modality' (2007:3)
63 See Sorensen (2008) and Phillips (forthcoming).
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As discussed in Chapter 1, one common way of individuating the senses is by means
of properties or objects that are only perceived by certain senses: by their ‘special
sensibles’, or key features (see for example Roxbee-Cox 1970). The special sensible
of hearing is sound, of vision (perhaps) colour, of smell, odours, and so on. The
philosophical question ‘what are sounds?’ arises from the fact that, as Martin puts it,
‘sounds count as phenomenal objects in auditory perception in a way that colours
and shapes do not in vision’ (Martin 1997: 93). To say that sounds count as ‘objects’
is not to say they count as material objects. They are, perhaps, better described, as
AD Smith suggests, as ‘physical phenomena’ (2002: 135). They nevertheless are
akin to objects in the broader sense that unlike colours, we don’t usually think of
sounds as perceptible properties of objects that we perceive. Rather, we usually think
of sounds as themselves the bearers of perceptible properties. The philosophical
question ‘what are sounds?’ is thus the question of how we should understand these
peculiar objects of hearing— the bearers of audible properties such as pitch and
loudness.
It might seem that the question ‘what are sounds?’ is a question for physics rather
than philosophy, and that the answer is already well-established: sounds are, as the
Oxford dictionary puts it, ‘vibrations which travel through the air or another medium
and are sensed by the ear’. Moreland Perkins is amongst those philosophers who
argue that this dictionary definition is in essence correct.64 On his view, a sound is a
train (or several trains) of waves in the air (or another medium) having one end at
64 Aristotle seems also to have had something like this view of sounds. Though see O’Callaghan
(forthcoming (a)) who suggests that Aristotle’s remarks are also consistent with his own event view.
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the sounding object which is the source of the sound, and the other end at the ears of
a perceiver (1983: 169). The main problem with what Casey O’Callaghan calls the
‘wave view’ of sounds is that, at least on the face of it, it makes auditory experience,
as Nudds puts it ‘generally non-veridical’ (Nudds forthcoming) with respect to its
spatial content. At the very least, it does not locate sounds where we usually take
ourselves to perceive them as being located. On the wave view, when I hear a sound,
say, of a car passing on the street outside, the sound I hear is located in the air
between myself and the car. But that’s not how I tend to think that things seem to
me. It seems to me as if what I hear is not only in some direction, but also at a
certain distance from me, and intuitively, in most cases, it seems as if sounds are
roughly where their sources are.65 Of course, it is possible that auditory experience is
generally illusory with respect to the location of sounds. The wave theorist might be
content to bite this bullet and adopt some kind of error theory of our experience of
the location of sounds. But, arguably, it is a good general principle to avoid the
conclusion that a perceptual system is generally non-veridical in this way, if
possible. After all, we assume that our perceptual systems evolved in such a way as
to be useful to us. And a system that yields experiences that are always illusory can
be of very limited use, plausibly anyway.
In response to this difficulty, Robert Pasnau has argued that reflection on where we
hear sounds as being should lead us to reject the wave view of sounds. Contra
65 I don’t want to rule out that we sometimes seem to hear sounds other than where their sources are.
For example, very loud sounds such as explosions sometimes seem, literally, to ‘surround’ one,
whilst their sources do not seem, in the same way, to be all around. I also don’t want to rule out that
we might, or do have experiences of sounds that don’t seem to be located at all.
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Martin’s remarks, quoted in the first paragraph of this section, we should, Pasnau
writes, ‘insist on putting sound back where it belongs, among the various sensible
properties of objects: among colour, shape and size’ (1999: 324). On Pasnau’s view,
sound, like colour, is a property of sounding objects. Objects ‘have’ sounds, on this
account, just as they ‘have’ colours. Specifically, sounds are vibrations of those
objects, or (to allow for a dispositional account) properties which supervene on these
vibrations (1999: 316). This view avoids committing hearing of being generally non-
veridical, by locating sounds just where we usually think we hear them as being—
where their sources are. Whilst this view might well do better at reflecting the spatial
character of auditory experience than the wave view, it runs into difficulties
elsewhere. And the most significant problem is that sounds just don’t seem to fit the
ontological category of properties of objects. Firstly, to make sounds properties of
objects is seemingly to overlook the fact that objects do not have, but rather produce,
sounds. There is a causal relation between sounds and the things that make them,
reflected in our talk of sounds— we talk about the sounds that things make, produce,
emit, not (or rarely) of the sounds that things have. What is more, sounds don’t have
the right kind of temporal profile to be properties of objects. Properties of objects are
instantiated. And whilst their being instantiated may be something that obtains at or
for a time, sounds do not obtain, but occur— they have duration, a beginning and an
end. They involve change, and have temporal parts or stages. Sounds then, do not
seem to be the sorts of things that can be thought of as properties of objects.
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The considerations raised against Pasnau’s view that sounds are properties,
especially those concerned with the temporal profile of sounds, suggest that sounds
should be understood as some kind of occurent, such as events or processes.
Theories of sound that take them to be events use the term loosely, insensitive to the
distinction that might be made between events as changes in the world that occur at
a time, and processes as lasting through a time (see Scruton 1999: 9). Event-theorists
adopt the term ‘event’, as a ‘general term to cover ‘things which occur’’ (ibid.). The
use of the term here is also intended to be understood in this way.
The lesson to be learnt from the criticisms made of the wave view is that our theory
of sounds should at least have the resources to explain why it is that these events
seem to be where their sources are (or at least, why it is that we take it that this is
how things seem). In this vein, Casati and Dokic (1994, also 2005) argue that a
sound is not a property of an object, but an event occurring in it. The sound seems to
be located where the source is, on this view, because that’s precisely where it is. The
car’s sound, as it passes on the street below, is ‘identical with, or at least
supervene[s] on, vibration processes in it’ (2005). This view avoids the perils of
accusing hearing of being generally non-veridical with respect to location, because it
has the consequence that sounds are just where we (usually) take ourselves to hear
them as being— at their sources. On this view, the vibrations in the air between the
source of a sound and its hearer are not to be identified with the sound. Rather, they
carry information to the perceiver about the sound, which is ‘in’ the source.
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There are alternative views as to which event should be identified with the sound
made by a source. On O’Callaghan’s view, sounds are ‘relational’ events, involving
both source and medium. According to him, a sound is the event of the medium
being disturbed by the vibration of an object: ‘sounds are the events in which a
medium is disturbed or changed or set into motion in a wave-like way by the
motions of bodies’ (forthcoming: 13). The sound of the car, on this view, is the
vibration of the car causing the air around it to vibrate. Again, as on Casati and
Dokic’s view, O’Callaghan has it that sounds are where we usually think that we
hear them as being— where their sources are, or roughly there. And both views can
accommodate the intuition that sounds are produced by their sources, or at least by
events involving their sources (more on this later).
One difference between Casati and Dokic’s and O’Callaghan’s views, is that the
latter has as a consequence that there are no sounds in a vacuum, as Berkeley also
argued. This is because, on this view, the occurrence of a sound requires that a
vibrating object set its surrounding medium vibrating. Thus if there is no medium,
there can be no sound. A third alternative as to where the sound-event is located is
suggested by Roy Sorensen’s attempt to make the wave view of sounds consistent
with the phenomenology of sound-location. On this alternative view, as on
O’Callaghan’s, there are no sounds in a vacuum. The proponent of this view accepts
that sounds are events, but locates them exactly where the wave view locates them—
in the medium between source and perceiver. On this view, sounds are events in the
medium itself. Whilst this view doesn’t locate sounds where we hear them as being
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—at their sources— it does provide an account of why we hear the sounds there. We
should understand, Sorensen suggests, the phenomenology of locatedness as
governed by analogous principles to those used by seismologists in identifying the
location of an earthquake. A sound, on the wave view, is a ‘big rapidly expanding
phenomenon’ (2008: 282). An earthquake, similarly, is a ‘series of shockwaves’.
Nevertheless, seismologists locate earthquakes at their epicentre— the location on
the surface of the earth above the ‘failure’ of rocks in Earth’s crust that caused the
shockwaves. This choice of location is pragmatic— the quake cannot be located by
its outer edges since these are not discernible. Similarly, the outer edges of a sound
are not discernible to us. Thus, Sorensen suggests, our perceptual systems have
evolved so as to ‘orient toward the centre’ (2008: 284). And this explains, on his
view, why it seems to us that sounds are where their sources are.
Amongst event views then there is room for disagreement as to which event we
should identify with the sound we hear. I don’t propose to choose between these
alternatives here. All three views can be seen as preserving some of the benefits of
the wave view and the property view, whilst avoiding some of their difficulties.
There might be other options as to which event to identify with the sound one
hears.66 For my account here, these details don’t matter very much. My conclusion is
just that given the considerations raised here, we should think of sounds as events of
some kind that occur in or more or less around their source. Before I move on to
66 Alternatively, we don’t seem to introduce any new difficulties if we argue that sounds are not
events, but properties of events of some kind. Whilst sounds don’t seem to be the right kind of thing,
temporally speaking, to be properties of objects, they might be properties of events. I don’t say
anything more about this option here.
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consider the question of whether we hear anything other than sounds, I want to look,
very briefly, at one other way of responding to the problems faced by the wave view
of sounds.
This way of responding is provided by Matthew Nudds. Recall that the problem for
the wave view was that it locates sounds in the medium between source and
perceiver. Prima facie, we usually hear sounds where their sources are. Thus the
wave view of sounds makes auditory experience generally non-veridical, on the
assumption that we are right to say that we hear sounds where their sources are. Both
property and event views of sound try to avoid this difficulty by locating sounds at
their sources. Nudds’ response is to deny that we hear sounds where their sources
are, by providing independent grounds for thinking that in fact, we don’t hear sounds
as being anywhere. What we hear as located, on his view, are not sounds, but the
sources of sounds. On what grounds does Nudds argue that we don’t hear sounds as
located?
What sounds we hear is determined by the way in which the auditory system groups
the frequency components which reach our ears. And, Nudds writes,
…we cannot explain why the auditory system groups the frequency
components that it detects in the way it does other than in terms of a process
that functions to extract information about the objects that produced those
frequency components…The auditory system groups together all and only
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frequency components that are likely to have been produced by the same
source because they are likely to have been produced by the same source
(Nudds forthcoming: 7).
The principles by which the auditory system groups frequency components into
sounds are a matter of which components are most likely to have come from the
same source. There are, as Nudds writes, ‘relationships that exist between
components produced by the same source that are unlikely to exist between
components produced by different sources’ (forthcoming: 6). The auditory system
exploits these relationships in grouping components into the sounds that we hear.
Now, in visual perception, there is reason to think that features are grouped into the
objects we see on the basis of spatial location. Features detected in the same location
are grouped into a single seen object.67 Nudds argues that the grouping of frequency
components into sounds in hearing is not performed on the basis of spatial location,
unlike grouping in vision (12). This makes, Nudds says, ‘ecological sense’, since
‘the transmission of sound waves —with frequency components being detected only
after they have been reflected off and refracted around other surfaces— disrupts
spatial cues and makes them unreliable’ (14). The auditory system instead groups
components that bear certain harmonic and temporal relationships to one another,
relationships that are much more likely to be reliable indicators that the components
thus grouped all have the same source. Nudds argues that this gives us reason to
think that sounds are ‘not intrinsically spatial’:
67 See, for example, Treisman 1996. Also Campbell 2002 and Matthen 2005 for discussion.
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Given that the auditory system’s grouping of frequency components
determines what sounds we experience, the fact that groupings are not
spatially individuated suggests that sounds aren’t either (forthcoming: 14)
In denying that we hear sounds as located, Nudds does not deny that auditory
experience is phenomenally spatial. But on his view, what are heard as located are
not the sounds themselves, but their sources— the things that make the sounds. The
spatial phenomenology of auditory experience, on Nudds’ view, does not derive
from the stage of processing at which frequency components are grouped into
sounds. Rather, it derives from the next and third stage, at which information is
extracted from the sounds that are the result of this grouping, about the sources of
these sounds. Amongst this information is spatial information. And it’s therefore, on
Nudds’ view, the sources, and not the sounds themselves, which we should
understand as seeming to be located in hearing. If this is right, then the wave view is
not inconsistent with where sounds seem to us to be located, because they do not
seem to be located anywhere.
One problem with Nudds’ view is as follows. Intuitively, we never hear the sources
of sounds without their making a sound that we hear. We hear sources only when we
hear their sounds. In this respect, if in no other, hearing sources depends on hearing
the sounds they make. This is consistent with hearing sounds being dependent on
hearing sources, in other respects. In particular it is consistent with Nudds’ claim
that hearing sounds depends on hearing sources, in that we have to understand the
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processes involved in grouping frequency components into the sounds we hear as
grouping components likely to have come from a single source. Now, according to
O’Callaghan, the view that we hear sources as located and their sounds as un-
located, is a ‘precarious’ one. I take it that O’Callaghan’s intuition is that this is
precarious because, as we have said, hearing sources is dependent on hearing sounds
in that we only hear them when we hear their sounds. This being so, it’s just very
difficult to understand how we are supposed, on Nudds’ view, to hear a source’s
location when we hear its apparently unlocated sound. A view such as
O’Callaghan’s (or indeed Casati and Dokic’s) on the other hand, gives us a quite
intuitive and plausible account of how we hear sources as located, that is, by hearing
sounds as located where their sources are. For this reason, for the purposes of
discussion here I will put Nudds’ claim that we don’t hear sounds as located to one
side. I will return to his claim that we hear the sources of sounds shortly.68
This discussion of the nature of sounds has been not at all exhaustive. Rather than
defend one particular view, my intention here has been to rule out, at least for the
purposes of this chapter, some views about the nature of sound. My rather limited
conclusion is that the sounds we hear should be thought of as events of some kind,
leaving open which event is to be identified with the sound one hears. In the next
subsection I discuss our awareness in hearing of things other than sounds.
68 I presume also that if Nudds is right about the metaphysical status of sounds as particularized
types, event views could be easily adapted to be consistent with the re-identification practices on
which this claim is based. Vibratory events could be said to instantiate, rather than being identical
with sounds. And that which seems to be located where the source of the sound is could then be said
to be not, strictly speaking, the sound, but it’s instantiation. Furthermore, the conclusions of the
second and third sections of the chapter, which are the most important for my thesis, are independent
of any claim as to what sounds are. I include this discussion largely because it seems impossible to
talk about sounds without making some claims as to what and where sounds are and seem to be.
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1.2 What else do we hear?
We have already seen, in 1.1, one argument for thinking that we hear the sources of
sounds. Nudds, we said, argues that since we have to think of the subpersonal
mechanisms underlying audition as functioning to tell us about the sources of
sounds, these sources had, if you like, better be represented in the content of
experience. In this section I want to give some account of what our awareness of the
sources of sounds might consist in.69
Nudds (2001) argues that one way in which we are aware of the sources of sounds is
in the bimodal experience of the production of sounds. The experience is bimodal in
that it is partly auditory and partly visual. An example of such an experience is that
of ventriloquism, in which it seems to us (illusorily) as if the voice we hear is
produced by the mouth of the puppet. And this kind of experience is a very common
one, exploited particularly by film-makers. Andy Hamilton discusses a comment of
Michel Chion’s, that ‘film-makers in the early days of sound worried that audiences
would be confused about the location of screen-sounds’. It was thought that the
discrepancy between the location of on-screen action, and of the loud-speakers from
which the sounds of such action emerged would be perceived by film-goers. But, as
Hamilton goes on to say, ‘it turned out that footsteps are heard as coming from the
location of the actor who is walking or running, and so on, rather than as coming
from the cinema sound-system’ (forthcoming: 23). As in ventriloquism, one
experiences, when watching a film, sound as produced by its source, due to an
69 We might think that we also hear things that whilst not sounds, are composed of sounds, such as
musical phrases (see Matthen forthcoming).
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interaction between vision and hearing. In such an experience, we’re aware of the
object which is the source of the sound, producing the sound. But on Nudds’ view
we do not have any purely auditory experience of the production of sounds by their
sources. I want to argue that we do have experiences that we might think of as
purely auditory experiences of the production of sounds. I will argue as follows: In
addition to sounds, we hear other, non-sound events. Experiences being as of these
non-sound events is not independent of their being as of the sources of sounds,
which are ‘participants’ in these events. And there is reason to think that the
apparent relation between sound and source is that of production.
Firstly, then, to argue that we hear non-sound events. For simplicity’s sake, I will, in
what follows, adopt O’Callaghan’s view of which event is the sound that we hear.
My claim is that when, for example, a glass breaks we hear two events. There is the
non-sound event of the glass breaking. And there is the ‘sound’ event of the glass’s
vibration setting the medium vibrating. The two events are distinct, first, in that one
in some way ‘generates’ the other. They are also distinct in that they have different
temporal properties. For example, the breaking may be a briefer occurrence than the
sound it makes, or the sound it makes may occur shortly after the breaking. Or, the
non-sound event may be ‘continuous’ in a way that the sound is not. To take another
example, consider the difference between the event of walking, and the sound that
walking produces. The sound of walking is ‘interrupted’— we hear one brief
footstep after another, alternating with brief periods of silence, or background noise.
But walking is a continuous event— someone is not only walking at the moments
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when their feet hit the ground, though their walking only produces sound at those
moments.
The sound and the non-sound event also differ in properties other than their temporal
properties. For example, putting aside as we have the view that sounds are properties
of events (see n66), only sounds are the bearers of ‘purely auditory’ properties, such
as pitch and loudness. Sounds either are, or supervene on, vibratory phenomena; on
O’Callaghan’s view, events of an object causing its surrounding medium to vibrate.
In turn, the purely auditory properties of pitch and loudness bear some special
relationship to certain properties of such a vibratory event. The pitch of a heard
sound is related to the frequency of this vibratory event. The loudness of a sound is,
as Goldstein tentatively puts it, ‘closely associated’ (2002: 339) with its pressure.
The tentativeness of these claims is due to the fact that the relationships between
pitch and frequency, and loudness and pressure are not straightforward. For example
frequency and pressure interact in determining the heard loudness of a sound. And
there are many possible accounts of the relation between sounding high-pitched and
being high-pitched, analogous to those of the relation between, for example, looking
red and being red. Whatever the relationship is between sounds and their properties
on the one hand and vibratory events and their properties on the other, the close
association between the two gives reason to think that only sounds have pitch and
loudness. Non-sound events such as walking and breaking do not have these purely
auditory properties. Whilst we do sometimes talk of occurrences that are not
themselves sounds, such as walking, as having auditory properties including pitch
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and loudness, I think we might follow Perkins in taking such talk to be elliptical.
What has the auditory properties is not the walking, but the sound. Occurrences such
as ‘hammerings and crackings’, he suggests, ‘may be loud or piercing or sharp in the
sense that each of these produces a sound that has one or more of these audible
sensible qualities’ (1983: 166).
Walking and breaking then are events distinct from sounds. In what sense are we
aware of these sounds, and of the non-sound events? We are aware of both of them
in that we can and do selectively attend to the properties of the sound— its pitch,
loudness, temporal properties and so on— or to the properties of the other non-sound
event, such as its temporal properties. Let’s look again at the example of hearing
walking. One can attend, in this experience, to properties of the sound itself. For
example, to the loudness of what is heard, and to its pitch. One would hear
something, perhaps, of relatively low pitch, at such-and-such a volume. These
properties, as we have said, are properties not of the walking, but of the sound. And
one can also attend to temporal qualities that are features not of the walking, but of
the sound. So, for example, one might attend to the sound’s coming and going as one
foot after the other makes contact with the ground— it is the sound, and not the
walking, that comes and goes in this way.
In addition to those of the sound, one can, in this case, attend to properties of the
walking. In so doing, I will not attend to pitch and volume. The properties of the
walking event might include temporal features that differ from those of the sound.
147
For example, whilst a property of the sound is that it comes and goes with the
footsteps the walker makes, a property of the walking might be that it lasts,
uninterrupted, for two minutes. Whether I attend to the properties of a sound, or the
properties of an audible non-sound event will depend partly on my interests and
purposes in listening. In musical listening, I will characteristically attend to the
properties of the sound, and not properties of the non-sound event.70 And there may
also be unusual cases in which I can only listen to the properties of the sound. For
example, in hearing the kind of pure tone that is sometimes used in experiments on
hearing, there might not be any properties that I can attend to other than pitch,
loudness, and perhaps location. In such a case the sound is, in Scruton’s words, ‘the
complete object of …aural attention’ (1999: 3). 71
Now, events such as walking or breaking are events in which, loosely speaking,
something does something, in these cases, walks, or breaks. Some non-sound events
that we can hear and so attend to are ones in which something performs an activity,
such as walking, or jumping. Others are ones in which something happens to
something, such as being broken, or squashed. But in both cases, whether the object
is the sufferer or performer of what happens, there is a loose sense in which it still
does something, even if it is just to suffer or undergo. These ‘doers’ are the very
things we think of as the sources of sounds. And, I want to say, when our
experiences are of non-sound events they are essentially of something doing
70 Although Hamilton (forthcoming) argues it’s not quite so straightforward.
71 Listen here: http://www.jhu.edu/~signals/listen/C.wav
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something, construed loosely. And in this way, we are aware of the things that are
the sources of sounds.
Our auditory experiences of non-sound events being essentially of something doing
something, and therefore of the sources of sounds, is not something in addition to
their being of the non-sound events. Being aware, when one hears a series of evenly
spaced sounds of a certain kind, of walking, is just being aware of something
walking. It is not clear that one could make sense of one’s being able to attend to
such an event, without one’s attending to it as an event that has a ‘doer’, that brings
the individual sounds together, as their source.
One thing that the sources of sounds can do, and of which we are aware, is move.
And in the case of hearing movement there is special reason to think that we are
aware of the sources of sounds. As the car goes past below my window, I hear
something move, and quickly. But what is it that I hear move? We do talk about
sounds moving, as we talk about other events, such as parties and battles moving.
But strictly speaking, events such as sounds, parties and battles do not move. When
something, such as a car, moves from one location to another, the whole of it is thus
relocated. Cars are present in their entirety at each instant at which they exist (which
is not of course to deny that bits can drop off them). But when the car goes past my
window, it is not the case that its sound, being an event, is relocated, as the car is.
Sounds are events. And, as Peter Hacker writes,
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…at any given time during the period in which an event occurs it is not the
case that the whole event occurs. At best, only a phase of it occurs (1982: 15)
If an event starts at some location l1 and ends many miles away at l2 we should not
think of the event as having moved from l1 to l2. Rather, one phase of the event
occurred at l1, and another, some time later, at l2. If this event is a sound that we hear
then what we hear is not the sound moving, but successive phases of the sound
occurring at different locations. Though events do not move, the objects that
participate in them —the guests at a party, the soldiers in a battle, the sources of a
sound— do move. Thus to accommodate the fact that we do have auditory
awareness of movement we should say that what we hear as moving is the source of
the sound, in this case, the car.
That we hear events such as walking and breaking, and thereby things such as
people who walk and glasses that break is not unfamiliar to common sense. It is how
we usually think about hearing. To take Berkeley’s example, ‘common speech
would incline one to think’ (1910: 33) that on hearing the sound of the rumbling of a
coach driving across cobbles, we also hear the coach driving across the cobbles. On
Berkeley’s view, however, the idea that one has of the coach driving across the
cobbles, on hearing its sound, ‘proceeds from reason and memory’ (1988: 153). One
hears, on his view, only a sound, which one knows from experience to be
‘connected’ with a coach driving across cobbles. The coach driving across cobbles is
not then on this account ‘properly perceived by sense, but suggested from
experience’ (1988: 153). The details of Berkeley’s claim here are unclear; in
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particular, what he has in mind by ‘suggestion’ is not obvious. For our purposes, the
important point is that what we call hearing the coach driving over the cobbles will
be on Berkeley’s view at least partly a cognitive affair— a matter perhaps of
believing, on the basis of repeated experience, that that is the kind of thing that one
hears.72,73 This would seem to be the right thing to say about the way in which, for
example, I might sometimes have an experience as of a clarinet playing. It seems
plausible that my doing so involves my recognizing the timbral quality of the sound
I hear as that which characterizes the sound of a clarinet. My recognizing the sound
as that of a clarinet may well have an effect on the phenomenology of my
experience, and thus we might say that this is one way in which I am ‘aware’ of the
sources of sounds. But this is not the way in which I am claiming that we are aware
of non-sound events, and thereby of the sources of sounds which participate in these
events. For one, it need not be that, when one has an experience as of some non-
sound event such as walking or breaking, it seems you that the event is precisely one
of walking, or breaking. Rather, the claim is just that you seem to hear something
doing something— you may have no idea what’s being done, or what sort of thing is
doing it.74
In addition, seeming to hear non-sound events and their participants is to be
distinguished from information about these events and things being available in what
72 See also O’Shaughnessy, according to whom we make only ‘thought contact’ with the sources of
sounds (2002: 453).
73 For discussion of this example see Jackson (1977:5), Armstrong (1961:20).
74 This is not to deny that having auditory experiences as of non-sound events and their participants
might require that one have some kind of background knowledge that one would not have were
hearing one’s only sense- as is true of the subject in Strawson’s sound world (see Strawson 1959).
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we hear. Many studies have shown that when asked to, we are able to judge with
some accuracy, and on the basis of hearing alone, such things as the shape and size
of dropped objects, and whether or not we’ll be able to get between a wall and a
sounding object (see Carello et al. 2005 for a review). But the shape of heard
sources, for example, is not something that is apparent to us in the phenomenology
of auditory experience. That is why experiments that tell us that we can judge the
shape of a sound-source with accuracy, and on the basis of hearing, are so
surprising. In contrast, we are able to judge, on the basis of hearing, that something
has done something, just because that is how it seems.
I have argued then that when we hear sounds, we (at least sometimes) hear non-
sound events. We can attend to the properties of these non-sound events, or to the
sound. And in attending to the non-sound event, we attend to something that is a
participant in the event— something that is doing something. Thus, we are auditorily
aware of the sources of sounds. Our auditory experiences are as of such sources in
that they seem to be of things doing things. This can be thought of as auditory
awareness of the production of sounds. We are not in any doubt, when we hear a
sound and are aware of something doing something, such as walking, which sounds
it is that are the sounds of the walking— the sound in virtue of which we hear
walking. There is no question of my having to work out which sounds it was that
alerted me to your walking into the room. I hear the sounds of your walking, rather,
as the sounds of your walking into the room. But to say that the sounds I hear are the
sounds of your walking is not to say that they are, or seem to be a property you have.
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We have already said that sounds are events, and not properties of objects. One
reason for this is that objects do not have but produce sounds. The sounds I hear
seem to be the sounds of your walking in that you seem to produce them when you
walk. Or rather, something seems to produce them by doing something.
Hearing the sources of sounds in the way that I have suggested that we do is
dependent on hearing sounds in the way in which I suggested, in 1.1, that hearing
sources is dependent on hearing sounds. Obviously enough, we never hear things
doing things that produce sounds, without hearing those sounds. On the event view
of sounds we are adopting here, we can say that we hear a trio of things —sound,
non-sound event and source— as located, when we hear a sound as located. There is
much more to be said about what things we hear than I have been able to say here.
But what I have said is enough to constrain the argument of the following section, in
which I give an account of the way in which conditions that enable our hearing this
trio of things, are manifest in the conscious character of hearing.
2. What enabling and defeating conditions are there for hearing the things we
hear?
Before discussing enabling conditions that there might be for hearing, and our
awareness of these enabling conditions, it was important to consider what things we
hear, in order to have some idea about what auditory enabling conditions might be
conditions for hearing. In this section, I argue that we are aware in auditory
experience of two enabling/defeating conditions. The first of these is not a spatial
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enabling condition— though we will see later, in section 3, that we can exploit it in a
spatial way, by getting into the right place to hear.
2.1 Masking
In order to hear a sound, it must be loud enough to be heard, and specifically, it must
be loud enough to be heard over other sounds currently present in one’s
environment. In vision, the objects that one sees can prevent other objects from
being seen by occluding them. Occlusion is spatial blocking. The reason why I
cannot see the cup behind my computer is because the computer is preventing me
from seeing it by being located between the cup and myself. Occlusion is then a
defeating condition for seeing an object. In hearing, the way in which the sounds one
hears can prevent other sounds from being heard is by blocking them in a non-spatial
way. The way in which one sound prevents another from being heard is by masking
it, by being louder than the masked sound, and by occurring at the same time as it
occurs. Masking is a defeating condition for hearing a sound. As discussed in
Chapter 3, there are no defeating conditions for feeling bodily sensations, analogous
to those there are for perception in the five familiar modalities. Bodily sensations do
not occlude one another spatially, as seen objects do, and they do not mask one
another, as sounds do. An intense pain may distract my attention from other
sensations in my body, but it does not prevent them from being felt, as a loud sound
prevents a quieter one from being heard. As Scruton puts it, ‘a severe pain distracts
me from lesser pains; but is does not ‘hide them from view’’ (1999: 13).
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Masking is a defeating condition for hearing sounds, since sounds are the bearers of
loudness and softness. When a loud crash masks the music from the radio, it is the
loudness of the sound the crash makes that drowns the quieter sound of the music
from the radio. However, since we sometimes hear non-sound events and the objects
that are involved in them when we hear sounds, as I argued in the previous section,
we can also be prevented from hearing these events and objects by being prevented
from hearing the sound made by the event in which the object is involved. When the
loud crash masks the sound of footsteps, it also prevents me from hearing walking,
and from hearing the person who is walking. So by being a defeating condition for
hearing sounds, masking is also a defeating condition for hearing the other things
that we hear.
The masking of one sound by another is something that we are aware of in auditory
experience. We are aware of loud sounds drowning out other sounds. Masking is
part of the phenomenology of auditory experience as such. What do I mean by this?
I mean that there is a difference for us between, say, a loud sound apparently
masking a quieter sound, and a quieter sound itself changing so as to be more
difficult to hear, or no longer audible at all. Imagine, for example, the sound of a
television on which the volume is being gradually turned up and up. As the sound
grows louder, it becomes more difficult to hear the sound of the people walking
about in the flat next door, until eventually, I can’t hear the sound of the people
walking at all. It does not seem to me, when I have such an experience, as if the
sound of the people walking about has changed at all. Their sound does not seem, in
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this example, to have grown gradually quieter, for example. Rather, it seems as if the
sound made by my neighbours has been made gradually more and more difficult to
hear, as the sound of the television has got louder. It seems precisely as if the
neighbours’ sounds have been masked by those of the television.
The experience of masking does not require that the masking sound be one that
grows gradually more loud. Imagine that a prolonged sound, or sequence of sounds,
is briefly and repeatedly masked, either partially, so that it is difficult to hear, or
totally, so that it can’t be heard at all. The impression that we have in such cases,
even that of total masking, is not that the masked sound changes or stops when the
masking sound begins. Rather, it seems to us as if the masked sound continues, and
is briefly masked.75
Awareness of masking and unmasking, as such, makes manifest to us an enabling
and defeating condition for hearing. Awareness of masking and unmasking does not
involve there being any auditory spatial field, as we have seen in chapter 2 that there
is a visual spatial field— I will discuss whether there is any reason to think there is
an auditory spatial field, below. But as we saw to be true of enabling conditions
being manifest in touch, it is something about the dynamic, temporal character of
auditory experience that makes manifest to us this enabling condition. Masking and
unmasking occur when one event (a sound) happens during a time that another event
is occurring. Thus whilst we may be aware of masking and unmasking at instants,
75 Albert Bregman discusses such an example (1994, 27-29), which is in turn alluded to by Mohan
Matthen (forthcoming).
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we will only be able to allow that this is so if we allow that the conscious character
of experience at a time is determined by its conscious character over longer periods
of time. A full account of the way in which the enabling condition currently under
discussion is manifest would require an in-depth consideration of the temporal
character of auditory experience, and in particular, its temporal structural features.
But such consideration would take us well beyond the scope of this thesis.76
When I say that we are aware of masking and unmasking, I do not mean to claim
that we can always tell the difference between a loud sound masking a quiet one,
and, say, a quiet sound getting even quieter and gradually stopping as a louder one
starts and increases in loudness. We quite obviously cannot always tell the
difference. My auditory experience would be exactly the same if, in response to my
gradually turning the television up, my neighbours stopped walking around and thus
stopped making the sound of walking. And in Bregman’s discussion of our
experience of the repeated masking of a tune, there is in fact no masking occurring.
Rather, portions of a melody are ‘snipped out’ (in Matthen’s terms) and filled with
bursts of broadband noise. My auditory system can of course be fooled. The point is
just supposed to be that there is an experience as of masking, whether or not
masking actually is occurring.
Strawson takes our awareness of sounds as carrying on when we don’t hear them to
be ‘based on vision’. It seems to us, he thinks, that the sound of a violinist playing in
the street carries on whilst the marching band passes more noisily by, only because
76 See, for example, Phillips forthcoming.
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during this time we can still see ‘the visible but inaudible scrapings’ of the violinist
(1959: 71). It seems very likely to be true of Strawson’s example that our awareness
of the continuing but masked sound will be based on our seeing that its
circumstances of production have not stopped. And I need not deny that a subject in
a purely auditory world would not have experiences of masking. It might well be
that there are some background beliefs, or concepts, or capacities or subpersonal
representations or mechanisms involved in the experience of masking that can only
be acquired on the basis of vision, or some other modality. Nevertheless, I think that
this does not provide us with grounds to deny that in general, we are aware of this
enabling condition on the basis of hearing alone. Our awareness of masking does not
(or more cautiously) does not always rely on concurrent visual awareness of the
circumstances of production of the sound masked (it’s not a bimodal effect, like
ventriloquism). In the examples discussed above, of the sound of the television
masking the sounds that the neighbours make when they walk, there is no concurrent
visual experience, or in fact experience in any other modality, of the neighbours or
their walking whilst their sound is masked. And in Bregman’s example, visual
experience of the melody continuing beneath the bursts of masking sound is not
even a possibility.
Neither do I think that we have any reason to think that the experience of masking is
one that requires one to have a belief that a sound is still occurring, but masked. I
don’t think we only hear that sounds are masked, or unmasked. Masking is part of
the phenomenology of auditory experience, independently of our beliefs about it. As
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I argued in the case of seeing empty space (Chapter 2), the usual reasons for saying
that an experience should be understood as one of hearing that are absent from the
case of auditory awareness of masking. When I hear the sound of the neighbours as
masked, it need not be the case that I, for example, expected the sound to go on and
in the light of my disappointed expectation and my awareness of the sound from the
TV formed a belief that the sound of the neighbours had been masked.
I have argued then that we are aware in auditory experience of masking, and that our
being aware of it as such makes manifest to us a defeating and enabling condition
for hearing sounds. Because we only hear non-sound events and the objects that
participate in them when hearing sounds, this defeating condition is also a condition
for hearing these things, though perhaps in some sense ‘indirectly’. In the next
subsection, I turn my attention to a defeating and enabling condition that is a
condition for hearing the full trio of things that we hear.
2.2 Proximity
For a sound to be heard, and thus for the source of the sound and the event in which
the source is engaged perhaps also to be heard, it is not sufficient that the sound be
loud enough, in relation to other sounds in the environment. The heard things must
also be or occur near enough to a perceiver, if she is to hear any of them. Proximity
is thus an enabling condition for auditory experience. But for auditory experience of
which things? On the account given in the first section of this chapter, sounds are
events in which the source of the sound is a participant. The sound is located roughly
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where the source is, and, of course, the event in which the source is involved is also
located in roughly the same place. So whereas loudness or softness is a property of
only one of the trio of things we hear, location is an audible property of all three, or
in any case, can be a property of all three. And we must be near enough to all three
things if we are to hear them, and far enough away if hearing any of them is to be
prevented.77
Proximity then is an auditory enabling condition— we must be in the right place in
order to hear the things we hear, in that we must be near enough to them. We have
seen that visual and tactile perception also has enabling conditions of this kind— we
must also be in the right place in order to have visual or tactile experiences of the
things we see. The enabling condition discussed in the previous sub-section is not
obviously of this kind— but we shall see in the final section of this chapter that we
can and do exploit our grasp of this condition by getting in or out of the right place
to perceive things. Bodily awareness, unlike vision, hearing and touch, lacks
enabling conditions of this kind. There is no question of getting in the right place in
order to feel my sensations, or to be aware of the locations of my body-parts, as
discussed in Chapter 3. I will argue in this section that proximity is a spatial enabling
condition for auditory experience that is manifest in auditory experience.
77 Of course, if there are circumstances in which I hear only a sound as located without hearing
anything else —which I don’t want to rule out— then in such a case what I will have to be near
enough to, is just the sound itself. In such a case, what proximity will enable is just experience of a
sound.
160
We are aware of being near enough to be heard as an enabling condition and being
too far away as a defeating condition in that we are aware of the things we hear as
coming in and out of earshot, as they move towards and away from us. Consider my
auditory experience as a car passes by on the road below. For ease of exposition,
let’s discuss just my awareness of the source, that is, the car. 78 It seems to me, as I
hear the car, as if it gets nearer to me from the left, then further away, to the right,
and then that it passes out of earshot, further to my right. As we saw to be the case
with masking, passing in and out of earshot is something I am aware of as such. I
mean by this that when the car comes into earshot, this it how it seems, auditorily, to
me. And when I hear the car getting gradually further away, until it becomes too far
away to be heard, and I can’t hear it at all, this again is how it seems, auditorily, to
me. There is a difference for me, between the phenomenology of a sound getting
louder and then quieter, or a sound starting and stopping, and something audible
(sound, source or whatever) coming into and passing out of earshot. It doesn’t seem
to me as if the car has started on my left and stopped on my right, or as if its sound
has got louder and then softer.
Awareness of something audible coming in and out of earshot, as such, makes
manifest to us an enabling and defeating condition for auditory perception of the
things we hear. When something comes near enough to be heard, having moved
towards me, it seems as if I hear it because it is near enough to be heard. And when
something seems to move out of earshot, it seems as if I no longer hear it because it
78 One reason it’s easier to talk about hearing sources here is that as we’ve seen above, events do not
move. Rather, successive phases of the event occur at different and subsequent locations.
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has gone too far away to be heard. It seems as if my hearing the car, and then not
hearing it, is explained by its proximity to me.
Again, the point is not that I can always distinguish coming in and out of earshot
from a sound starting and stopping, or growing louder and then more quiet. I can’t.
The point is just that there is a difference for me between a sound apparently starting
and stopping, or growing louder and then more quiet, and something coming near
enough to be heard, and then going too far away to be heard. And as I said in the
previous subsection, with respect to our awareness of masking, I don’t think that
there is any reason to think that awareness of things coming in and out of earshot is
something that (a) requires concurrent visual experience or (b) the belief, or other
cognitive attitude that that which one is hearing has come into or gone out of
earshot.
Now. I have suggested that in auditory experience there is manifest a spatial
enabling condition, and that this condition is made manifest by our awareness of
things coming in and out of earshot. And like masking and unmasking, coming in
and out of earshot is something our awareness of which needs to be explained in the
context of a more-or-less prolonged period of time. Thus this enabling condition too
is made manifest by temporal features of perceptual experience. In vision, the spatial
enabling condition to which we gave most consideration was things falling within
one’s sensory limitations, and thus in the visual field (recall that vision’s having a
field is a matter of our being aware of our visual sensory limitations). And there
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being a manifest spatial enabling condition for hearing does not by itself imply that
there is an auditory spatial field, parallel to the visual field. And whether or not there
is an auditory field doesn’t really matter very much to the account I give here: what
matters is there being a manifest spatial enabling condition for hearing. Still, the idea
that in auditory experience something can seem to be ‘near enough to be heard’
suggests awareness of an auditory sensory limitation. And thus, it is worth
considering whether the notion of a spatial field is applicable to hearing as well as to
vision.79
That, for example, your speaking has to take place ‘near enough’ for me to hear it,
entails that it cannot occur too far away— that there are limits to where it can take
place and be heard. And it seems that these limits could only be sensory ones: it is
not that there is some fixed region of space —say, a room, or a sports ground— in
which things have to be if they are to be near enough to me to be heard. Rather, it
seems right to say that things can’t be or occur too far away from me and be heard
because I am limited, sensorily. I can only hear things that are within a region of
space fixed by my sensory limitations.
If there is an auditory field, then it will differ from the visual field in a number of
ways. The most obvious is its ‘shape’. The visual field, we noted in Chapter 2, is
cone-shaped. In contrast, we can hear things ‘all around’. There is no equivalent in
hearing to the ‘sides’ of the cone formed by our visual sensory limitations. If there is
an auditory field, it will, presumably, be a sphere, with the perceiver at the centre.
79 For a more in-depth discussion of these matters see Phillips (forthcoming).
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Another way in which an auditory field would differ from the visual field is in the
nature of its boundaries. The boundaries of the sphere will not be like those of the
sides of the cone made by the visual field. At the sides of this cone, visual
experience very straightforwardly stops. There is a determinate limit beyond which
if anything goes, no matter how large or bright, it will not be seen. Imagine, sat in a
car at traffic lights, that a pedestrian crosses the road in front of your car, from left to
right. As they cross, there will be a certain point at which, keeping your eyes and
head still, you can no longer seem them. They then pass beyond one of the
boundaries fixed by your visual field. And any visible object at all that passes in
front of you in this way will pass out of the region of space delimited by the visual
field, at precisely the same point. It’s because we can hear things all around, that
what spatially enables our hearing them is just their being near enough. They needn’t
fall in front of me, if I am to hear them, as they must, if I am to see them. I can turn
180 degrees, or lie on my back, and still hear you speaking, so long as I am near
enough to you.
Interestingly, the ‘straight ahead’ limit of the visual field is not like this. Straight
ahead, there is no determinate boundary beyond which any visible object will no
longer be seen. Watching someone walk away from me, there is a point beyond
which I will no longer see her. But I can nevertheless see other things that lie beyond
that point. How far away things can be, and be seen, interacts with how large they
are, and with their illumination conditions. I can see very distant stars because they
are huge, bright, and contrast with their surroundings— this I touched upon in
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Chapter 2. It would be analogous to this in all directions, in an auditory field. The
boundaries of such a field, on all sides, would be like the straight-ahead limit of the
visual field, in that how far away something can be, and be heard, in any direction,
interacts with how loud the sound it makes is, and with the loudness of other
surrounding sounds. There are no boundaries manifest in auditory experience
beyond which nothing whatever, no matter how loud, can be heard, like the sides of
the cone of the visual field are boundaries beyond which nothing whatever, no
matter how large and bright, can be seen.
Within an auditory field, things would seem to be located differently to the way in
which things seem to be located in the visual field. When we see material objects,
we see them as having a certain shape or form, and as coloured. Quite obviously, we
don’t hear anything as coloured. And neither do we hear anything as having a certain
shape and form. This is, on the one hand, just an empirical fact about the capabilities
of hearing: it is no more able to represent shape than colour. On the other hand, it
also reflects the fact that whatever else one hears to be located, one hears it only
when one hears an event of some kind as located— a sound. And the way in which
events are located is very different to the way in which material objects are located.
Events don’t have shape, or form. In fact, as Hacker points out, events, unlike
material objects, do not really fill or occupy space at all:
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The rising of an arm needs space, but does not occupy space, only the arm
that rises does that. A car fills space, but the event of its rolling into the
garage does not; rather it occurs at a place. (1982: 10; my italics)
The sounds, and non-sound events of which we are auditorily aware, like arm-
raising and car-rolling, do not occupy space. Neither the sound of footsteps, nor a
glass breaking, ‘fill up’ space, though of course the material objects involved in such
events do. It’s because they are events, that we can hear a number of sounds, and
non-sound events, in the same location. Not occupying space, as a material object
does, an event does not exclude other events from occurring where it occurs. Thus, I
can hear various sounds, and non-sound events all at the same location, as I listen to
the radio, for example. Because the sources of sounds are heard only when their
sounds are heard, auditory experience also locates material objects (the sources of
sounds) in a different way than does vision. These too, we only hear ‘at’ rather than
‘in’ locations. When I see a dog in front of me, six feet away, it seems to be dog-
shaped and sized. When I hear it as located, auditory phenomenology tells me
nothing about the size and shape of the source. When I hear a dog in front of me, six
feet away, its location is the only spatial property of which I am aware. And it seems
to me only to be ‘at’ the location at which I hear it.
Furthermore, auditory experience often locates its objects less determinately than
does vision. It is less determinate in the sense that often, when we hear something as
being located somewhere, there are more ways that the world could be consistent
with the experience being veridical, than is usually the case in visual experience (see
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Nudds forthcoming: 21). Whilst it sometimes seems to me that the dog that I hear,
barking, is six feet away and directly in front of me, at other times it seems only as if
it is ‘somewhere over on the right’, or even ‘somewhere around here’80. In this latter
experience of the dog as only very indeterminately located, there are very many
places that the dog could be, consistent with my experience of its location being
veridical.
These differences between the spatial phenomenology of auditory and visual
experience do not rule out there being an auditory field. However, one may think,
with Matthew Nudds, that auditory spatial experience differs from visual spatial
experience in that we are not aware, in hearing, of empty space. And this, we might
think, would be an obstacle to there being an auditory field. He suggests:
Unlike our visual experience, our auditory experience of space is exhausted
by our awareness of spatial relations between sound sources and us, and
between sound sources and other sound sources (forthcoming: 25).
Hearing is, on Nudds’ view, like touch, in that when I hear things or feel things as
located,
…the space that separates the experienced locations is not itself an object of
the experience. In neither case are we aware of the region of space between
80 Vision is not always that determinate as to the location of the things we see. For example, there
seems very often not to be a very specific answer to the question ‘how far away does the moon seem
to be?’
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the places we experience something to be in the way that we are visually
aware of the empty space that is the hole in the polo mint (forthcoming: 19).
We are not aware of the region of space in hearing in that, Nudds claims, we don’t
hear such locations to be either occupied or empty.
Given what’s been said about hearing the locations of sounds and non-sound events,
I would of course want to say that we are also aware of spatial relations between
sounds and also the other things we hear; non-sound events and the sources of
sounds. But in addition, I want to reject Nudds’ claim that there is no auditory
experience of empty space.81 We do hear empty space between locations at which
we hear things. Experience of a silent location is not equivalent, phenomenally, to an
absence of experience at a location.82 Where hearing and vision differ, in this
respect, is in what it seems that empty regions are empty of, and in the way they
seem to be empty. The absence of which I am aware in seeing empty space, recall, is
not an absence of everything (a void) but an absence of visible objects. The absence
of which I am aware in hearing silent locations is an absence of audible things at
those locations. And, given what we said earlier about the differences between
seeing and hearing locations, we should say also that I don’t hear the space as being
‘unoccupied’, so much as hearing regions at which there seems to be nothing
audible. When I hear locations as silent, auditory experience is neutral as to whether
any objects are at those locations. When I turn my radio off, auditory experience is
neutral as to whether there is anything at all at its location. What experience of silent
81 So do Dainton (2000: 75) and O’Callaghan (forthcoming: 24).
82 Note that it’s with the experience of silent locations that I’m concerned here, not with the
experience of silence more generally.
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regions is not neutral about, is whether anything is making a sound at that location.
At silent locations, I am aware of an absence of sounds that are loud enough to hear,
of non-sound events which produce sound, and of material objects only in so far as
they are involved in such sound-producing activities. So I would want to say that
hearing differs from vision not in that we don’t hear empty space, but in that what
we hear empty space as empty of differs from what we see empty space as empty of.
This, far from being inconsistent with the idea of an auditory spatial field,
emphasizes what, if there is an auditory field, it would involve: awareness of
specifically auditory limitations. And these limitations, if we are aware of them,
would delimit a region of space within which audible things would be perceptible,
and located in the distinctive way in which the objects of audition are located.
As suggested above, this diversion through the notion of an auditory field, is, strictly
speaking unnecessary for our purposes here. The important point is that there are
enabling conditions manifest in the conscious character of auditory perceptual
experience, as there are in visual and tactile experience. It looks to me plausible that
our awareness of proximity as an auditory enabling condition is awareness of an
auditory spatial sensory limitation. If this is so, then in hearing as in vision,
structural features are implicated in making manifest the enabling condition. (In
touch this was true too, but the structural features were features of bodily
awareness). But in any case, whilst the spatial phenomenology of vision and hearing
is different in the above-noted ways, both involve awareness of spatial enabling
conditions. In one case, that of vision, this is a matter of things seeming to fall
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within the space delimited by the visual field. In the other, that of hearing, whether
or not there is an auditory field, there is awareness of things seeming to be near
enough to be heard.
I have argued in this section that we are aware of two auditory enabling conditions—
masking, and proximity. In the next and final section of the chapter I argue that we
exploit these conditions in listening.
3. How are these enabling and defeating conditions exploited in listening?
I have argued that we are aware of two enabling conditions in auditory experience:
masking, and proximity. The first is primarily a defeating condition for hearing
sounds, but since we hear sources and activities by hearing the sounds they make, it
is also, indirectly, a condition for hearing these sources and activities. Proximity is a
condition for hearing whatever we hear to be located— any of the trio of heard
things. We can listen to any of the trio of things that we hear. And these enabling
conditions can be and are exploited in our listening to sounds, sources, and their
activities.
I’m going to consider first the way in which the obviously spatial enabling condition
for hearing is exploited in listening. In vision, we exploit the spatial enabling
condition by keeping objects within the visual field so as to maintain visual
perceptual contact with them, as discussed in Chapter 3. I said there and it should be
re-emphasized here that this was not supposed to be an explanation of the selectivity
of visual attention. Keeping an object in the visual field does not suffice to pick it
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out, selectively. It does not suffice because it will usually be the case that very many
other objects will also be in the visual field, other than the one to which one is
attending. Just by keeping the object at which I’m looking in the visual field, I do
not pick it out from all these other objects. Selectivity requires an altogether
different explanation (though in vision, this explanation will probably be spatial). It
is nevertheless necessary, in order for me to keep the object singled out, that I
maintain perceptual contact with it —keep seeing it— by ensuring that it remains in
the field. I exploit my grasp of the visual spatial enabling condition by being
sensitive to the object’s apparent location in tracking it: if it seems to be going
behind me, I’ll turn around, for example.
Similarly, exploiting the auditory spatial enabling condition identified in this chapter
is not intended as an explanation of the selectivity of auditory attention. Which is
just as well. Selectively attending to one thing rather than others, in hearing, does
not, or does not usually, involve picking it out from these others spatially— the
explanation for the selectivity of auditory attention is not likely to be spatial. Recall
the example from Nudds, discussed above, of selectively attending to sounds from a
radio. All the sounds one hears seem to come from the same location. Still, one is
able to selectively attend to one sound amongst them, to the sound of one voice, or
instrument, or whatever. And this is not just a matter of selective attention to sounds.
In listening to the activities of sound-sources outside my window, the locations of
many of them seem to be no more determinate than ‘over there, outside my
window’. But I can nevertheless listen selectively to now a car going past, now a
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bird singing, and now a dog barking, though I am not able to distinguish the spatial
locations of these things from one another. So neither exploiting the auditory, nor
the visual spatial enabling conditions is supposed to be an explanation of selectivity.
And whatever exploiting the auditory spatial enabling condition does involve, it will
differ from exploiting the visual condition. Because in hearing we perceive things in
all directions, we do not, generally, have to move ourselves so as to keep hearing the
things to which we’re listening, whereas we do, as we have seen, have to keep things
in front of us, and thus in the visual field, if we are to see them.
The straightforwardly spatial condition for hearing something, recall, is it being near
enough to be heard. And the most straightforward way in which I think one does
exploit this condition is just by staying near enough to hear the things to which one
listens, or alternatively, by moving further away from the things that one no longer
wishes to hear. Of course, to just stay where I am is to do very little. So if staying
where I am is something that I do in maintaining auditory contact with the things to
which I listen, then when this is what I do in listening, I do very little. It is not,
however, to do nothing at all. It is to exhibit sensitivity to the role of proximity in
keeping hearing things. Compare this to bodily awareness. In bodily awareness, for
which there are no enabling and defeating conditions that I can exploit, I need do
literally nothing in order to maintain perceptual contact with my sensations or body-
parts, though there is no doubt something that I do in order to selectively attend to
one sensation, or body-part, rather than others (see Chapter 3). And sometimes in
hearing I do more than just stay where I am in order to hear things. When those
things move around, I may sometimes move with them, in order to stay near enough
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to them to hear them— consider moving from room to room with someone with
whom you’re having a conversation whilst they perform some other task. One
follows them (at least partially) in order to keep hearing what they’re saying. Again,
this is exhibiting sensitivity to the role of proximity in maintaining auditory contact
with things, or in other words, exploiting the auditory spatial enabling condition.
Masking and unmasking is not a spatial enabling condition. And as we have said, a
full account of the way in which this condition is manifest to us would involve
considering the temporal structural features of audition. Nevertheless, this condition
is one one’s grasp of which one can exploit, especially in tandem with the spatial
enabling condition, by getting into or out of the ‘right place’ to hear something.
Imagine listening to someone talk whilst a baby cries noisily, nearby. One might
exploit one’s grasp of both spatial and non spatial enabling conditions by moving
away from the location of the masking sound (that of the baby crying) and closer to
that of the speaker to which one is trying to listen. Or in similar circumstances in
which one is, for some reason, unable to move about, one would equally be
exploiting one’s grasp of the enabling conditions by giving up trying to listen to the
speaker, so long as the baby keeps on crying. Thus though masking and unmasking
is not an overtly spatial enabling condition one is able to exploit it in a spatial way—
by getting into, or out of what is the right place to hear something, given the
occurrence of other noises in the environment.
173
The examples considered so far are examples of listening in which I maintain
auditory contact with (keep hearing) something I can already hear. But we also
exploit both kinds of spatial enabling condition in cases in which we can’t yet hear
any sounds: in ‘listening out for’ things at locations, or from sources. We can
understand ‘listening out for’ as involving maintaining perceptual contact with a
location or source with the aim of hearing something at that location, or from that
source, should something arrive or happen there. For example, I can listen out for
sounds or activities, or sources as they are involved in activities in the space behind
me, in which I currently hear nothing. Or, when I am looking at a silent source, I can
listen out for sounds or noisy activities from it. For example, whilst looking at a
silent, sleeping baby, I can listen out for it crying. I need to be looking at the silent,
potential source of a sound to count as listening out for sounds and activities from it,
because, as we have said, purely auditory experience of silent locations is neutral as
to the presence or absence of merely potential, silent sound-sources at such
locations. 83 How do I exploit the enabling and defeating conditions in listening out
for things? Well, in a multitude of ways. I might, for example, try to get closer to a
silent location or source at which I’m listening out for something, particularly if
there are potential masking sounds about. Or again, I might exhibit my sensitivity to
the conditions by giving up listening to sounds from a silent location once potential
masking sounds start up, or once I see the sound source move to a location at which
any sounds it makes will be out of earshot.
83 Though I might have purely auditory awareness of a silent source during brief intervals of a period
of time during which I listen to it making a sound. For example, I might be auditorily aware of my
phone for 10 seconds, though it beeps during that time only every other half-second.
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Finally, it’s perhaps as significant as any other way in which I might exploit auditory
enabling conditions, that I exhibit my awareness, in listening, of the difference
between the conditions that there are for hearing, and for seeing. I realise I don’t
have to keep something in front of me and free from spatial occluders in order to
hear it, as I would have to do in order to see it. And I realise that having something
in front of me won’t be enough for me to hear it if I’m in a noisy environment, for
example. My sensitivity to these things will affect what I do in listening, or indeed,
in giving up on listening.
In this final section then, I have considered ways in which we exploit the two
enabling conditions that I have argued we are aware of in auditory experience, in
listening. We exploit these conditions in maintaining perceptual contact with things
that we hear, and in listening out for things at silent locations and from silent
sources. Whilst, in many cases, what we do in exploiting these conditions is very
little (merely staying near enough to what we hear— staying where we are) to do
very little is to do a great deal more than we do in maintaining perceptual contact
with our sensations and body-parts in bodily awareness. In bodily awareness, there
are no such enabling conditions to exploit, and therefore nothing at all to be done.
Thus, in hearing as in vision and touch, enabling conditions are manifest in the
conscious character of experience, and exploited in active perceptual attention.
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Chapter 6: Taste and Smell
In the preceding chapters I have discussed vision, hearing and touch. I have argued
that these perceptual modalities differ from bodily awareness in that certain enabling
conditions which are exploited by perceivers in active perceptual attention are
manifest in the conscious character of seeing, hearing and touching, and not in
bodily awareness. Bodily awareness, I have suggested, has no such enabling
conditions. I come now to the most neglected of the senses: taste and smell. These
‘chemical’ senses have received very little attention in the philosophy of perception,
less even than hearing and touch. And it is not clear how theories of perception
developed with vision in mind can be extended to them.84 This will not, however, be
my concern here.
Some features of experiences of tasting and smelling have led some philosophers to
suggest, in the small literature there is devoted to them, that these experiences are
not phenomenally exteroceptive. By this I mean that, on the view of such
philosophers, gustatory and olfactory experiences do not seem to be experiences of
anything beyond the boundaries of one’s body. At most, they may accept that
gustatory experiences are perceptions of one’s body as being some way, or having
some quality, if they accept the perceptual model of bodily sensation described in
earlier chapters.
84 Batty (2007, unpublished thesis) addresses the question of whether a representationalist account of
smell can be given. Tye (2000) suggests, in passing, that such an account can be give of both taste
and smell.
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In this chapter I argue against this view of taste and smell. I argue that gustatory and
olfactory experiences are phenomenally exteroceptive, and that enabling conditions
are manifest in both tasting and smelling, and exploited in the olfactory and
gustatory equivalents of looking. In this, taste and smell are like vision, hearing and
touch, and unlike purely ‘interoceptive’ bodily sensation (i.e., sensation that directs
attention only onto one’s body). Whilst the components of the view against which I
will argue are to be found in the philosophical literature, they are not there to be
found as components of a fully worked-out view of either taste or smell.
Nevertheless, my imagined opponent’s view is one that I hope to show, whilst
wrong, has enough intuitive appeal to be worth arguing against. In the first part of
the chapter I discuss taste, and in the second, smell. In both parts, I will start by
spelling out my opponent’s view, and then go on to argue against it.
Part I: Taste
In this part of the chapter I will be concerned with gustatory experience. In section 1,
I characterize my opponent’s view. We shall see that on AD Smith’s account, whilst
gustatory experiences are not phenomenally exteroceptive, we ‘take’ taste sensations
as signalling the presence of flavours of things in our mouths because we also feel
these things there. In Chapter 4, we saw that some experience being a bodily
sensation is not in itself an obstacle to it being also an experience of something
beyond one’s bodily boundaries. When one has a tactile experience, one has a bodily
sensation in which one seems to perceive a mind-independent quality of body of
which one could have no (apparent) awareness without also seeming to feel
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something beyond one’s bodily boundaries. In section 2 I argue that we should think
of the bodily sensations that it is plausible to think are involved in gustatory
experience in the same way. And thus, we can understand the way in which enabling
conditions are manifest in taste in the same way as I argued in Chapter 4 that we
should understand the way in which they are manifest in touch. Once we have
formulated the account of taste in section 2, we can see that being committed to
certain claims about how the senses are individuated might lead one to accept my
opponent’s view.
1. Gustatory sensations
On my opponent’s view, taste experiences are not phenomenally exteroceptive. By
this I mean that, on their view, when one has a taste experience, one does not seem
to be aware of anything beyond one’s bodily boundaries. So, on their view, taste
experiences are akin to pains, or itches or sensations of warmth. If my opponent
accepts a perceptual account of bodily sensation they will think of pains, itches and
taste experiences as perceptions of one’s body. Representative of my opponent’s
view is the following remark, from Kant’s Anthropology:
Taste, in the proper sense of the term, is…the property of an organ (the
tongue, palate and throat) to be specifically affected by certain dissolved
matter in food or drink. (2006: 136)
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Whilst there is hardly enough written on taste to merit thinking of this view, or any
other, as orthodoxy, Carolyn Korsmeyer, echoing Kant, writes:
Tradition holds that taste directs attention ‘inward’ to the state of one’s own
body. When one tastes a flavour…that flavour is positioned
phenomenologically in one’s mouth, nose and throat; the sensation is
perceived to be an alteration of the body. (1999: 96)
Whilst I want to reject this view of gustatory experience, it cannot be denied that it
has some initial appeal. One aspect of gustatory experience that makes this view
appealing is its spatial content. It is certainly true that taste ‘directs our attention
inward’ in the sense that whatever one tastes, the qualities one experiences are ‘in’
the mouth, phenomenologically, in some way or another. Of course, the question yet
to be answered is how it is that flavours seem to be in the mouth. Whilst, on our
opponent’s view, flavours seem to be in the mouth in that the sensation seems to be
an alteration of one’s body, on another interpretation of ‘in’ the mouth, the flavours
of things are only experienced as in the mouth in as much as the qualities of a pebble
one grasps with one’s hand are experienced as in the hand. However, the qualities of
which one is aware in gustatory experience seeming to be —in some respect— in the
mouth is not the only aspect of the spatial content of such experience that might give
my opponent’s view some intuitive appeal.
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The spatial content of gustatory experience is impoverished in comparison to that of
experience in vision, hearing, and touch. The spatial content of gustatory experience
is limited to location: we are not gustatorily aware of distance for example, or of
shape. The qualities of which we are aware in taste do seem to have an ‘extent’, in
that we do not experience flavours only at pin-points, but their extent does not
always seem to match that of the object or liquid one feels in one’s mouth. If I place
a mint on my tongue, I feel the mint right there on my tongue, but the flavour seems
to fill my mouth. Furthermore, the mintiness I experience does not seem to have any
clearly delineated boundaries, aside from the bodily boundaries of my mouth itself,
in that the flavour of the mint doesn’t seem to extend out beyond my cheeks. This
might encourage the thought that, like a sensation of pain, a gustatory experience is
an experience of a part of one’s body. After all, the boundaries of a pain in my foot
are just those of my foot.
Kant’s own motivation for thinking of taste as, as he puts it, ‘the property of an
organ’ was that gustatory experiences are much more closely involved with pleasure
and displeasure than are, say, visual experiences. On Kant’s view, vision, hearing
and touch, are ‘more objective than subjective’. Taste, and also smell, are ‘more
subjective than objective’. The first three are ‘more objective’ in that
…they contribute more to the cognition of the external object than they stir
up the consciousness of the external organ (2006: 46).
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Taste and smell, on the other hand, are ‘more subjective’, ‘stirring up’ consciousness
of the ‘external organ’, in that
…the idea obtained from them is more a representation of enjoyment than of
cognition of the external object. (ibid.)
Whilst pleasure or displeasure can be associated with perception in any modality,
Kant was surely right that it is particularly prominent in the case of taste (and
smell— see part II of this chapter). We rarely have a gustatory experience without
taking some degree of pleasure or displeasure in it. And much of our interest in
gustatory experience is in the having of pleasure or the avoidance of displeasure,
rather than in exploring our environment— we rarely, at least as adults, use our
sense of taste for the latter purpose. This is significant to thinking of taste as
directing attention ‘inward’ since, as Kant puts it, pleasure and displeasure ‘are
determinations of the subject, and so cannot be ascribed to external objects’ (2006:
136).
Though, on Kant’s view, taste is more subjective than objective, he does not claim
that it is not objective at all. And whilst we may, when considering the spatial and
‘hedonic’ qualities of taste experience, find my opponent’s view appealing, we do
normally talk and think about ourselves as finding out, when we have taste
experiences, about the qualities of extra-bodily things. When I eat an apple, or drink
coffee, and so have gustatory experiences of the flavours characteristic of these
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things, I take myself to be finding out about qualities that not only persist unsensed,
but which are qualities of things that are beyond the surfaces of my mouth, namely,
a bite of apple, or a mouthful of coffee. How then is this to be accounted for, on my
opponent’s view? Our opponent can allow that we take our gustatory experiences as
experiences of these external qualities. On AD Smith’s view, we only do so because
we have contemporaneous tactile experience of things in our mouths. When you put,
for example, a mint into your mouth, Smith writes,
You take yourself to be tasting the mint only because you feel the mint with
your tongue (2002: 139; Smith’s italics).
For Smith, the aspect of one’s tactile experience that allows you to take your
concurrent gustatory sensation as being of the flavour of that which you feel in your
mouth, is your apparent awareness of pressure (Smith forthcoming: 14–15). You
take yourself to be tasting the mint because you feel the pressure the mint exerts on
the surfaces of your mouth. But taste ‘as such’, on Smith’s view, is a mere bodily
sensation (ibid.). The mintiness one experiences is really only in one’s mouth as a
headache is in one’s head. On the perceptual view of bodily sensation accepted in
this thesis, the mintiness, we might say, qualifies one’s mouth, and not the mint. (I
will consider just how gustatory qualities such as mintiness are supposed to be
experienced in purely interoceptive bodily sensations later).
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The central role given by Smith to pressure sensations does not look to me to be an
obligatory aspect of his account. As we emphasized in Chapter 4, one can have what
we would normally think of as tactile experiences that do not involve the having of
pressure sensations. For example, we feel the warmth of the air around us, and it’s at
least not obvious that the —as we say— ‘tactile’ experience one has when one is in
contact with liquid involves any awareness of pressure. Consistent with Smith’s
claim that tactile experience is responsible for our taking our gustatory experiences
as being of the flavours of things we feel in our mouths, we might have gustatory
experiences of flavours that we attribute to things that are external to the surfaces of
our mouths, though those things exert no pressure on these surfaces. One might
attribute a flavour to the air in one’s mouth, or to the saliva one feels there.
Having introduced my opponent’s view, and suggested that it has some initial
appeal, in the next section, I argue against it. I argue that the bodily sensation
involved in tasting, like that involved in touching, is a sensation that one could not
have without thereby seeming to perceive something beyond one’s bodily
boundaries. Like touch, taste is enabled by contact. And this enabling condition is
manifest in tasting in the same way as we have already argued, in Chapter 4, that it
is manifest in the conscious character of touching.
2. What kind of a sensation is a gustatory sensation?
Now we might perhaps agree with our opponent that in gustatory experience one is
aware of one’s body being apparently some way. Let’s suppose, for the sake of
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argument, that we do agree to this. However, we saw in Chapter 4 that it does not
follow from it being true that an experience is a bodily sensation that one does not,
in having that sensation, seem also to be aware of something beyond one’s bodily
boundaries, and thus have an experience that is phenomenally exteroceptive. There
we saw that tactile perceptual experiences, which are phenomenally exteroceptive,
just are bodily sensations of contact. So though we may agree that to have a
gustatory experience is to have a bodily sensation, we do not, yet, in so agreeing,
accept that gustatory experiences are not also phenomenally exteroceptive. In this
section I argue that we should also understand gustatory bodily sensation as
sensation in which one seems to be aware of something beyond the surfaces of one’s
mouth and tongue.
Assuming as we are doing that when one has a gustatory experience, one has a
bodily sensation, the following question arises: is this sensation intransitive, or
transitive? Recall, from chapter 4, that a sensation is transitive if, in having such a
sensation, one seems to be aware of one’s body being some way that it might be
without one’s sensing it. A sensation is intransitive, on the other hand, if it does not
seem to be, at least on the face of it, a sensation of a quality that might persist
unsensed. If one takes gustatory bodily sensation to be transitive, one can then ask:
is the way in which one’s body seems, in having this sensation, a way in which it
could not seem to be without one thereby seeming to be aware of something beyond
one’s bodily boundaries? In order to answer both these questions (and my answers
184
will be ‘transitive’ and ‘yes’) it is helpful to consider gustatory experiences
alongside what we usually think of as tactile experiences of surface temperature.
When you feel warmth, there are a number of things the warmth of which you might
seem to feel. For example, when you have a fever, or sunburn, you feel your body,
or parts of it, to be warm. In this sort of case, one has a certain transitive sensation,
in that one seems to be aware of one’s body being some way that, on the face of it, it
could be independently of one’s sensing it. But in having this sensation, you are not
thereby aware of anything beyond your bodily boundaries. This sensation is
phenomenally interoceptive. Other experiences of warmth, on the other hand, are
experiences as of the warmth of things beyond those boundaries. For example, you
might seem to feel the warmth of the air around you, or of objects against your skin.
Because warmth is something that can seem to be a property of one’s body, or of
some external object, one might be tempted to think of what happens when one
seems to feel the warmth of external objects, as follows: one has a bodily sensation
of warmth in one’s skin, in tandem with a tactile experience —involving pressure—
of something in contact with one’s skin at the very location at which it feels warm.
Because the bodily sensation of warmth and the tactile experience involving
pressure occur in tandem, one takes the quality which one feels in one’s skin, to be
the quality of the object that is in contact with one there. Let’s call this a ‘projective’
model of perceiving surface temperature, since according to it, when a bodily
sensation of warmth occurs in tandem with a tactile perception, one could be said to
‘project’ the warmth one feels in one’s body onto that which one feels beyond it.
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This in fact, or something very like it, is Smith’s account of perceiving surface
temperature, and clearly analogous to his account of taste:
[I]ndependently of association with tactile perception, sensations of taste and
heat and cold would be simply located in our bodies. When, however, they
occur in tandem with feeling an object, temperatures and tastes are attributed
to the object (Smith forthcoming: 6)
Now this projective model may be tempting in the case of the perception of surface
temperature, because, as we have seen, warmth is the sort of thing that we can make
good sense of feeling to be a property of body, or a property of things beyond the
body. But if we try to apply this model to taste, we run straight away into the
following difficulty. It is not clear what quality of body it is that we are supposed on
this model to project onto the things we feel in our mouths. In the case of perceiving
surface temperature, there is no such obstacle. The bodily sensation is a transitive
sensation of warmth: we feel our bodies in having such a sensation as being,
straightforwardly, warm. This warmth is then the very same quality that we take
objects as having, when we feel their surface temperature. The quality you take
things such as apples and coffee as having is flavour. But it is clearly not right to
think that when you take a bite of apple, or a sip of coffee, your mouth itself seems
to be flavoured, as apples and coffee are flavoured. As Smith writes, when you eat
your mint, ‘it is not that your mouth tastes minty, in the sense in which we say that a
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mint does’ (2002: 139). Faced with this obstacle one might conclude, as Smith does,
that —since it is not right to think of you as experiencing your mouth as tasting
minty— there is no mind-independent way your mouth seems to be when you eat a
mint. In other words, one might conclude that the bodily sensation you have when
you put the mint in your mouth is an intransitive one, like a sensation of itchiness, or
pain. To quote Smith again:
there is…simply a taste in your mouth. This is a pure gustatory event.
Indeed, it is a mere gustatory sensation, having no ‘object distinct from itself’
(ibid.)
Thus, on my opponent’s view, when I take qualities of which I am aware in bodily
sensation as being qualities of external things I am ‘projecting’ onto them some
mind-dependent quality, analogous to pain or itchiness.
And here lies a problem for my opponent. Very often, we feel pain or itchiness at
locations at which we also feel things in contact with us. For example, when I touch
an electrically charged object with my fingertips, I have a sensation of pain in my
fingertips in tandem with a tactile experience —involving pressure— of something
in contact with my skin at the very location at which it hurts. On my opponent’s
view it looks entirely mysterious that we do not take painfulness and itchiness to be
qualities of things beyond our bodily boundaries, when it is the case that sensations
of pain or itchiness occur in tandem with tactile perceptions. This Smith recognizes,
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setting out to answer the question of why pains aren’t taken to be qualities of
external objects in his forthcoming ‘Tastes, temperatures and pains’.85 A more
general problem is that there is something very odd about the idea of an experience
of flavour as an intransitive sensation. For one, we usually think of flavours as the
sorts of things objects have independently of their being tasted, and we said in
section 1 that our opponent does not wish to deny that tasting allows us to find out
about these mind-independent properties.86 Our opponent will have to say that we
find out about these mind-independent properties by having bodily sensations in
which they are somehow presented as mind-dependent.
I want to suggest that these peculiar consequences of our opponent’s view suggest
that the projective model is altogether wrong, for the case of perceiving surface
temperature as much as for the case of tasting flavours. I will discuss first how we
should understand tactile perception of surface temperature, and then apply this to
taste.
Even though the projective model seems more plausible for perceiving surface
temperature than it does for perceiving flavour, I want to argue that it is wrong, even
in the former, thermal, case. My claim is that we should not think of perceiving
surface temperature as involving the projection onto an external object of a quality
85 Grice (1962) briefly addresses the same question. Smith (forthcoming) finds Grice’s suggested
answers unsatisfactory, as indeed they are. His own answer is that we do not ‘externalize’ pains
because, due to their very painfulness, they do not ‘meld’ into sensations of pressure, as sensations of
taste and warmth do.
86 When I say that we think of flavours as mind-independent qualities, I do not mean to deny that they
are secondary qualities.
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that would otherwise, without the offices of tactile perception, seem to be a quality
of one’s body. It should be emphasized that this is not to deny that when I hold my
warm coffee cup in my hand, I feel both my hand as warm, and the cup as warm, nor
that the warmth I feel in my hand seems to be the same quality (namely, warmth) as
I feel in the cup. Neither is it to deny that I feel the cup’s warmth in virtue of feeling
my hand to be some way. What is denied, rather, is that the way one’s body feels
when one feels surface temperature is the very same way as it feels when one just
feels one’s hand to be warm. When I feel my hand to be warm the sensation I have is
just that of my hand being warm. When I feel the surface temperature of some
object, I have a different bodily sensation. Though my account is presented in
opposition to his, Smith’s description of the bodily sensation one has when feeling
the warmth of the cup as a sensation of ‘warm pressure’ is apt (forthcoming: 17). We
might pack this out as it seeming as if one’s body is resisting the pressure of
something warm. In having a sensation of warm pressure, as opposed to merely one
of one’s hand as warm, one has a bodily sensation that one could not have without it
seeming to one that something warm was pressing against one. And to feel
something warm pressing against one is to have a tactile, phenomenally
exteroceptive perception of surface temperature.
Now let’s apply this to taste. We saw above that one might come to the conclusion
that gustatory experiences are intransitive bodily sensations, as the result of looking
for the quality of body that gets projected onto things one feels in one’s mouth, as,
on the projective model, one projects the warmth one feels in one’s body onto things
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one feels against one’s skin. But in looking for this quality one cannot find any
objective way one’s mouth might seem to be that corresponds to a bodily sensation
of flavour. Thus, we saw, one might conclude that gustatory bodily sensations are
intransitive, like sensations of pain, or itchiness. Now, if one rejects the projective
model in general, then one is never tempted to look for a quality experienced in a
gustatory sensation, that gets projected onto extra-bodily objects. Rather, one can
say that, as we have argued is the case in perceiving surface temperature, when one
has a gustatory sensation one’s mouth seems to be some way that it could not be
without it thereby seeming to one that one was tasting the flavour of something
beyond the surfaces of one’s mouth and tongue. On this account, when one eats
something solid, or relatively so, the bodily sensation one has is that of something
flavoured pressing against the surfaces of one’s mouth. When one experiences the
flavour of something that does not exert any pressure, such as the air or saliva in
one’s mouth, one has a bodily sensation of something flavoured in contact with the
surfaces of one’s mouth and tongue. There is no mystery as to why pains and itches
aren’t likewise ‘externalized’. A sensation of pain, unlike a gustatory experience,
just isn’t a sensation that one can’t have without having a phenomenally
exteroceptive experience.87 And we are not forced to countenance sensations in
which flavour, experienced exactly as we attribute it to things such as apples and
coffee, is experienced as a mind-dependent quality. Which is just as well, since it is
hard to make sense of.
87 My opponent might perhaps say that there still remains to be answered the question of why this is
the case. But I’m not sure what would count as an answer to this question.
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Taste, like touch, is enabled by flavoured things coming into contact with one,
specifically, with the surfaces of one’s mouth and tongue. The bodily sensation that
is involved in tasting, like that which is involved in touching, is a sensation of
contact. In the case of taste, it’s a sensation of contact with a flavoured thing. This
being the case, we can explain an enabling condition for taste being manifest in the
conscious character of gustatory experience in the same way as we can an enabling
condition for touch being manifest in the conscious character of touching. And we
can likewise explain the exploitation of the enabling condition in actively tasting. As
in feeling, we exploit our grasp of the enabling condition in order to maintain
perceptual contact with the objects of taste, by maintaining literal contact with them,
though of course, in the case of taste, that contact must be specifically with the
surfaces of one’s mouth. We also exploit our grasp of the enabling condition in order
to disable gustatory experiences, when, for example, we spit out unpleasant tasting
food. When left with, as we say, a ‘funny taste’ in the mouth, it can seem to one as if
something oddly or unpleasantly flavoured is coating the surfaces of one’s mouth.
Then we exploit our grasp of the enabling condition by trying to remove this
coating, again, by spitting, or washing our mouths out.
And to restate what we said about this in Chapter 4, implicated in contact seeming to
be an enabling condition for touch are two aspects of the conscious character of
touching. These are, firstly, a structural feature of bodily awareness, in virtue of
which it is possible for us to have bodily sensations in which we seem to be affected
from without, and secondly, the dynamic, temporal character of experiences
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involving sensations of contact. An enabling condition for taste is thus manifest to
us due to tasting involving these same two aspects of the phenomenology of
sensations of contact. I can, in taste as in touch have bodily sensations in which I
seem to be affected from without because my bodily awareness is structured by a
sense of my body as bounded in a world that extends beyond the location of any
possible present sensation. And, contact being made with my mouth and tongue
being something that happens over a period of time (though perhaps brief), it might
be missed if one were to be overly focused on the conscious character of perceptual
experience at snapshot-like instants, rather than over longer periods of time.
In section 1 we saw that my opponent’s view has some intuitive appeal. In this
section I have tried to argue that though we may accept that gustatory experiences
involve bodily sensations, they are bodily sensations that one could not have without
seeming to taste the flavour of some object external to one’s body. In the next
section I argue that my opponent’s view might also be motivated by certain
assumptions about the way in which the senses are distinguished from one another.
3. Taste, and touch, and distinguishing the senses
I have said above that when one has an experience of tasting, one has a bodily
sensation that one could not have without seeming to experience the flavour of
something beyond one’s bodily boundaries. Thus gustatory perception is analogous,
in this way, to tactile perception. On certain views about how the senses are to be
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distinguished, on the account given here, tasting will just be a form of touching.88
For example, a proponent of the view that the senses are individuated by the features
one perceives by means of them might argue that gustatory experiences, on the
account offered here, are tactile, in virtue of their involving awareness of contact.
Or, someone who accepts the sense-organ criterion might want to think of gustatory
experiences as tactile in virtue of their involving the stimulation of tactile receptors
in the mouth and tongue.
In response to this latter suggestion, one might give the following Gibsonian
response. In taste, what we think of as gustatory, tactile (and also olfactory)
mechanisms work together in taste as a single perceptual system.89 And in fact, some
taste-scientists do seem to see things in this way. Researchers looking at the brain
structures underlying taste often see the fact that the normal stimuli for taste are also
tactually operative as posing a ‘methodological challenge’ (O’Doherty 2004: Section
II). In brain imaging, researchers employ ‘baseline comparison conditions’, using
tasteless substances to control for, as they put it ‘tactile’ interference (ibid.). On the
other hand, some, particularly those whose flavour-related research interests are in
88 Cf. Aristotle’s labelling taste ‘the variety of touch that serves nutrition’ (Korsmeyer 1999: 20)
89 This looks like the right kind of thing to say about the contribution of smell to taste. Research
confirms the familiar fact that flavours such as those of coffee, wine, cherries, lemon, pineapple and
even water become difficult to recognize with a cold (Vroon 1997: 25). This is due to the
involvement of ‘olfactory’ receptors and mechanisms in taste. When eating and drinking, air from
one’s mouth reaches the olfactory receptors at the roof of the nasal cavity via the nasopharynx. When
one has a cold, the mucous layer of the nasal epithelium, which contains the olfactorily-sensitive
cells, swells. Thus, odiferous substances are less able to reach these cells. Yet when everything works
normally, we say that we taste the flavour of coffee, wine, cherries, and so on. We shouldn’t take
from this that we really only taste, say, bitterness and sweetness, the ‘coffee’ quality being, strictly
speaking, olfactory. Rather, part of our physiology that contributes to the sense of smell, and thus
forms part of the olfactory system, in normal gustatory experience, also forms part of the gustatory
system.
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food science and technology, are happy to take a more Gibsonian approach, on
which taste itself is ‘an oral chemoreceptive, and also mechanoreceptive and
thermoreceptive sensory system’ (Halpern: 2001). The sense of taste, on this view,
involves whatever receptors contribute to our overall experience of eating and
drinking. On this approach, the contribution of ‘tactile’ receptors and mechanisms to
normal taste experience is such that we see the tactile component as part of the
gustatory system itself, rather than something in addition to taste proper. This is
consistent with the view presented above in section 2. However, though this
Gibsonian suggestion looks to me plausible, I have no prior commitment to it, or to
any claim about how the senses are distinguished from one another. My point, in this
section, is just to suggest that my opponent’s view might be motivated by being
committed to some claims about how the senses are distinguished from one another.
In Chapter 1, I gave a very brief account of the philosophical debate over how the
senses are distinguished from one another. We can see even from this brief account
that the following two assumptions are commonly, though not universally, made by
those who have considered the individuation question (that is, the question of how
the senses are distinguished from one another):
(a) The individuation question can be answered without appeal to
convention.
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(b) An answer to the individuation question requires the formulation of
criteria by means of which we can distinguish the five commonly-
identified senses from one another.
Now, given (a) and (b) one of the things that one will want one’s account of how the
senses are distinguished to do, is to say in virtue of what, other than convention, all
those experiences that we usually think of as tactile, are tactile. For example, one
will want to be able to say in virtue of what, other than convention, feeling surface
temperature, feeling ambient temperature, and feeling the rim of the glass when I
press against it with my fingertip, are all tactile perceptions. On the standardly
proposed criteria for individuating the senses, as introduced in Chapter 1, one might
for example say that these perceptions are all tactile in virtue of, for example:
(i) Their all involving awareness of contact (if one adopts a version of the
features criterion), or
(ii) Their all involving parts of the body that serve as sense-organs in virtue
of that which is perceived coming into contact with those body-parts (if
one adopts a version of the organ criterion)
Now if you are committed to (a), (b) and either (i) or (ii) then you will want to reject
an account like that which we have given in section 2. This is because if you accept
the account given of taste there, then by (i) or (ii) taste experiences are also tactile.
They are bodily sensations that involve awareness of contact, and they involve parts
195
of the body, namely, the mouth and tongue, that serve as sense-organs in virtue of
that which is perceived coming into contact with those body-parts.
In order to avoid accepting that that perception of flavour is a form of touch (which
would be inconsistent with (b)), you might then be lead to pick out a distinct
gustatory experience from the overall experience you have in your mouth when, say,
eating an apple or drinking coffee. This gustatory element, in order not to count as
tactile by (i), or (ii), will be a gustatory sensation that one could have without
thereby seeming to be aware of anything beyond one’s bodily boundaries. This, of
course, is my opponent’s view, against which I have been trying to argue in this part
of the chapter. As emphasized in Chapter 1, it is not my intention in this thesis to
provide or support any way of answering the individuation question. Thus I am
committed to none of the assumptions above. With no commitment to (b), I am free
to accept that taste is a form of touch, as Aristotle suggested. Or, with no
commitment to (a), it will not matter to me if there is no non-conventional way to
distinguish taste from touch. I am free to say that though we have as good a reason
to distinguish a thermal sense as we do a gustatory one, we do not, because our
counting the senses as we do is at least partly a matter of convention.
Part II: Smell
In part I of this chapter, I argued against the view that gustatory experiences are not
phenomenally exteroceptive. In this section, I do the same for olfactory experiences.
One reason for considering taste and smell separately is that smells, unlike flavours,
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we usually think of as, loosely speaking, objects in their own right. In section 4 I
suggest that it is right to say that we only take our olfactory experiences to signal the
presence of the sources of their smells on the basis of experience in another
modality. However, on my opponent’s view, olfactory experiences are bodily
sensations that we only take to signal the presence of smells themselves, considered
as extra-bodily objects or phenomena. In section 5 I consider why someone might
think this of smell, and in section 6, argue that they would be wrong to do so. On the
account of smell I give in section 6, enabling conditions for olfaction are manifest in
olfactory perception, and exploited in actively smelling.
4. Smelling the sources of smells
Whilst I want to say that olfactory experiences are phenomenally exteroceptive, it
also seems right to say that we only take our olfactory experiences as being of the
sources of smells, on the basis of experience in another modality. This will be my
claim in this section.
In Chapter 5 we saw that sounds count as objects of auditory perception in that they
are the bearers of auditorily sensible properties, unlike colours and shapes, which are
the visually sensible properties of the objects of visual perception. Smells count as
the objects of olfactory perception in an analogous way as do sounds. We do
sometimes think of smells as properties of their sources; I might, for example, think
that the apple has a sweet smell, just as it has a spherical shape or a red colour.
However, we also think of smells as objects, or better, phenomena distinct from their
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sources, that are themselves perceptible, and can survive the removal or destruction
of their sources. For example, it is not unusual to smell the smell of someone’s
perfume after they have left the room, and cooking smells linger in the kitchen long
after the meal has been eaten and the dishes washed. Smells thus understood are,
loosely speaking, the ‘effluvia’ (Reid 1997: 25) of material objects or stuff. We can
think of smells as being made up of parts of their sources, dispersed in the air, or as
supervening on such things.90
In the previous chapter I argued that in addition to sounds, we also, at least
sometimes, hear their sources. We also commonly think of ourselves as smelling not
just smells, but also the sources of those smells— things such as roses, bits of cheese
and bars of soap. But it seems right to me to say, as Smith does, that
…attributions of smell to physical objects require…the perception of such an
object by a different sense (2002: 143).
On this view, I only take the sweet, rosy smell as being that of a particular rose, in
virtue of, say, concurrently seeing, or holding it. Reid seems to have held a similar
view:
90 I assume a realist account of smells. See Batty (unpublished thesis) and also Scruton (1999: 4). He
takes sounds and odours (and rainbows) to be ‘secondary objects’.
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By the original constitution of our nature we are both led to believe, that
there is a permanent cause of the sensation, and prompted to seek after it; and
experience determines us to place it in the rose (1997: 75).
On Reid’s view, we come to take, because of the original constitution of our nature,
our olfactory experiences as signalling to us the presence of the sources of smells
because one finds that these experiences occur in the presence of certain external
things, the presence of which, presumably, we learn about via experience in some
other modality.91
One reason, alluded to by Smith, that it seems right to say that olfactory perception
is not by itself as of the sources of smells is that there seems to be no phenomenal
difference between an olfactory experience of the smell of a rose, and an olfactory
experience that is, as we say, of the rose itself. In particular, there is no difference in
the spatial content of the experience when I attribute the smell to its source, and
when I smell only the smell. I discuss the spatial content of olfactory experience
more in the following sections. In addition, the reasons we saw in chapter 5 that
there are for thinking that we hear the sources of sounds, are absent from the case of
our supposed olfactory experience of the sources of smells. I argued there that by
hearing sounds, we hear non-sound events in which the sources of sounds
participate. When we hear these events, we hear the sources of sounds. There are no
91 In addition to the involvement of experience in another modality, some part might also be played
in my attributing smells to their sources by my knowing that the smell of which I am aware is that
which is characteristically the smell of roses. Otherwise, I might well attribute the smell to the hand
that holds the rose, or to something else in the room.
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grounds for thinking that the considerations I raised in the hearing chapter as
supporting the claim that auditory experience is as of the sources of sounds apply
here. For example, it doesn’t seem that we are led by the facts about olfactory
grouping (if there is such a thing) to think that we smell objects. And we are not
aware in olfactory experience of events that seem to be the activities of material
objects.
Whilst I accept that it may, for these reasons, be right to say that olfactory
experiences themselves are not ‘as of’ the sources of smells, in what follows I want
to deny a stronger claim one might make about smelling. According to this stronger
claim, olfactory experiences are not as of smells, considered as extra-bodily physical
phenomena, either. Rather, they are sensations that at most, are directed onto one’s
body. I will introduce this view in the next section.
5. Olfactory sensations
On our opponent’s view, olfactory experiences are not phenomenally exteroceptive.
One proponent of this view is Reid, who writes of a man’s first experience of the
smell of a rose that he:
…cannot give it a place, any more than he can give a place to melancholy or
joy: nor can he conceive it to have any existence, but when it is smelled. So
that it appears to be a simple and original affectation or feeling of the mind,
altogether inexplicable and unaccountable.(1997: 37)
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Similarly, William Lycan writes:
…considered only phenomenologically, a smell seems a modification of our
own consciousness rather than a property of a perceptual object that would
exist unperceived (2000: 277).92
According then to Reid and Lycan, olfactory experiences do not even direct
attention to one’s body.
However, our opponent may also hold that when one has an experience of smelling,
one seems to be aware of a quality that is located, phenomenally, within one’s bodily
boundaries. Specifically, on this view, olfactory qualities seem to be located in one’s
nose. Our opponent’s view of smell may be motivated by much the same factors as
those introduced in section 1 as motivating our opponent’s view of taste. For
example, Kant thought of both smell and taste as ‘more subjective and objective’
due to the involvement of pleasure and displeasure in both. But particularly relevant
to olfactory experience is its spatial content. Much of what follows will be
concerned with how to describe the spatial character of olfactory experience. But
suffice it to say, at this point in the argument, that its spatial character might be
thought even more impoverished than that of taste. Smells never seem, when we
smell them, to be at any distance from us. And neither do they seem to be in any
92 Whilst Lycan denies that olfactory experiences seem to present their subjects with any mind-
independent object or quality, he argues that they do, nevertheless represent odours, considered as
extra-bodily, mind-independent phenomena.
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direction, or to move. Neither do we seem to move in relation to them. As AD Smith
points out, in tandem with awareness of our own bodily movements we may ‘judge’
that a smell is ‘objectively unchanged and that a less intense perception is due to our
having distanced ourselves from it; but we do not smell this’ (2002: 174; my italics).
And when we smell more than one smell at a time, we do not pick them out from
one another spatially. Thus the spatial content of smell is rather deprived, especially
in comparison to that of seeing, hearing and touching. It is this deprived spatial
content that leads Smith to deny that olfactory experiences are phenomenally
exteroceptive. He writes:
Whereas you see and hear things at a distance, and feel spatially located
objects with your hands, you typically experience smells in (or just behind)
your nose. (2002: 139)
Now there are two ways in which we can understand the claim that smells are
experienced as ‘in’ the nose. On the first, olfactory experience is phenomenally
exteroceptive. On this reading of the claim that smells are in the nose, they are there
in the way in which a pebble seems to be in the hand that holds it, or, a swallowed
fishbone seems to be in the throat, or given the account of taste given in part I,
something tasted seems to be in the mouth. A pebble held in the hand is, and is
experienced as in some respect being, enclosed by part of one’s body— one’s closed
hand. But it doesn’t seem to one, in the experience one has when grasping the
pebble, just as if one’s hand is some way. One seems to feel the pebble, which seems
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to be something extra-bodily— something beyond one’s bodily boundaries. We
might take Smith as claiming that smells seem to be in one’s nose as pebbles seem to
be in the hand— as enclosed by some part of one’s body, but nevertheless distinct
from it, beyond its boundaries.
On the second reading of the claim that smells are experienced as in the nose, smells
seem to be in the nose as an itch or a pain might seem to be there. It’s on this reading
that we can take Smith as denying that olfactory experiences are phenomenally
exteroceptive. Now, which of these readings does Smith have in mind? There is
some evidence that he is thinking of the second reading, on which smells are in the
nose as itches and pains are. Having claimed that smells are experienced in the nose,
he writes that ‘experientially, they are not spatially located’ (2002: 44). In the
context of the discussion in which this remark appears, Smith can be taken as
meaning that smells don’t have ‘phenomenal, three-dimensional locatedness of the
objects of awareness in relation to a sense-organ’ (2002: 134) that, for example,
visual experiences do have. It seems reasonable to conclude from this that Smith
means that the locatedness of smells in the nose is akin to the locatedness of itches
or pains there, that is, that olfactory experiences are not phenomenally exteroceptive.
In section 6 I argue that smells are not in the nose as itches are there. In section 7 I
consider whether they seem to be in the nose in any other way.
6. The nose as a sense-organ
In this section I argue that smells don’t seem to be in the nose in the way in which in
bodily sensations, qualities are located in parts of one’s body, because instead, in
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olfactory experience the nose seems to be the place ‘from’ which we smell things.
On the account I give of the way in which the nose seems to be the place from which
things are smelt, enabling conditions for olfactory perception are manifest in the
conscious character of smelling.
To say that the nose is the place from which things are smelt is to say that it is a
sense-organ, minimally construed (see Chapter 3). It is nothing new, of course, to
claim that the nose is a sense-organ. What I want to emphasize is that it is a sense-
organ in the following way: it is a place from we seem to smell things in that
smelling, like seeing, involves, as Mike Martin puts it, ‘perspectival elements’.
Bodily awareness does not involve such elements. Vision’s perspectival elements
involve seeing things at distances and directions from the place roughly where one’s
eyes are. When one sees a duck, it seems to be a certain distance from one, in a
certain direction. The distance and direction seem to be a distance and direction from
somewhere. It’s not however that the place from which one seems to see the duck is,
in Martin’s words, ‘an explicit element in how things are presented as being’ (409).
One sees the duck, and not oneself. Rather, the place from which one apparently
sees is ‘marked in one’s…experience through it being the point to which the objects
perceived are presented’ (ibid. 410). Seeing a duck involves awareness of a point to
which the duck is presented, namely, the point roughly where one’s eyes are. Bodily
experience, in contrast, does not involve a point to which things are presented in this
way. When one has headache, one’s experience does not include a place to which
the headache is presented. Rather, one feels the ache as in a part of one’s body.
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Now, think about an olfactory experience of, say, the smell of coffee. Is the
experience like seeing the duck, or like having a headache? That is, does one’s
experience involve perspectival elements, such that there seems to be a place to
which the smell is presented? The smell, unlike the duck, does not seem to be at any
distance or in any direction from me. As we saw above, in this way, olfactory spatial
content is deprived, in relation to the spatial content of experience in other
modalities. So if there are perspectival elements to olfactory experience, these
elements are not a matter of our smelling things at distances and directions. But this
does not mean that there are no perspectival elements to olfactory experience.
Olfactory experience does not just involve being aware of certain qualities, such as
smokiness or floweriness. It also involves awareness of the smells that have these
qualities being brought to the nose, when we breathe in through it, or sniff. The nose
is the place from which things seem to be smelt in that we are aware of smells being
brought to the nose in breathing and sniffing. Thus, smells do not seem to be in the
nose as itches and pains do. Rather, olfactory experiences are phenomenally
exteroceptive: the smells that seem to be brought to our noses by breathing and
sniffing seem to be extra-bodily phenomena.
The account given here of the way in which the nose seems to be the place from
which things are smelt is an account on which smell, like taste and touch, involves
bodily awareness. We saw in Chapter 4, and in part I of this chapter, that touching
and tasting both involve being aware of one’s body as being a certain way, a way
205
that it could not seem to be without one’s seeming to be aware of something beyond
one’s bodily boundaries. In touch and taste one is aware of one’s body as being a
certain way, in that one has a certain bodily sensation, namely one of contact. We
might see olfactory experience as also involving a sensation of contact made by the
smell that is breathed in, with the inner parts of one’s nose. But it also involves
bodily awareness of one’s breathing— this will include proprioceptive awareness of
happenings over a more extensive portion of one’s body than one’s nose.
It needs no argument that smelling is enabled by breathing and sniffing. It is a
necessary condition for smelling some smell, that that smell be brought into one’s
nose. I have suggested, above, that we are aware of smells being brought to our nose
by our breathing and sniffing. Olfactory perception being enabled by breathing and
sniffing through the nose is thus manifest in the conscious character of smelling. We
have seen already, in Chapter 2, that one way in which to miss the enabling
conditions that are manifest in sense-perception is to ignore the conscious character
of experience over periods of time more extended than the ‘snapshots’ with which
philosophers are sometimes overly concerned. Breathing and sniffing are temporally
extended goings on. Correlatively, one is aware of one’s breathing or sniffing over a
period of time. Thus if one conceives of the conscious character of experience at an
instant as determined by what happens at that instant, one will miss the manifest
enabling condition in olfactory experience, as we have seen that one will likewise
miss the conditions that are manifest in hearing and touching.
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So I have argued in this section that smells are not in the nose as itches and pains
are. Rather, the nose seems to be the place from which we smell smells, by seeming
to be the place to which those smells are brought, by breathing and sniffing.
Furthermore, in smelling involving this awareness, an enabling condition for
olfactory perception is manifest in the conscious character of smelling. This enabling
condition is that of olfactory perception of smells being enabled by these smells
being brought into one’s nose when one breathes or sniffs. I have argued then, over
the last six chapters that enabling conditions for perception are manifest in the
conscious character of olfactory experience, as they are manifest in that of seeing,
hearing, touching and tasting. In these four modalities, I have also argued that these
enabling conditions are exploited in active attention. At the end of the next section I
will argue that the same is true of smelling— that the enabling condition that is
manifest in the conscious character of olfactory experience is exploited in active
olfactory attention. Before that I argue that not only do smells not seem to be in the
nose as itches and pains are, but that neither do they seem to be just in the nose as a
fishbone is in the throat, or a pebble in the hand.
7. Where do smells seem to be?
In section 5 we identified two readings of the claim that smells seem to be in the
nose. On the first reading, they seem to be there as itches and pains do. On this
reading, olfactory experiences are not phenomenally exteroceptive. In section 6 I
argued that smells don’t seem to be in the nose as itches and pains do. Rather, the
nose seems to be the place from which we smell smells, in that it seems to be the
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place to which smells are brought by our breathing and sniffing. On the second
reading of the claim that smells seem to be in the nose, olfactory experiences are
phenomenally exteroceptive. Smells, on this view, seem to be there as a pebble
might feel to be in one’s hand— that is, as distinct from, but enclosed by a part of
one’s body. Here I want to argue that this second reading of the claim that smells
seem to be in the nose is, with some qualification, correct. The qualification is this:
smells seeming to be brought into the nose, they don’t seem to be just there, even in
the innocent way that a pebble seems to be in the hand. Smells seem to have been
brought into the nose, from the extra-bodily world beyond. And thus they seem to be
located in that extra-bodily world. With this made clear, we will, at the end of this
section discuss some ways in which we exploit our grasp of the olfactory enabling
condition in actively smelling.
Smells seem to be in the nose in something like the way that a pebble seems to be in
the hand, or a fishbone in the throat. When I breathe in, and smell the smell of
coffee, the smell seems to make contact with the inner parts of my nose, this contact
being of the variety that does not involve pressure. But because smells seem to come
from beyond the nose, and in fact, from beyond the body altogether, they do not
seem to be only in the nose, as an object inserted in a nostril would seem to be.
Where then, in addition to the nose, do smells seem to be? And how should we
describe the phenomenology of their seeming to be both in the nose, and beyond it?
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We have already touched upon the deprived spatial content of olfactory experience,
in section 5. We don’t smell things at distances and directions, and we don’t pick out
smells from one another by picking out their locations. We don’t seem to move in
relation to smells, and they don’t seem to move in relation to us. And when I smell
something, the smell doesn’t seem to occupy a certain region of space. The smell of
cooking I smell when I walk into the kitchen doesn’t seem to have a certain volume,
though I may take it to fill the kitchen, knowing that that is where I am. Rather, the
spatial content of olfactory experience is neutral not only with respect to distance
and direction but also with respect to size or extent. So it’s not that the smell seems
to be in my nose, and also beyond it, in the sense that I am aware of it as having
some (even relatively) determinate extent, and of this extent encompassing both the
location of my nose, and of some (even relatively) determinate region of space
beyond it.
Whilst it is possible, under controlled conditions, for us to locate smells much more
precisely than we do (see Georg von Bekesy 1967), in the normal case, as Matthen
puts it, ‘every smell of which I’m aware is simply here’ (Matthen 2005: 284, my
italics). Beyond the nose, we are aware only of a smell of a certain intensity, ‘here’.
This is again comparable, in certain respects, with the (as we usually put it) ‘tactile’
perception of ambient temperature. When I feel the warmth of the air around me on
my skin, it seems as if the air is warm not merely in some narrow layer on the
surface of my skin, but, more generally, it seems to be warm ‘around here’, in the
vicinity of my body, where this vicinity is not of any determinate extent. The
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difference in the case of smell is that, whilst smells can also be described as seeming
to be ‘around here’, they seem to be in the vicinity not of one’s body, but of the
nose, into which one is aware of them being brought by one’s breathing and sniffing.
Thus smells do seem to be in the nose, but they do not seem to be just there. They
also seem to be beyond the nose, in its vicinity, where this is a region of
indeterminate extent.
The restricted spatial phenomenology of smell impacts upon the way we exploit our
grasp of the enabling condition that I have argued is manifest to us. That we do in
fact exploit our grasp of this condition is fairly obvious. Before I conclude the
chapter, I will consider some examples of the way in which our awareness of the
enabling condition is exploited in actively smelling.
One sort of purpose to which we put our active olfactory attention is in tracking and
escaping smells. So, for example, if I smell gas, I might try to get away from the
smell. Or if I smell coffee, I might track the smell to its source. As we saw, smells
don’t seem to move, and we don’t seem to move in relation to smells. Thus the
olfactory element of tracking and escaping smells is partially the registering of the
intensity of the smell at different locations— it also involves awareness of bodily
movements. Because smells only ever seem to be ‘here’, in tracking the coffee
smell to its source, I move in some direction and see if the smell intensifies. If not, I
move in another direction. If so, I keep on in the originally chosen direction unless
the smell begins to weaken, or disappears. Tracking smells is thus in some respects
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like playing the HOT/COLD game, in which a hider guides a finder to a hidden
object by shouting out ‘hotter’ as they move closer to it, and ‘colder’ as they move
away from it. Whatever else it might involve, tracking the smell of the coffee in this
way involves taking in the air at different locations in order to smell it.
However, on this description of tracking smells, it differs not at all from tracking
ambient temperature to its source. Walking into a dark, cold, room, I might find my
way to a heat-source by ‘feeling around’, moving in the direction in which I discover
the heat intensifies, and backtracking when it gets cooler. But where actively
smelling is different from this feeling around is in the role of sniffing. All smelling
involves breathing through the nose (smell that involves the retronasal passages
aside).93 But we can also take control of this activity, by sniffing. Sniffing alters the
speed with which odiferous substances reach the nasal epithelium, velocity in some
parts of the nose reaching hurricane speeds with vigorous sniffing (Proctor 1982:
171). The nasal cavity is open to the rest of the world, through the nostrils, and to the
throat, through the retronasal passage. Sniffing increases the rate of flow through the
nasal cavity, and directs the flow upwards to the olfactorily receptive cells. This can
increase the proportion of inhaled odiferous molecules reaching the cells ‘from
about 5 to 20%’ (Proctor 1982: 280). Interestingly, some studies have found that
there seems to be some kind of constancy phenomenon operative here: for though
smelling brings, as it were, more of the smell to the receptors, this does not affect the
perceived intensity of the smell. The smell of coffee in the room has the same
93 It is also possible to smell substances that have been injected into the bloodstream, as the result of
the substances reaching the blood-vessels of the nasal epithelium. See Vroon 1997.
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apparent intensity, whether I sniff vigorously, or breathe normally. What it does
affect is detectablity. If the smell is very faint, I may be able to detect it only with
vigorous sniffing. Beyond this, as one author puts it, ‘it is not fully understood to
what extent odour perception is influenced by the sniffing behaviour of the observer’
(ibid.). What is clear is that tracking smells differs from tracking ambient heat in that
the former involves actively sniffing smells into one’s nose.
I also exploit my grasp of the olfactory enabling condition in trying not to smell
certain things. If I don’t want to smell some particularly unpleasant smell, I might
(temporarily!) avoid taking in air so as to no longer smell the smell, or at least avoid
sniffing. And, of course, it’s not just in tracking and avoiding smells that I exploit
the manifest enabling condition for smell, sniffing. Actively smelling, no less than
the other forms of perceptual attention considered so far, can be put to many uses. I
can track a smell, avoid one, or I can perform the olfactory equivalent of ‘looking
out for’ an odour where there currently is none, sampling the air in my current
immediate vicinity. And in all of these activities, I exploit the manifest olfactory
enabling condition, sniffing, that I have discussed in this section.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In Chapters 2–6 I have identified a feature that is common to the five familiar
senses, and lacking from bodily awareness. This feature is having enabling and
disabling conditions for perception of a certain kind, that are manifest in the
conscious character of sense-perception, and exploited in sense-perceptual activity.
This feature, I claim, is what is distinctive about the senses. But, as we said in
Chapter 1, in order for this claim to be acceptable, we must have reason to believe
that it is not just incidental that we group together those faculties that have these
enabling conditions, and exclude from this category bodily awareness, which just
happens to lack enabling conditions of the relevant kind. In this concluding chapter,
I argue that it is not just incidental that we group the five familiar senses in this way.
Though it is not just incidental that we group together faculties that have this feature,
as instances of single kind of thing, I do not want to argue that the possession of this
feature is necessary and sufficient for some faculty to count as a sense. I will argue,
in section 3, that this is not the sort of significance that one should expect an account
of what is distinctive about the senses to have. Here I will be expanding upon a
suggestion made in my introductory chapter. I will suggest that it is enough for us to
be able to say that our grouping together perceptual faculties that have this feature
serves certain interests that we humans have.
First though, I want to look at some other things that the account given in Chapters
2–6 has in its favour. At the outset of our investigation, in Chapter 1, we introduced
some expectations that one might have about what makes something an instance of
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sense-perception, or correlatively, a faculty a sense. And we saw that it was far from
obvious how these expectations might be met. In section 1, I argue that the account
given of what is distinctive about the senses meets these expectations. Furthermore,
we can see that bodily awareness lacking enabling conditions of the kind I have
argued that the senses have allows it to serve a number of important and distinctive
functions. This I discuss in section 2.
1. Phenomenology and sense-organs, again
In chapter 1, section 2 I noted that an interesting feature of the way in which we
usually distinguish between senses, and other faculties, is that we do not usually
count bodily awareness amongst the senses. We do not usually think of bodily
awareness as a sense, even though it is quite intuitive to think of it as a perceptual
faculty. So my aim was to identify some feature that is distinctive to the five familiar
senses, and in particular, that they do not share with bodily awareness. In other
words, we wanted to find some feature that was distinctive of sense-perception. And
we saw that this is something about which one might have some intuitions or
expectations. And since it was far from obvious how these expectations were to be
met, the question we have been engaged in answering looked worth pursuing. In this
section I look at the way in which the account given here meets these expectations.
1.1 Phenomenology
Sense-perception (perception in the five familiar senses) is, as a matter of fact,
informative about the world. Intuitively, we said, sense-perception differs from other
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ways we have of finding out about the world in that it both allows us to acquire
knowledge specifically about things in the environment as they currently are, and
also in that the knowledge thus acquired is causally explained by the phenomenal
character of sense-perceptual experience. This then might lead one to expect that
what is distinctive about sense-perception should have something to do with its
conscious character (see Chapter 1, section 3). That is, we might expect that appeal
to the conscious character of sense-perceptual experience will be ineliminable from
an account of what is distinctive about the senses, just as, on Grice’s view, it is
ineliminable from an account of how the senses are distinguished from one another.
But it was, we noted, far from obvious in what the phenomenological distinctiveness
of sense-perception might consist. In chapters 2–6 I have argued that enabling
conditions for perception are manifest in the conscious character of seeing, touching,
hearing, tasting and smelling. In bodily awareness, no enabling conditions are
manifest. This is what is phenomenologically distinctive about sense-perception.
It is worth noting two obstacles to accepting the claim that enabling conditions for
perception are manifest to us in the conscious character of sense-perception, the first
of which has already been mentioned in several places during the preceding
chapters. This first obstacle to accepting the claim is a pre-occupation with the
conscious character of experience at instants, or at least, during extremely brief
periods of time. If one is overly concerned with how things seem to one during such
‘snapshots’, then one is unlikely to notice that enabling conditions are manifest in
sense-perception. After all, many of the enabling conditions we have said are
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manifest to perceivers involve the way things seem to those perceivers over
relatively extended periods of time. This is true, for example, of the enabling
condition that I argued, in Chapter 4, is manifest in tactile perception. I argued there
that it is manifest to one, in tactile perception, that tactile perception of o is enabled
by o’s making contact with one’s body (either directly or indirectly). It is manifest to
one in that when one touches something, one has a bodily sensation of contact, for
example, of being pressed against, or of being warmed from without. Sensations of
contact such as these involve one being aware of something that is temporally
extended. And thus the sensations in which we are aware of these things are
sensations in which our awareness of contact being made itself unfolds over a period
of time. Similarly, in hearing, one way in which enabling conditions for auditory
perception are manifest is in it seeming to us as if audible things come in and out of
earshot. Something comes into or goes out of earshot over a period of time, and I
am, consequently, aware of such things only over relatively extended periods of
time. If one focuses on how things seem to one only at snapshot-like instants, one is
unlikely to notice the presence of enabling conditions like this.
The second obstacle to agreeing to the claim that enabling conditions are manifest in
the way I have argued they are is accepting a certain view in the philosophy of
perception about the nature of perceptual experience, namely, a strong transparency
thesis.94 If one holds this view, one thinks that all the features of perceptual
experience are representational. Some of the features in virtue of which enabling
94 Amongst those who accept this thesis are Tye (1995; 2000) and Dretske (1995). For discussion and
critique see Martin 2002.
216
conditions are manifest in the conscious character of perceptual experience are, I
have argued, structural. Structural features of experience are not representational—
they are independent of the objects and properties one apparently perceives. In
Chapter 2 I argued that an enabling condition for visual perception of visible objects
is manifest to us in virtue of the structural feature of visual experience that
constitutes vision’s field-type character. And in Chapter 4 we saw that a structural
feature of bodily awareness is implicated in a tactile enabling condition being
manifest to us.
1.2 Sense-organs
We also said (Chapter 1, section 3.2) that it’s intuitive to think that what is
distinctive about the senses, has something to do with their involving sense-organs,
which bodily awareness does not involve. But we also saw, (in the same place, and
in Chapter 3) that it is very difficult to give conditions under which some part of the
body counts as a sense-organ. This prevents us from saying that the presence of an
organ is what distinguishes sense-perception from bodily awareness. Whilst it has
not been my intention to provide criteria for counting some body-part as a sense-
organ, the account given in Chapters 2–6 nevertheless allows us to say what is right
about the intuition that what is distinctive about the senses is that they involve a
sense-organ. Furthermore, it allows us to say what is right about the intuition in a
way that is closely related to the expectation, just discussed, that there should be
something phenomenologically distinctive about sense-perception.
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First of all —and again, this is a thought that we have come across earlier in the
thesis— it is natural to think of sense-organs as, as Armstrong puts it, ‘parts of the
body that we habitually move at will’ in order to affect perception. As well as being
manifest in the phenomenology of experience, I have argued that the enabling
conditions that are distinctive of sense-perception are exploited in sense-perceptual
activity, in particular, in maintaining perceptual contact with the things one
perceives. In seeing, tasting and touching, at least, what is done when one exploits
one’s grasp of the enabling conditions in this way is to move parts of one’s body one
usually thinks of as sense-organs around in order to perceive. One moves them, or
keeps them where they are, so that they are in the right place for one to perceive
things, or indeed, so as not to perceive things. Which body-part one moves, and
where the ‘right place for one to perceive’ is, depends on the perceptual activity in
which one is engaged, that is, on whether it is a visual or tactile or gustatory activity.
For example, if you are looking at something, you may move your eyes in order to
keep it in front of you, within the limits of your visual field. Or, if you are tasting
something, you have to keep your mouth (or just your tongue) in contact with the
object. Or, if you are feeling something, you may move parts of your body serving
as sense-organs (see Chapter 4) to keep them in literal contact with it. In each of
these cases, exploiting your grasp of the enabling condition will involve moving
parts of your body around, and specifically, the parts of your body that we usually
think of as sense-organs, or in touch, that it makes sense to think of as serving as
sense-organs.
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It is not (or not straightforwardly) true of all the senses that exploiting one’s grasp of
the relevant enabling conditions will involve moving parts of your body that we
think of as sense-organs around in this way. For example, one does not move one’s
ears when one listens, or one’s nose when one smells, independently of moving
one’s head, or larger portions of one’s body than this. We humans cannot, of course,
move these body-parts independently. That’s not to say that one doesn’t have to be
‘in the right place’ in order to smell or hear things. Quite the contrary. In all
modalities, there are parts of the body that have to be in the right place if one is to
perceive things (Chapter 3, section 2). And in all modalities, exploiting one’s grasp
of enabling conditions can involve getting these body-parts into an appropriate
relation with perceptible things, as we have seen. In smell and hearing, one can only
get one’s ears or nose into the right place by moving larger portions of one’s body.
So whilst our account allows us to see what’s right about the idea of sense-organs as
parts of the body one moves at will in order to perceive, it does not allow us to
identify sense-organs as such body-parts.
There is another way in which our account is related to the expectation that what is
distinctive about the senses is that they involve sense-organs. I suggested that we
might construe sense-organs, very minimally, as places from which things seem to
be perceived. Our everyday conception of a sense-organ may, and probably does
involve more than this. But it seems right to say that the parts of the body we usually
think of as sense-organs are places from which things seem to be perceived, even if
they are also, and we also think of them as being more than this. It is true of touch
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that whenever we touch something there is a part of the body that serves as a sense-
organ, construed in this minimal way. And smell, and hearing, also involve sense-
organs thus construed. Bodily awareness, of course, does not involve any part of the
body from which things seem to be perceived. As we have emphasized in previous
chapters, there is no part of the body from which one seems to feel, for example, a
pain in one’s foot, or as if one’s arms are stretched out in front of one. How though
does this relate to the account we have given of what is distinctive about the senses?
We need not think, and I have not suggested, that there being a place from which
things seem to be perceived, in some modality, is prior to enabling conditions being
manifest in the conscious character of perceiving in that modality. Perhaps, on the
contrary, there seems to be a place from which things seem to be perceived in sense-
perception just in that the enabling conditions are manifest to one. This looks like
the right thing to say for smell, for example. In Chapter 6 I argued that olfactory
qualities do not seem to be ‘in’ one’s nose in the way in which pains or itches might
seem to be in parts of one body. Rather, the nose is the place ‘from’ which smells
seem to be perceived: a sense-organ, minimally construed. And, I argued, it seems to
be the place ‘from’ which things seem to be perceived in that a certain enabling
condition for olfactory perception is manifest to us. This enabling condition, recall,
was that olfactory perception is enabled by smells being brought into the nose by our
breathing and sniffing. And it might be right to say, with respect to the other
modalities too, that there seems to be a place from which things are seen, heard,
tasted or felt in that enabling conditions are manifest in perception. Or, in other
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words, we might say that there is a sense-organ, minimally construed, in that such
enabling conditions are manifest to us. This then would be another way in which it
would be right to say (as it is intuitively right to say) that what is distinctive about
the senses has something to do with their having sense-organs. There is of course
much more that one might say here.
In this section I have suggested that the claim that what is distinctive about the
senses is their having enabling and disabling conditions of a certain kind, meets
some expectations that we might have had, at the outset, about why we might think
of sense-perception as a single kind of thing. In Chapters 2–6 I have been careful not
only to argue that the five familiar modalities have these enabling conditions, but
also that bodily awareness lacks them. In the next section I point out that lacking
these conditions allows it to effectively serve a number of important functions that it
has for us.
2. Functions of bodily awareness
As a matter of fact, at least in normal human perceivers, bodily awareness of various
kinds serves certain important functions that other perceptual faculties do not have.
For example, the awareness one has of one’s body has a special role for one in
protecting that body from harm, and in moving it in action. And amongst the actions
that bodily awareness has a role in helping us to perform are the attentive activities
of looking, listening and so on, that we have argued in this thesis involve the
exploitation of enabling conditions of a kind that bodily awareness does not have.
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These are all, obviously, important functions. Now, I do not intend to give anything
like a functional analysis of bodily awareness— I do not claim, for example, that no
faculty that did not have these functions could be one of bodily awareness. Rather,
what I want to point out is that bodily awareness having these important functions, it
would not serve them nearly so well if it had enabling and defeating conditions of
the kind that sense-perception has.
Let’s consider, first of all, bodily awareness’ distinctive function of protecting one’s
body from harm. Amongst the forms of bodily awareness that serve this function,
the most obvious is pain. That pain does normally have this function is made vivid
by consideration of sufferers of congenital analgesia. Patients with this condition
lack all capacity for pain. As such, they are prone to allow great harm to come to
their bodies and also to behave in ways that are not conducive to healing when their
bodies are already damaged.95 For example, one patient with congenital analgesia,
known as ‘Miss C’ is said, as a child, to have ‘bitten off the tip of her tongue while
chewing food’ and to have once suffered ‘third degree burns after kneeling on a hot
radiator to look out of the window’ (Grahek 2007: 8). In normal subjects sensations
of pain would alert you to withdraw your knees from the radiator or your tongue
from your teeth before such horrible damage occurred. And when you or I do hurt
ourselves, pain at the site of injury alerts us to rest or protect the damaged area,
95 Grahek notes that we can distinguish, functionally and also physiologically, two subsystems of the
pain system. The first is the avoidance system, which is sensitive to ‘potentially noxious stimuli’
exposure to which if prolonged, would damage body tissue. The second is the restorative or repair
system which ‘guards injuries against further insult’ and thus allows healing (2007: 9-10).
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whereas a patient like Miss C will continue to walk on a damaged foot or write with
a damaged hand, to their obvious detriment.
Pain, then, has an evident benefit— it helps prevent us from damaging our bodies.
Now, if pain is to serve this beneficial function, what’s important is not merely that
it is a mechanism of informing us that we’re damaged or in danger of becoming so.
This is what a second sort of pathological pain condition highlights. Sufferers of
pain asymbolia have sensations that we might want to call sensations of pain (they
certainly recognize them as such) but in whom these sensations are no longer felt as
something unpleasant or something that they want to avoid. Pain asymbolics feel
and can recognize pain sensations when they’re damaged. What they lack are the
normal affective and behavioural responses to these sensations. They’re not bothered
by their pain sensations and they don’t withdraw from the things that hurt them. In
experimental settings, they have been observed to smile or laugh when pained
(Grahek 2007: 46) and they remain friendly to experimenters throughout testing in
which they are subjected to what would in other circumstances be considered torture
(47).96 Pain doesn’t serve its beneficial function in these patients either. Whilst it
gives them a way of knowing of damage or threat to their bodies, their not being
bothered by pain means that they nevertheless are not sufficiently motivated to avoid
it. The wife of one such patient reported that he had recently suffered serious burns
to his hand ‘without escape or emotional reactions’ (Grahek 2007: 85). Pain serves
96 Grahek describes such subjects as feeling pain, but not being in pain -it doesn’t matter to us here
whether that’s an apt description.
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its function not just because it’s a reliable indicator of damage or danger, but
because it’s horrible.
Problems related to these considerations faced Paul Brand’s first attempt to build a
prosthetic pain device for use by patients with a variety of disorders of pain
perception. The intention, initially, was to produce a pain system that ‘warns of
danger but doesn’t hurt’ (Grahek 2007: 83). Sensors worn on the body would react
to pressure, sending a signal to a hearing-aid that would buzz when the wearer’s
body was in danger of damage and emit a piercingly loud sound when actual damage
occurred. Such a system, it was hoped, would preserve the ‘good’ aspects of pain
and not the ‘bad’ aspects, in that its wearers would not experience the warning
sounds as horrible, in the way that we experience pain. Unfortunately, the system
didn’t work: its users would ignore it or turn it off when the loud signal sounded.
Now, part of the problem here is evidently that the sound emitted by the hearing aid
wasn’t horrible enough for it to serve the functions of pain— like the pain
asymbolics, there were not, for the device’s users, the usual affective responses
associated with pain. But the failure of Brand’s next attempt demonstrates that this
wasn’t the only problem.
In this next attempt, Brand and his colleagues created a device that could be used by
patients whose lack of pain sensations was localized. Leprosy patients, for example,
tend to retain a capacity for pain sensations in the warmer parts of their bodies, such
as their armpits. Brand replaced the hearing-aid component of their prosthetic pain
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device with an electric coil, placed in the armpit, which would deliver a painful
electric shock when the sensors detected danger or damage to other parts of the
body. Brand realised that this device too was doomed to failure when, he says, he
observed one of his volunteer patients, Charles, attempting to loosen a rusted bolt
with a wrench:
I saw him put some force behind the wrench and then stop abruptly, jerking
backward. The electric coil must have jolted him… Charles studied the
situation for a moment, then reached up under his armpit and disconnected a
wire. He forced the bolt loose with a big wrench, put his hand in his shirt
again and reconnected a wire. It was then that I knew we had failed (Brand,
quoted in Grahek 2007: 88).
Why had they failed? We’ve seen that the asymbolics highlight the fact that if pain
wasn’t horrible, we’d ignore it, and then it wouldn’t serve its function. But precisely
because it’s horrible, we’d stop it —disable it— if we could. And if we could make
sure that we didn’t experience it in the first place, then we would probably choose
not to. For normal subjects, in the main, the things we can do in order to put an end
to pain, or not get it in the first place, are to get out of situations in which things are
harming us, or are likely to do so. Thus, pain, being so horrible, gets to serve this
function of preventing (or at least, minimising, harm). But the asymbolics using
Brand’s second device had a different way in which to stop pain, or not get it in the
first place; they could just turn their pain device off. As we’ve said, the horribleness
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of pain is such that we’d stop it if we could. The device-wearing asymbolics could,
and so did stop it. And thus pain could no longer serve its harm-preventing function
for them.
For our purposes here, the moral I want draw from such cases is that if there were
enabling and conditions for pain (or for other kinds of bodily awareness), of the kind
there are for the senses it would not serve its function of protecting the body nearly
so well. It’s not of course that for Charles, enabling and defeating conditions are
manifest in the conscious character of his pain experience, or exploited by him in
attending to his body as visual enabling conditions are exploited by us in looking.
The point is that were there such enabling and defeating conditions for bodily
awareness, one would then be able to put an end to one’s bodily experiences,
including pain, by exploiting such conditions. Charles, due not to exploiting his
grasp of enabling conditions that are manifest to him, but to the design of the pain-
device with which he has been fitted, is likewise able to put an end to his pain.
Because pain is unpleasant, this is precisely what he does. And in so doing, he
endangers his body. If there were enabling and defeating conditions for bodily
awareness of the kind there are for vision, touch, and so on, chances are that we
would act like Charles does, thus likewise endangering our bodies. If I could —for
example— do something analogous to turning my back on, or getting very far away
from, my hand in order no longer to feel the pain there, I would.
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As we said in Chapter 3, its not that there aren’t things we can do to put an end to
bodily experience, nor that there isn’t an activity of attending to bodily states and
goings-on.97 But these things are importantly unlike exploiting enabling and
defeating conditions in order to maintain or break perceptual contact with one’s
body. There is nothing analogous to turning away, or getting further away that I can
do in order to no longer feel my headache, or the relative position of my hands, or
the itch in my foot. And correlatively, there is nothing like this that I do in order to
keep feeling these things. I don’t keep my body-part or sensation within some bodily
field to maintain contact with it. I don’t more generally, ‘stay in the right place’ to
feel my headache.
Pain, we have said, plays a special role in bodily protection. But other ways of being
aware of our bodies also help us to keep our bodies safe. Being aware of my
movements, and of where my limbs are in space helps me to keep them out of
harm’s way, and also helps me not to injure myself by, say, poking myself in the
eye. If there were enabling and defeating conditions of the relevant kind for these
kinds of bodily awareness then I could also exploit them in order to lose track of my
limbs and movements, and I would be at much greater risk of injuring myself.
Bodily awareness also has a distinctive role in moving our bodies in action. It’s not
my intention here to say anything at all about what, in particular, this role is— to do
so would be to go well beyond our concerns here. It’s not obvious, for example,
97 See Chapter 3, section 4.1 for how the ways we can put an end to bodily awareness differ from
exploiting enabling conditions for perception of the kind there are for the senses.
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what one should say about how much control of one’s bodily movements when
acting is taken care of by subpersonal systems. But it is, I think, uncontroversial to
say that bodily awareness has some distinctive role here, a role that, say, vision or
touch does not have. The kind of bodily awareness that is relevant here is
proprioception, and kinaesthesia— our awareness of the position of our limbs in
space and overall layout of our bodies, and our awareness of the movement of those
body-parts. Another pathological example helps us to see that if there were enabling
and defeating conditions for bodily awareness of these kinds, they would be much
less fit to serve their distinctive function in controlling action.
The example is the well-known case of Ian Waterman, who due to a viral infection
suffered extensive damage to his peripheral nervous system. Waterman lost much of
what we think of as tactile perception from the neck down, and also awareness of the
position of his limbs, posture and movements. In addition, the nerve damage stopped
the functioning of, in Jonathan Cole’s words, ‘subconscious programmes’ involved,
in the normal subject, in the control of action. He retained normal awareness of
temperature, pain and muscle fatigue (Cole 1991: 24–33). What it is like to be Ian
Waterman is difficult to imagine.
Whilst there has been no neurological recovery, nevertheless, and against all
predictions, Waterman has been able to learn to control his body, to some extent. He
can stand, walk, drive and generally carry out sufficient day-to-day tasks to enable
him to live independently and hold down an office job. But his repertoire is
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limited— he cannot run, stairs are still difficult, and such things as playing the piano
or riding a bike would now be inconceivable for him. None of the movements he can
now perform have been ‘relegated to the reflex, the unthinking’ (1991: 113). His
movements are also awkward. According to Jonathan Cole, no one who saw Ian
moving his body around could think that nothing was wrong— his movements look
unnatural, which, of course, is exactly what they are (127). This is partly because all
those tiny adjustments of posture that for us, are taken care of by subpersonal
systems, are for him under conscious control. This takes a great deal of
concentration and effort. Here is Waterman’s description of the kind of challenge
just moving around the office in which he works can pose for him:
I was walking down a slope at work, one that I don’t normally use. As I
approached it and before I even stepped on it I had planned how it would be
tackled. I assessed the surface and the angle of the slope, inclined my body in
sympathy with it, shortened and slowed my pace and widened my stance.
(Cole 1991: 113)
Thus his movements, whilst limited and awkward, are also expensive in terms of
energy and attention. Having to devote such a large amount of attention just to
keeping upright and moving around takes these resources from other things. He
cannot take notes at a meeting, the concentration involved in writing and listening
being too much for him also to retain posture (1991: 136). He cannot, he says, ever
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lose himself in his work, since he always has to keep partially focussed on the task
of staying upright.
For our purposes, Waterman’s intriguing story brings out the fact that were bodily
awareness to have enabling and defeating conditions of the kind that the senses have,
it would not be able to play its role in action, or at least, not well. It’s not that Ian
Waterman is someone for whom bodily awareness has such enabling conditions. But
in the absence of normal bodily awareness, and the normal mechanisms of bodily
control, one way in which he now keeps track of the parts of his body in acting is
visually: ‘For Ian and his body it is literally ‘out of sight, out of mind’ (Cole 1991:
128). But, vision having the enabling and disabling conditions that we have seen that
it has, this presents its own set of problems. If he loses sight of his feet when
walking, for example, in deep mud, he cannot carry on (1991: 120). At his wife’s
funeral he could not allow himself to cry, since to do so would have led to blurred
vision and possible collapse (108). He has to brace himself to sneeze, otherwise the
brief loss of visual awareness of the position of his body can lead to falling (129). In
order to control his body, Waterman has to look at it. And he thus has to exploit his
grasp of visual enabling conditions to keep in perceptual contact with parts of his
body, keeping them in his visual field and free from occluders. Having to exploit
visual enabling conditions in this way contributes to his being so inefficient and
limited an actor. There not being enabling and disabling conditions of this kind for
normal bodily awareness facilitates it performing its distinctive role in acting. Thus
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it is important to the carrying out of this role that bodily awareness does not have the
feature that I have argued is distinctive of the senses.
Amongst the (loosely speaking) actions with regards to which bodily awareness
plays its distinctive role are those perceptual activities in which we exploit enabling
and defeating conditions— looking, listening, and so on. And here there is reason to
think that bodily awareness plays some additional and unique role, though there is
much more to be said about this role than I will be able to say here. I have argued
that we exploit enabling and defeating conditions in these attentive perceptual
activities (see especially Chapter 3). Specifically, one exploits one’s grasp of the
conditions in order to maintain (or break off) perceptual contact with objects of
perception. And this involves keeping, (or not) parts of one’s body serving as sense-
organs in the right place, relative to such objects, in whatever way is appropriate to
the modality in question. And presumably, this must involve one’s having
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness of the location and movements of the
relevant body-parts. But what if there were enabling conditions of the kind there are
for vision and the other senses, for bodily awareness? That is, what if in order to be
aware of the locations or movements of one’s body-parts, including those serving as
sense-organs, one had to be sure to be in the right place? Presumably, one would
then have to have some prior awareness of that which had to be got into the right
place, in order to be aware of one’s body-parts, including one’s sense-organs. Then
it looks like, as Armstrong writes about something rather like this imagined scenario,
‘we are faced with an incipient vicious infinite regress’ (1993: 213). So if, as looks
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plausible, bodily awareness plays some special role in perceptual activity in the five
familiar senses, then its playing that role depends on it not having the kinds of
enabling and disabling conditions that these faculties have.
3. Convention and significance
We said, in the introduction to this thesis, that a desideratum of our account was that
it identify a feature that is in some way significant, or relevant, to our grouping
together as instances of a single kind of thing, the five familiar senses. The
discussion in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter itself goes some way to meeting this
requirement. This is because, or so I have argued, the account I have given of what
is distinctive about the senses has met some expectations that we might have about
the notion of sense-perception. And furthermore, it is not ‘just incidental’ that bodily
awareness lacks this feature in that, as we saw in section 2, it would not be as useful
to us as it is if it had enabling conditions of the kind that sense-perception does have.
Still, one might hope, and indeed would be right to hope that more than this can be
said about the significance of the senses having and bodily awareness lacking this
feature, to our grouping them as we do. One might still feel that not enough has been
said to dispel the thought that this feature is one that the senses just happen to have,
and nothing at all to do with our thinking of them as instances of a single kind of
thing. In this last section of this chapter, and of this thesis, I argue that the feature
does have the required significance.
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First of all, what kind of significance is it that this feature has to our grouping the
senses in the way that we do? We saw, in Chapter 1, that it is not my intention to
claim that having enabling conditions of the requisite kind is necessary and
sufficient for something to be an instance of sense-perception, or —which amounts
to the same thing— for a faculty to be a sense. It seems right to say that we might
easily have grouped faculties together in ways other than we do, and that we might
have called bodily awareness a sense. It might be objected, at this point, that if
having such enabling conditions is not a necessary and sufficient condition for being
a sense, then it is just incidental that the senses in fact have such enabling
conditions. This objection, however, would be too hastily made. This is because,
from the claim that we might have grouped faculties together in ways other than we
do, it does not follow that our actual grouping practices are entirely arbitrary, or
capricious. Before I look at the significance that the having of enabling conditions of
the relevant kind has for our grouping practices, I want to expand on the suggestion,
made in Chapter 1, that the request for conditions necessary and sufficient for some
faculty to be a sense would be, in the first place, misguided. In order to do so, it will
be helpful to return again to Matthew Nudds’ answer to the question of how the
senses are distinguished from one another.
Nudds, as we saw, points out that the most commonly proposed answers to the
question of how the senses are distinguished from one another try to map the
distinction between the senses onto some distinction ‘in nature’. A distinction is a
distinction ‘in nature’, for these purposes, if it is one that exists independently of our
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practice in making it. Nudds argues that the distinction we make between the five
familiar senses cannot be mapped onto a distinction in nature. There is no ‘natural’
distinction that corresponds to that between the five senses. We saw, in Chapter 1,
that on Nudds’ view, the distinction we make is a distinction between ‘ways of
perceiving’, understood as sets of conditions necessary for perceiving something.
There are though as many ways of perceiving as we can individuate sets of
necessary conditions for perceiving something, which will be very many indeed. Our
distinction between five of these sets is, Nudds’ argues, ‘conventional’.98
Analogously, since it is easy to imagine that our practices of grouping faculties
might have been different, the distinction between faculties that are senses, and other
faculties, is not one for which we should expect to find a corresponding distinction
‘in nature’. This being the case, the task we have been engaged in, as was indicated
in Chapter 1, is not that of uncovering or discovering a natural kind. And thus, we
should not expect to find conditions necessary and sufficient for some faculty to be a
sense, or for something to be an instance of sense-perception.
But that is not to say that our grouping together the faculties we do as senses is
entirely capricious. And in particular, it is not to say that the having of enabling
conditions of the kind discussed in Chapters 2–6 is not significant to our grouping
together the faculties we do as senses. Paul Snowdon (1998) argues that the idea of
98 On his view, making the distinction as we do is conventional not just in that we could have made it
in some other way, but also in the way that driving on the left is conventional. In this way, making the
distinction between the five familiar senses is something that it is in each of our interests to do, given
that everyone else makes the distinction in the same way. I do not want to say that the distinction we
make between senses, and faculties that are not senses is conventional in this latter way. It is
‘conventional’, if that’s even the right word here, only in that it seems right to say that we could well
have distinguished between senses and other faculties in some other way than we do.
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uncovering of ‘a priori determinable necessary truths about some ‘element’ or
‘feature’’ is only one conception of what one might be up to in providing an analysis
of some concept. On another, more restricted conception, one aims, rather ‘to
articulate the essential components involved in the possession of the concept in
question’ (1998: 307, my italics). And on Snowdon’s view, this articulation should
relate, in some way, to the way in which the concept is acquired— it should aim to
‘recreate (or make sense of) the conceptual route whereby the concept is acquired’
(ibid.). We have said nothing at all about the way in which the concept of a sense, or
of sense-perception is acquired. The important point, for our purposes, is a
distinction that Snowdon then goes on to make. When we approach our
psychological concepts in the latter way, aiming to provide an analysis of this more
‘restricted’ sort, there is a distinction that, as Snowdon puts it, at least ‘seems
evident’ (308). This is a distinction between, on the one hand, psychological
concepts that pick out phenomena to which we can attend, or which attract attention,
such as pain or itchiness; and on the other hand, psychological concepts that are not
concepts of phenomena of this sort. If we are interested in concepts of psychological
phenomena to which we can attend, presumably, such attention will play a role in
our acquiring such concepts. But if we are interested in the other sort of concept, we
will need, nevertheless to tell some story about how such concepts are acquired, of
how we can, as he puts it, ‘latch onto’ the phenomena in question. And on
Snowdon’s view, we latch onto the relevant phenomena as they perform certain
roles. In other words, such concepts are, in some respect, functional concepts. We
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would, in this way ‘latch onto’ seeing, or belief, or consciousness as phenomena
that, as a matter of fact, in us normal humans, have a certain role or function.
We saw, in Chapter 1, that Matthew Nudds gives an account of the distinction
between the senses of this sort. The account he gives aims to spell out the role or
function of, as we might put it, the concept of there being distinct senses. And as we
saw there, on his view, its role lies in being informative about what other people are
in a position to know about things on the basis of the way in which they have
perceived them. Since the distinction between the senses has for us this significance
(or, since it is for us a concept that plays this role) we are not capricious in
distinguishing between the senses in the way that we do. We individuate ways of
perceiving in a way that is constrained by the significance that the distinction
between the senses has for us. We distinguish between them in such a way that it is
informative to know which of these ways is the way in which someone perceived
something. And we make the distinction in such a way that we can recognize in
which way —that is, by what sense— someone has perceived something.
Now, it is a contingent fact about humans that we have an interest in interpreting and
explaining the behaviour of other people. If Nudds is right, if we didn’t have this
interest, then, presumably, we wouldn’t make the distinction between the senses in
the way that we do. In this way, the distinction between the senses is, on Nudds’
account, interest relative: relative to an everyday human interest in interpreting and
predicting the behaviour of others. Similarly we can say I think that our grouping
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together faculties with the feature identified in this thesis, whilst ‘conventional’ (in
the sense that we can conceive of it being otherwise) is not arbitrary. Given certain
interests or concerns that we humans have, we can see that it would serve these
interests for us to group faculties in this way. There might be, in fact, many interests
that are served by our doing this. I end by discussing some of them.
One way in which it might serve our interests to group together faculties that have
enabling conditions of the relevant kind takes us back to the discussion of sense-
organs, in section 1 above. One thing in which we humans have an interest is in
finding out about things in the world. Faculties that have enabling conditions of the
kind I have argued the senses have are those that involve sense-organs— parts of the
body that have to be in the right place in order for one to perceive things. Where a
faculty involves the use of a sense-organ, we will often have to get up and move
around the world in order to get and keep that sense-organ in an appropriate relation
to the things about which we want to find out, even where these sense-organs are not
independently movable. We can use bodily awareness to find out about things too,
of course, but in order to do so, we won’t have to move our bodies around the place,
to keep bits of it in an appropriate relation to that about which we want to find out.
So, given how important to us humans finding out about things in the world is, we
can see why we would take those faculties that have enabling conditions of the kind
I have discussed in Chapters 2–6 to be instances of a single kind of thing, of which
bodily awareness is not an instance. If we weren’t interested in finding out about
things (and we might not have been), it would not be, in turn, interesting or notable
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for us that sometimes, we have to move our bodies around the place in order to find
out about things, and sometimes, we don’t. So though we might have grouped
faculties together in ways other than we do, this provides one reason to think we are
not wholly capricious in our grouping practices.
Finally, we have seen that on Nudds’ view, the distinction between the senses is, in a
certain way relative to our concern with interpreting and predicting other people’s
behaviour. It might also serve this interest for us to group faculties with enabling
conditions of the relevant kind together. The enabling conditions considered in this
thesis are not the only sorts of necessary conditions for perception. There are also, as
Nudds points out (2003: 47), external physical conditions, such as —perhaps— the
presence of light for seeing, and there are also innumerably many necessary
conditions for perception that are, roughly, subpersonal, having to do with the
functioning of the psychological and neurological mechanisms underling perceiving.
Bodily awareness has enabling conditions, no less than do the senses. But the senses,
we have seen, have enabling conditions that have to do with getting in the right place
to perceive. This means that not only I, but also everyone else is moving about the
place getting and staying, as we have said, in the right place to perceive in the five
familiar modalities, and I can observe them doing so. My observing them doing so,
as Nudds emphasizes, is informative for me. By observing other people’s perceptual
activities, we are in a position to know what they know, and thus, how they might
behave. Bodily awareness lacking enabling conditions of the kind the senses have,
there are no analogous perceptual activities we can observe, to be analogously
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informed about how other people are perceiving their bodies. This then might be
another reason for our thinking of faculties that have the feature identified in
Chapters 2–6 as instances of a single kind of thing, of which bodily awareness, not
having this feature, is not an instance.
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